By Agha Iqrar Haroon
A recent 1,200-worded analysis published in an English newspaper examines the proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan. Over 500 words of the piece consist of comments from four individuals, including Dr. Shireen Mazari, a former top leader of PTI. When she was in PTI, had expressed support all actions taken by PTI chairman Imran Khan who allegedly arranged a mutiny against Pakistan Army on May 9, 2023. Ignoring these comments, the writer’s analysis alone amounts to around 700 words, yet it provides limited clarity of the writer of the piece on the issue.
The article claims that Article 243 of 1973 Constitution, which would recast Pakistan’s military command hierarchy, represents the most ambitious restructuring effort in decades. It is described as ‘highly contentious, colliding with entrenched institutional cultures and the fragile balance between civilian and military power’. The analysis further suggests that implementing the amendment could prove far more difficult than its drafters anticipate, while presuming that there are inter-service rivalries and the delicate equilibrium between civilian oversight and military autonomy that has, in theory, shaped Pakistan’s power structure since 1973.
Viewed analytically, however, the proposed overhaul of Article 243, including the establishment of a Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), does not necessarily signal military domination. Globally, centralized, joint-service command structures have become the norm, aimed at modernizing defense institutions and enhancing national security. Rather than eroding civilian supremacy, the reform could strengthen it by streamlining reporting lines and removing bureaucratic overlaps that have historically diluted accountability.
The analysis raises concerns about abolishing the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), suggesting that this change represents a leap toward military centralization. Yet, the CJCSC role has remained largely ceremonial for over two and a half decades, making this claim less compelling. The writer also asserts that “deep-seated rivalries among the Army, Air Force, and Navy, each guarding its operational turf and doctrine,” exist, without citing examples or evidence, presenting an unsubstantiated assumption.
From an analytical perspective, several key points emerge:
Merging Command Roles Does Not Equal Military Overreach:
Comparative precedent shows that countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, India, and Australia maintain unified or quasi-unified systems to centralize coordination and improve strategic clarity. Pakistan’s current structure follows a classical British Raj model, which UK has evolved over time. The CDF framework aligns Pakistan with international norms, reinforcing institutional continuity and preventing ad-hoc, personality-driven interpretations.
Army Dominance Is Not a Novel Concern:
The Army has historically been Pakistan’s most operationally engaged branch. Assigning the joint-command role to the Army chief formalizes a practice long observed in de facto terms. Modern defense strategy requires integrated planning across air, land, sea, cyber, and nuclear domains, making cohesive coordination essential rather than optional.
Strategic Roles and Nuclear Security:
The proposal to appoint the Commander of the National Strategic Command from the Army has been labeled by critics as dangerous centralization. Yet Pakistan’s nuclear program has been land-centric, with the Army primarily responsible for its security. Civilian oversight remains preserved, as the Prime Minister retains appointment authority.
Five-Star Officers and Constitutional Protections:
Critics argue that granting constitutional protections to five-star officers creates “parallel authority.” International practice shows that five-star titles are guardianships over command posts.
Embedding the CDF in the Constitution:
Constitutional codification of the CDF does not remove Parliament’s role but formalizes a modern command hierarchy. A scattered, service-linked hierarchy is incompatible with contemporary warfare. Joint command structures are essential for operational effectiveness, ensuring accountability and integration across branches.
In sum, arguments suggesting that the 27th Amendment threatens civilian supremacy assume the worst-case scenario while overlooking its potential benefits. Pakistan’s defense architecture has long suffered from a lack of integration, strategic clarity, and transparent authority. The proposed reforms offer a structured pathway to modernization, remove symbolic inefficiencies, and establish clearer chains of command aligned with global best practices.
An unbiased review of the proposed amendment suggests that it is not proposed to defend any individual or personality, but to strengthen state institutions, continuity of leadership, and the constitutional system. The main objective of the amendment is to free important national leaders from any political vendetta, personal preferences and temporary political bargaining so that institutions remain free from political pressure and national security decisions can be taken with consistency. The relevant clause of this amendment does not authorize any political party or personality—whoever he may be—to target national security institutions in the future out of personal vendetta, stubbornness or anger, to satisfy their ego.
Providing constitutional protection does not mean freeing institutions from accountability but rather providing them with a clear jurisdiction, tenure and responsibilities through law, so that no ruler can tamper with the constitutional process at will or in revenge.
This amendment is not the first time that constitutional protection has been given to institutions — the heads of the judiciary, the Election Commission, the State Bank, the NAB and other institutions were similarly given constitutional security so that their tenure and decisions are free from political pressure.
To my understanding, the proposed amendment will strengthen the national security and command chain system so that sudden changes in leadership or political interference cannot occur during internal and external threats — a necessity that was inevitable in the changing security situation of the world and the region.
The fact is that the state is built on the continuity of institutions, not on individuals. This amendment is not for the individual but for the permanent structure of the state, constitution and national security.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk.
