DND Report:
The leadership of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), instead of accepting the collapse of law and order in the province and trying to address governance issues to fight terrorism, has started arguing that since the law-and-order situation is also bad in Balochistan, there is no reason for the government to consider extraordinary measures to deal with emerging threats along the Pak-Afghan border. This claim may appear reasonable on the surface, but it is contrary to basic facts that must be kept in mind when comparing the situations in KP and Balochistan.
In Balochistan, provincial ministers and their families are not providing protection money to TTP or BLA terrorists, while in KP, several provincial ministers have in the past acknowledged that they provided protection money to TTP terrorists in order to live peacefully in the province.
When conducting a comparative study of the two provinces, the basic factors involved in managing terrorism—such as their geographical and demographic characteristics, the varying structures of terrorist groups, and, above all, the respective provincial governments’ political priorities, operational cooperation and resolve in combating terrorism must be taken into account.
While both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are severely affected by terrorism, their challenges, geography, demographics, terrorist organizations, the nature of violence and government responses differ significantly. Consequently, dismissing or rationalizing the current situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by using the situation in Balochistan as a benchmark amounts to distorting ground realities.
The fundamental question is not which province is facing more difficult circumstances. The fundamental question is: to what extent is each provincial government demonstrating clear resolve, practical seriousness and an effective strategy regarding the protection of its people, the enforcement of state authority and the eradication of terrorism?
In terms of land area, Balochistan is approximately four times larger than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whereas Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s population is roughly three times that of Balochistan. Consequently, the issues of terrorism, the reach of state authority and counterterrorism strategies in the two provinces cannot be assessed using the same yardstick.
The population density in Balochistan is approximately 43 people per square kilometer, compared to about 401 people per square kilometer in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Due to its denser population and the presence of major urban centers, the police and Counter-Terrorism Department in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa operate on the direct front lines of the security challenge. Conversely, Balochistan’s vast, rugged and sparsely populated geography presents a completely different type of counterterrorism challenge.
Security reports reveal distinct differences in the nature and intensity of violence across the two provinces. According to the available data, 732 violent incidents were recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 366 in Balochistan during the first eleven months of 2025, while the total death toll stood at 2,165 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 896 in Balochistan. Therefore, equating the two provinces simply by counting the number of incidents is misleading. The real questions concern the nature of the threat, the provincial government’s response and the extent to which the provincial government is playing an active role in this conflict.
The terrorist landscape also differs between the two provinces. In Balochistan, terrorist organizations, particularly the BLA, are linked to other terrorist groups, whereas the TTP and its affiliated groups pose the primary threat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. According to some reports on 2025, the TTP remained the principal driver of violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while in Balochistan, Indian-sponsored terrorism focused on targeted violence, infrastructure and government development projects.
While the TTP’s core activities are centered in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former tribal districts, the operations of its networks and affiliated groups create security challenges well beyond provincial boundaries. Reports from 2026 also point to the TTP’s continued activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and evolving tactics, including an increase in drone attacks.
The real difference lies not merely in the strength of the terrorists but also in the response of the provincial governments.
Success against terrorism is not achieved solely through the operations of federal agencies or security forces. The cooperation of the police, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD), the administration, political leadership and the provincial government is of fundamental importance. Therefore, when comparing the two provinces, one cannot overlook the respective provincial governments’ practical cooperation, administrative performance, support for law enforcement agencies and clear political resolve to combat terrorism.
Balochistan’s provincial government, in coordination with the Pakistan Army and other security agencies, has maintained a unified state response against terrorism, while political divisions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have emerged as a major challenge to counterterrorism efforts, according to political and security circles.
Since October 2025, the Balochistan provincial government, in collaboration with the Pakistan Army and security agencies, has convened four Apex Committee meetings aimed at developing a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and ensuring state-level support for security forces.
The contrasting approaches have become a subject of growing political debate, particularly as funerals of police personnel and other victims of terrorism continue to take place across KP.
Critics of the PTI provincial leadership allege that its political priorities have focused more on rallies, processions and confrontation with the federal government than on strengthening the province’s counterterrorism response.
The issue has also revived controversy over the PTI-era policy toward the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). KP has continued to bear the consequences of earlier decisions to facilitate the return and resettlement of militants, while PTI leaders have subsequently opposed or criticised state measures against terrorism. Describing terrorists as “misguided brothers” have contributed to providing political space to narratives associated with militant groups. PTI leaders, however, have their own stated political positions on militancy, governance and state policy. Despite more than a decade of PTI-led provincial governments and substantial federal transfers under the NFC framework, the provincial police remained inadequately equipped in several areas, including night-vision equipment, thermal scopes and armoured vehicles. Provincial resources that could have been directed towards strengthening police capabilities were instead consumed by administrative and political priorities, including official entourages and political activities in KP.
Border management and illegal immigration have also become major points of difference between the two provinces. While the repatriation and crackdown against undocumented foreigners have been pursued in Balochistan, PTI leaders in KP of turning the issue of illegal Afghan nationals into a political controversy and thereby weakening public support for border-control measures. Political interests have also discouraged effective action against smuggling networks involved in the movement of petrol, dollars and food commodities. The political and security situation in Balochistan, meanwhile, is being contrasted with that of KP on the basis of public support for state institutions and the security forces.
According to the assessment, Balochistan has maintained a relatively clear distinction between the state and terrorists groups, enabling the provincial government, Pakistan Army and security agencies to operate with a common counterterrorism strategy. In KP, PTI leaders of using political narratives against the state and the Pakistan Army and of creating confusion among sections of Pashtun youth over counterterrorism policies therefore therefore political polarisation makes it more difficult to hold provincial authorities accountable for governance failures, depleted resources, weaknesses in policing and policies toward militants.
While Balochistan’s provincial government has sought to demonstrate institutional unity with the security establishment in confronting militant groups, critics contend that political confrontation and disagreements in KP have weakened the province’s collective response to terrorism.
The central question emerging from the comparison is whether provincial political leadership can place counterterrorism, police preparedness, border security and public safety above partisan political interests at a time when both Balochistan and KP continue to face serious security challenges.
The bottom line is that the Balochistan government, in collaboration with state institutions, is confronting terrorists with full vigor and determination while making optimal use of its resources. In contrast, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government refuses to even acknowledge the war against terrorism. It possesses neither the resolve to fight this battle nor the willingness to allow security forces to wage it. Instead of resolving the issue of terrorism, it continues to create further complications and confusion—a situation that makes it impossible to leave the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at their mercy any longer.
