By Akhtar Hussain Sandhu
Muslim extremism has declared many Muslim factions as non-Muslim or kafir (takfiriyat).
History testifies that takfiriyat was the reason extremist Muslims opposed Pakistan when millions of Muslims of the Subcontinent were working for an independent state under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The Thinker of the East, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, wrote extensively in his poetry and lectures against the “mullahs” who issued fatwas against the concept of Pakistan. Alas, these same mullahs soon hijacked the corridors of power once Pakistan came into being. They still control power domains in Pakistan even after 78 years of independence. This takfiriyat has long placed Pakistan in an identical crisis because if we call everybody we do not like kafir, then what remains of the reality and justification of the Two-Nation Theory and Muslim nationalism in India, and even the narrative of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
Democracy, not being an indigenous system, cannot function successfully in India and Pakistan unless it is made compatible with social dynamics and cultural heritage. However, it leaves no alternative for Pakistan, India, and other Asian countries; therefore, they have to run state affairs under either a parliamentary or presidential system. Pakistani society cannot deal with the system in the same way Western societies do, but at least Pakistani leadership can eliminate the vices and ills detrimental to the polity and the future of the people living in Pakistan. The odds are not hidden from Pakistani politicians, but they lack the capacity to cope with them. For example, meritocracy and the elimination of corruption, smuggling, and religious extremism can bring positive change to society and elevate Pakistan’s stature internationally. Good governance requires political will, understood as adherence to the rule of law, free from fear, rapacity, or expediency.
Religious extremism propounded by many Muslim clerics in Pakistan has caused a major setback to the national narrative related to the struggle for Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam was Shia and Allama Iqbal belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam, but they never discussed this publicly because they knew that such emphasis could vivisect Muslim unity in the Subcontinent. It was a blessing that the people of Pakistan inherited an inclusive and brotherly legacy, as all sects and religions played a pivotal role in the making of Pakistan. Unfortunately, religious extremism by a few fanatics has caused a severe setback to intra-faith and interfaith harmony in Pakistan.
Many Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and leftists may be cited as having had a soft corner for the Muslim League. Quaid-i-Azam, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the Raja of Mahmudabad, the ulama, and pirs of different sects played their due roles in the freedom struggle for Pakistan, and history has preserved this fact. However, after the emergence of Pakistan, Pakistani historiography was predominantly influenced by religious extremism, which relegated the role of non-Muslims and numerous individuals and groups within the Muslim community.
Sectarian hatred exists throughout society, but our textbooks avoid mentioning the sectarian affiliations of the founding fathers, which has left a negative impression on both older and younger generations. It would be a significant step toward shaping posterity if textbooks educated young minds that Pakistan is the product of a joint struggle by Shias, Sunnis, Deobandis, Barelvis, Christians, Qadianis, Sikhs, Hindus, leftists, and other factions. This message could foster unity by convincing future generations to create space for all Muslim sects and other religious communities living in Pakistan.
Leftist intellectual thought could have counterbalanced religious extremism, but it was curbed mercilessly, as sought during the Cold War era. It is an unfortunate reality that the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq promoted religious extremism. Instead of politicians, religious political parties were easy prey; therefore, military regimes promoted an extremist form of religiosity under the so-called “Divine Right Theory.” As a result, the curriculum came under the influence of religious extremism in Pakistan, and no rival force remained to demand a balanced approach. Textbooks are still replete with material based on hatred and religious extremism, leaving no space for religious minorities and minority Muslim sects.
The leaked data allegedly attributed to Gen. Asim Munir and shared with the ambassador of a Gulf country, purportedly to prove his family’s sectarian affiliations is an immediate example of how sectarianism has been used in Pakistan. Although Z. A. Bhutto included clauses in the Constitution of Pakistan related to religious extremism, perhaps he did so to secure the favor of right-wing activists. Military regimes facilitated not only religious segments of society but also promoted their own sectarian affiliates. These non-democratic traditions prevailed in Pakistan’s political environment and tremendously empowered specific Muslim theocrats.
