By Agha Iqrar Haroon
Although it appears that Pakistan’s one-sided affection toward Afghanistan may continue, it is imperative to reemphasize that it would be wiser for Pakistan to reassess and conclude this phase of its relationship sooner rather than later.
In recent weeks, Pakistani media has portrayed the Afghan Taliban as working against Pakistan, suggesting that they have become operatives of India. This framing implicitly assumes that previous governments in Kabul were not inherently hostile toward Pakistan. However, such a narrative contradicts both the historical and political realities of the Pak–Afghan relationship.
The current tensions along the Pak–Afghan border must be understood within a historical continuum of Afghan antagonism toward Pakistan, ideological manipulation, and external influence.
For policymakers, the lesson is not merely about tactical response but about recognizing the structural hostility embedded in Afghan state behavior. Sustainable regional stability will depend on Pakistan’s ability to align its foreign policy with historical lessons rather than emotional or idealistic expectations of reciprocity from Kabul.
Historically, Kabul has consistently adopted an adversarial posture toward Pakistan. Afghanistan was the only country that refused to recognize Pakistan’s independence in 1947 and was also the first to launch a military operation against Pakistan during the Bajaur Campaign (1960–62). Additionally, Afghanistan sponsored and financed ethnic nationalist movements in the former North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and in Balochistan. It also provided sanctuary to Baloch and Pashtun militants who conducted attacks against Pakistani forces as early as the 1960s.
The ideas of Pakhtunistan and Greater Balochistan were conceptualized in New Delhi and subsequently propagated through Kabul. This historical context is well-documented. Whether or not the Pakistani state chooses to draw lessons from these realities, students of history, political science, and media should carefully examine the latest Pak–Afghan border clashes, which highlight several critical points:
Operational Dynamics:
Pakistan inflicted substantial losses on Afghan and foreign terrorist elements affiliated with TTP (Officially called by Pakistan as Fitna al-Khawarij), Daesh (ISKP/ISIS) across multiple sectors from which infiltration into Pakistan was being attempted. These developments should be analyzed within the context of Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s recent anti-Pakistan statements in New Delhi, which indicate possible coordination or synchronization with hostile regional rhetoric.
Historical Hostility:
Afghanistan’s antagonism toward Pakistan dates back to its refusal to recognize Pakistan in 1947 and has been a consistent feature of Kabul’s foreign policy.
Ideological Irredentism:
Afghan aggression stems from deep-rooted irredentist and ideological motivations reinforced by anti-Pakistan narratives cultivated over decades.
Myth of Unbroken Independence:
Afghan assertions of “never being ruled by foreigners” are historically inaccurate. The region was successively dominated by Persian, Mughal, and British powers. The modern state of Afghanistan was largely a British imperial construct, designed to serve strategic objectives. Even the Durrani Empire’s brief ascendancy was indirectly supported by British interests.
Invasions:
Historical Afghan incursions into Punjab were primarily predatory raids, often facilitated by British officers. Conversely, the resistance mounted by Charat Singh and later by Maharaja Ranjit Singh represented the indigenous response of the people of present-day Pakistan. The decisive defeats inflicted upon Afghan forces by Ranjit Singh effectively terminated centuries of Afghan dominance over Punjab.
Resistance Myth:
The commonly propagated myths of Afghan resistance against British and Soviet forces are historically overstated. Afghan factions frequently collaborated with the British and relied heavily on foreign assistance, including Pakistani support during the Soviet–Afghan War.
The Taliban Phenomenon:
The emergence of the Taliban in the 1990s resulted from Islamabad’s misguided strategic policies, and their post-2000 survival was sustained primarily through Pakistan’s logistical and diplomatic support. Without such backing, Afghanistan has historically failed to achieve either military or political stability.
Contemporary Implications:
The swift and effective response of the Pakistan Army during the night of October 10–11, 2025, serves as a clear strategic message to Kabul. Continued cross-border aggression and terrorism—often facilitated through Indian funding and Afghan complicity—will ultimately prove self-destructive for Afghanistan. The pattern of Afghan hostility toward Pakistan reflects a cyclical historical tendency toward overreach, inevitably culminating in strategic failure.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk.
