Editorial
The leadership of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) instead of accepting the collapse of law and order in the province and try to fix the governance issue to fight back terrorism, it has started talking that since law-and-order situation is also bad in Balochistan therefore why government is thinking to take extraordinary measures to handle emerging threats from Pak-Afghan border. This claim looks reasonable at surface but is contrary to basic facts that should be in mind to compare situation in KP and Balochistan.
In Balochistan, provincial ministers and their families are not providing protection money to TTP or BLA terrorists while in KP several provincial ministers in past accepted that they provide protection money to TTP terrorists to live in the province peacefully.
While conducting comparative study of both the provinces the basic factors involved in managing terrorism such as geographical and demographic nature of both provinces, the varying structures of terrorist groups, and above all, the respective provincial governments’ political priorities, operational cooperation, and resolve in combating terrorism should be kept in mind.
While both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are severely affected by terrorism, their challenges, geography, demographics, the terrorist organizations involved, the nature of the violence, and the government responses differ significantly. Consequently, dismissing or rationalizing the current situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by using the situation in Balochistan as a benchmark amounts to distorting ground realities.
The fundamental question is not which province is facing more difficult circumstances; The fundamental question is: to what extent is each provincial government demonstrating clear resolve, practical seriousness, and an effective strategy regarding the protection of its people, the enforcement of state authority, and the eradication of terrorism?
In terms of land area, Balochistan is approximately four times larger than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whereas Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s population is roughly three times that of Balochistan. Consequently, the issues of terrorism, the reach of state authority, and counter-terrorism strategies in the two provinces cannot be assessed using the same yardstick.
The population density in Balochistan is approximately 43 people per square kilometer, compared to about 401 people per square kilometer in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Due to the dense population and presence of urban centers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, police and counter-terrorism departments operate on the direct front lines; conversely, Balochistan’s vast, rugged, and sparsely populated geography presents a completely different type of counter-terrorism challenge.
Security reports reveal distinct differences in the nature and intensity of violence across the two provinces. According to the available data, 732 violent incidents were recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 366 in Balochistan during the first eleven months of 2025; the total death toll stood at 2,165 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 896 in Balochistan. Therefore, equating the two provinces simply by counting the number of incidents is misleading. The real questions concern the nature of the threat, the provincial government’s response, and the extent to which the provincial government is playing an active role in this conflict.
In Balochistan, terrorist organizations, particularly the BLA are linked to other terrorist groups, whereas the TTP and its affiliated groups pose the primary threat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. According to the 2025 some reports report, the TTP remained the principal driver of violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while in Balochistan, Indian-sponsored terrorism focused on targeted violence, infrastructure, and government development projects.
While the TTP’s core activities are centered in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former tribal districts, the operations of its networks and affiliated groups create security challenges well beyond provincial boundaries. Reports from 2026 also point to the TTP’s continued activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and evolving tactics, including an increase in drone attacks.
The real difference lies not merely in the strength of the terrorists, but also in the response of the provincial governments:
Success against terrorism is not achieved solely through the operations of federal agencies or security forces; the cooperation of the police, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD), the administration, political leadership, and the provincial government is of fundamental importance. Therefore, when comparing the two provinces, one cannot overlook the respective provincial government’s practical cooperation, administrative performance, support for law enforcement agencies, and clear political resolve to combat terrorism.
The bottom line is that the Balochistan government, in collaboration with state institutions, is confronting terrorists with full vigor and determination while making optimal use of its resources; in contrast, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government refuses to even acknowledge the war against terrorism. It possesses neither the resolve to fight this battle nor the willingness to allow security forces to wage it. Instead of resolving the issue of terrorism, it continues to create further complications and confusion—a situation that makes it impossible to leave the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at their mercy any longer.
