DND Report: Just after signing a ceasefire agreement in Doha and assuring the facilitators that the Afghan Taliban would disengage from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP-that is officially called as Fitna-e-Khawarij by Pakistan) and other terrorist groups attacking Pakistan, the Minister of Defense of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, held a press conference declaring that Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line as a “border.” He also stated that ties with India should not be viewed as a threat to Pakistan.
“We seek strong and respectful relations with India, a key power in the region,” he said. “At the same time, we aim to maintain friendly and positive relations with Pakistan. We are not in favor of enmity with any country.”
This press conference came in the backdrop of the Pak-Afghan Ceasefire Agreement, under which Afghanistan managed to include Article 2: Cooperation Against Terrorism, stating that “Afghanistan assures that it will not allow its territory to be used by any group operating against Pakistan.” In return, Pakistan agreed to continue cooperating with Afghan refugees in accordance with humanitarian and Islamic principles.
This clause may be used to suspend the deportation of Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan — individuals whom Pakistan has previously claimed were involved in activities against its national interests.
Meanwhile, Article 3: Trade and Human Connectivity also appear to favor the Afghan Taliban, as it reinstates the “special pass system” for civilians, traders, and patients, allowing them to travel without valid travel documents such as passports and visas. Pakistan had made valid travel documents mandatory for Afghan entry nearly two years ago, but through this article, Afghans can once again cross into Pakistan under traditional arrangements.
According to unconfirmed reports, Pakistan has already faced three terrorist attacks (two on the D.I. Khan pipeline) since the signing of the agreement. So far, it appears that the Afghan Taliban have gained valuable time through the ceasefire potentially to regroup and reorganize possibly instructing the TTP to operate under a new name. Afghanistan has long been described as a factory for producing various militant outfits under different brand names as needed, a pattern dating back to the Taliban’s first regime (1995–1997).
International affairs experts and regional analysts believe that attacking Pakistan while overtly engaging with India (despite covert ties reportedly existing since 2006, when the TTP was formed with Indian funds and tacit Afghan Taliban backing) could trigger internal divisions within the Taliban. Some relatively pragmatic factions within the movement are reportedly against direct confrontation with Pakistan and prefer maintaining covert rather than overt relations with India.
Some experts even suggest that the situation could escalate to the point of threatening the existing Taliban leadership. However, many within Taliban ranks believe that adopting a hardline stance toward Pakistan and aligning more closely with India will be financially rewarding.
It must be noted that the Taliban’s structure has historically operated on cash patronage distributed among tribes and religious factions. Nation-building, healthcare, and education have never been on their governance agenda. Even during their first tenure, they justified their lack of infrastructure development by claiming insufficient resources and in the past four and a half years, little has changed.
India, on the other hand, is reportedly offering financial incentives and infrastructure projects such as dams and road networks direct benefits to Taliban leadership while Pakistan does not provide such “hard cash.”
Regional observers argue that although a confrontational policy toward Pakistan may enrich the Taliban leadership, it would be disastrous for ordinary Afghans, who depend heavily on Pakistan for employment, trade, education, and healthcare.
Afghan Emirate-linked social media accounts are claiming that Articles 2 and 3 of the ceasefire ensure that Pakistan cannot stop Afghans from entering without visas or passports, and that around 200,000 Afghans will be able to cross the border daily without restrictions. They also claim Pakistan cannot halt cross-border trade.
Officials in Islamabad, however, emphasize that the Doha talks reflect Pakistan’s consistent policy of resolving issues through dialogue while preventing the Taliban from exploiting the agreement. They assert that Pakistan’s discussions with the Taliban, held under Qatari and Turkish mediation, are from a position of strength after Pakistan delivered decisive military responses to Taliban aggression.
Officials further maintain that Pakistan’s sole agenda is to “purge Khawarij” referring to the TTP and other terror networks operating from Afghanistan and nothing else.
“Qatar and Turkey have both stepped in as trusted friends, and we have confidence in their influence and sincerity,” said an official on condition of anonymity, as he was not authorized to speak to the media. “Moreover, the strength, clarity, and capability of Pakistan are visible to all. Whatever is necessary to safeguard the lives and honor of Pakistanis is being done — and will continue to be done.”
He added that Pakistani media have shown maturity compared to Afghan outlets, which he claimed are largely influenced by India. He urged Pakistani media to continue acting prudently and responsibly to counter Indian attempts to inflame tensions, stating that “acting in a sober and responsible manner serves the country’s interests.”
