Curtain Raiser: Pakistan–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission is ready to address bilateral trade bottlenecks

DND Thought CenterCurtain Raiser: Pakistan–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission is ready to address bilateral trade bottlenecks

DND Special Report: Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Shehbaz Sharif is scheduled to visit Moscow in the last week of this month. Pakistan and Russia are working together to make this visit more than merely a routine engagement and are confident that the event will reshape and revitalise bilateral relations between the two countries.

Pakistan’s foreign policy, under the vision of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is based on ‘connectivity’ with verifiable and tangible results. Islamabad has mastered the art of navigating relations between the United States and China and has perceptibly added Russia to its diplomatic equation. Global unipolarity is a reality, and the recent trilateral talks involving President Putin, President Trump and President Xi have demonstrated that even superpowers are considering collective efforts to address the challenges arising from changing global realities. Pakistan strongly believes that the 21st century is an era of connectivity that must be based on mutual prosperity. Trade and business are therefore key to this connectivity, and Pakistan and Russia lag behind in this sphere. Consequently, both countries are working extensively to mitigate the obstacles hampering bilateral trade and are prioritising their resolution before President Putin meets Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Moscow this month.

With bilateral commerce languishing near multi-year lows, Pakistan is preparing an economic and financial reset ahead of this meeting. The 11th Session of the Pakistan–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC), scheduled to convene in Moscow from November 23 to 25, will focus on this issue.

According to available information, Pakistani negotiators are heading to the Russian capital with a clear mandate: to dismantle the banking, regulatory and logistical bottlenecks that have crippled bilateral trade and double Pakistan’s exports to Russia from US$55.6 million to at least US$112 million within the next 18 to 24 months.

Official figures compiled through the Pakistan Single Window (PSW) reveal that Pakistan’s exports to Russia have plummeted by roughly 68 percent over the past five years, tumbling from an all-time high of US$171.94 million in FY2020-21 to a dismal US$55.55 million in FY2025-26. Early data from the first four months of the current fiscal year (July–October FY2026-27) paints an even grimmer picture, with exports registering just US$15.72 million, putting annual shipments on track to fall below US$50 million unless immediate corrective measures are enacted. Overall bilateral trade has similarly contracted, shrinking from US$963.07 million in FY2023-24 to US$206.59 million in FY2025-26, largely due to a sharp drop in Pakistani imports of Russian pulses.

Trade economists and commerce officials stress that the steep erosion of Pakistan’s market share in Russia is not the result of waning Russian consumer demand. Since the onset of Western sanctions in 2022, Moscow has been forced to decouple from European supply chains across a vast spectrum of consumer and industrial goods, including apparel, footwear, leather products, pharmaceuticals, surgical instruments and processed foods. While regional competitors such as China, Turkey, India, Uzbekistan and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) states have moved aggressively to fill the vacuum, Pakistan has remained largely sidelined.

According to PITAD’s diagnostic assessment prepared for the Ministry of Commerce, the binding constraints lie squarely on the operational side of transactions. Chief among these is a near-total paralysis of formal banking channels. Fearing exposure to secondary Western sanctions, Pakistani commercial banks have avoided maintaining correspondent relationships with Russian counterparts. With Letters of Credit (LCs) virtually unavailable, exporters and importers on both sides have been forced to demand risky advance cash payments, stifling routine commercial transactions.

Sources in the Ministry of Finance are of the view that, to break the trade deadlock at next week’s Moscow summit, Islamabad’s delegation will place financial engineering and countertrade at the top of the agenda. Rather than relying on conventional hard-currency transfers, Pakistan intends to leverage its existing import bill as a financial engine for its exporters.

Dried pulses, such as chickpeas, lentils and peas, currently account for roughly 95 percent of Pakistan’s imports from Russia, valued at between US$140 million and US$220 million annually. Under the government’s amended barter framework, SRO 1989(I)/2025, which scrapped the restrictive “import-first” requirement and authorised multi-party consortia, Islamabad is proposing “linked-trade” structures. Under this model, major pulse importers in Karachi and Lahore will be paired with consortia of Pakistani rice, kinnow, potato, textile and leather exporters. Pakistani importers will settle their dues by paying domestic exporters in Pakistani rupees (PKR), while Russian pulse suppliers will offset the value against incoming Pakistani goods.

Alongside private-sector barter, Pakistan plans to push for mandatory export-offset clauses in state-level procurements of Russian urea, DAP fertiliser, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and crude oil. Negotiators are also set to formally respond to Russia’s January 2026 Note Verbale regarding barter pilots by sharing verified lists of Pakistani importers of fertilisers, steel, plastics and rubber, while asking Moscow to nominate confirmed buyers for Pakistani chrome ore, cotton and seafood.

On the banking front, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is expected to finalise a bilateral settlement framework with the Central Bank of Russia. The proposed architecture involves designating one or two Pakistani banks with zero US-dollar clearing exposure, or creating ring-fenced banking windows, to operate PKR and Russian rouble (RUB) correspondent accounts with non-sanctioned Russian lenders. Supported by a domestic clearing and escrow account, local-currency and Chinese yuan (CNY) invoicing, buyer-risk insurance from EXIM Bank of Pakistan and a joint compliance vetting desk, the mechanism is designed to insulate Pakistani businesses from sanctions risks while guaranteeing timely payments.

Beyond finance, the Pakistani side may press Moscow for immediate regulatory breakthroughs in agriculture and digital commerce ahead of the winter export season.

In the agro-food sector, Pakistan’s export basket remains perilously narrow, with five textiles, leather and surgical product lines accounting for 80 percent of total shipments. Despite Russia being one of the world’s largest consumers of mandarins, Pakistani citrus exports fetched a mere US$0.75 million in FY2025-26. With the December–April kinnow season imminent, Islamabad will ask Moscow to rapidly accredit additional Pakistani orchards and packhouses, accept joint pre-shipment inspections by Pakistan’s Department of Plant Protection (DPP), and lift the long-standing restriction on Pakistani rice through remote video inspections. Pakistan will also seek broader approval for potato exporters, after only three firms were cleared when the market reopened in April 2026, and offer reciprocal market access for Russian meat and dairy products in exchange for the registration of Pakistani halal meat and seafood plants.

To slash transit times from over a month by sea to roughly 20–25 days, Pakistan Railways and Russian Railways (RZD) are working to finalise a launch date and regular monthly schedule for the 7,000-kilometre pilot container train running through Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Recognising geopolitical vulnerabilities along the Iranian leg, Pakistani planners are also exploring contingency overland routes via Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, alongside greater utilisation of International Road Transport (TIR) corridors. However, this factor depends on security situation in Afghanistan.

When Pakistani and Russian officials sit down in Moscow on November 23, Islamabad’s wish list will also include signing the pending Programme for Trade & Economic Cooperation (2025–30), establishing a bonded Pakistani showroom in Moscow, creating a registration support fund for Sialkot’s surgical manufacturers and pharmaceutical exporters, expanding tariff concessions under the EAEU Unified System of Tariff Preferences, and launching a joint feasibility study for a future Pakistan–EAEU Preferential Trade Agreement.

If successfully negotiated and backed by rigorous quarterly monitoring in Islamabad, officials believe the Moscow session could mark a decisive turning point, not only halting a five-year export slide but also laying the structural groundwork to propel bilateral exports towards a stretch target of US$250 million by the end of the decade.

 

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