Political parties with a leftward tilt were compelled to present themselves as religious, fearing religious verdicts. This approach effectively influenced both the uneducated and the educated. Although this was not a new political trend. Punjab elections during the British era had already experienced such tactics. Pakistan could not afford such extremist tendencies.
Muslim extremism has declared many Muslim factions as non-Muslim or kafir. If this is so, what becomes of the Two-Nation Theory and Muslim nationalism in British India? Writers such as Shamsul Islam (Muslims Against Partition) have published works claiming that the Muslim majority was not in favor of Pakistan, basing their thesis on voting rights. However, I believe that the masses supported the Pakistan Movement by joining processions and protests and by participating in annual political sessions, even though many were not registered voters.
Pakistani textbooks of history, Pakistan Studies, and social sciences frequently argue that the whole of Gurdaspur in August 1947 was or should have been part of Pakistan because it was a Muslim-majority district with 51 percent (50.8 percent) Muslim population, but it was unjustifiably awarded to India. Indeed, Gurdaspur was initially included in Pakistani Punjab, and Mushtaq Ahmed Cheema served as Deputy Commissioner for three days until the final award was enforced. Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, in their book Region and Partition (p. 205), state that according to the Second Schedule of the Indian Independence Act, Gurdaspur was part of Pakistan.
The total population of Gurdaspur district was 1,153,511, including 589,923 Muslims, 563,588 non-Muslims, and 221,261 Sikhs. A pencil-sketched map of Punjab found in the Mountbatten Papers shows Gurdaspur as a Muslim-majority district (Ref. MB1/D259, British Library, London). According to the 1941 Census (Ref. No. 336, in Z.H. Zaidi, ed., Jinnah Papers, 20 February–2 June 1947, Vol. II), the Muslim population is recorded as 638,651.
Pakistani historians frequently cite the Gurdaspur case in international discussions on the faulty demarcation of the Indo-Pak border. I have reasons to believe that they should now avoid citing this case. What would be the percentage of the Muslim population in Gurdaspur district if the Ahmadi community (declared non-Muslim in 1970s) were excluded from the Muslim population in future debates? Would this stance not nullify the arguments advanced by Quaid-i-Azam, the ulama of different sects, and the advocates who appeared before the Punjab Boundary Commission to secure maximum territory under the “notional boundary” principle? All fought the Gurdaspur case based on the total Muslim population across all tehsils of the district in the 1941 Census. The religiously extremist approach in Pakistan has thus dented the case of Muslim nationalism in British India. It remains to be seen how Pakistani historians will respond if Indian historians raise this issue.
Another striking question is what the status of the Two-Nation Theory in British India would be if Shias, Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandis, Barelvis, Ismailis, Baha’is, Bohras, etc., were added to the non-Muslim population following the verdicts of extremist maulvis who issued fatwas of disbelief (kufr) against these sects. Indian historians could ask Pakistani scholars to first provide a definitive list of who is Muslim and who is not in Pakistan, based on the extensive fatwas issued by clerics against one another.
In conclusion, following the verdicts of extremist theocrats of the Subcontinent undermines Muslim separatism and Muslim nationalism, commonly known as the Two-Nation Theory, as propounded by the founding fathers and Muslim leadership of British India. The state of Pakistan presents a moderate interpretation of the Two-Nation Theory in textbooks and the national narrative. The state ought to impose checks on curriculum content and provincial social science textbooks so that future generations can better comprehend the philosophical foundations of the national narrative as articulated by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and ultimately by Quaid-i-Azam on 11 August 1947. It is the duty of the state to protect both the physical and ideological boundaries of Pakistan.
Note: Akhtar Hussain Sandhu is a professor of history & Columnist. Currently, he is working on his book in USA.
He can be reached at [email protected]
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The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk.
