DND Report
There are unconfirmed reports that India may recognize the interim government of the Afghan Taliban, with diplomatic engagements between India and Afghan representatives reportedly underway in a third country.
Sources claim that significant diplomatic interactions between Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar are taking place, focusing on intelligence sharing, military training, exchange of technical experts, and dam construction.
According to available information, a key role in the emerging Indo-Afghan partnership is being played by the Taliban-appointed Acting Consul General in Mumbai, Dr. Ikramuddin Kamil. He holds a PhD from South Asian University in New Delhi and had been living in India for many years after completing his earlier education in Pakistan. Dr. Kamil earned his BA and LLB from the International Islamic University in Islamabad, then completed his LLM, MPhil, and PhD at South Asian University under the SAARC Silver Jubilee Scholarship arranged by India. His doctoral research examined the “Standard of Review under International Investment Law,” while his MPhil focused on applying international law to transboundary water resources in the Amu Darya Basin.
“Pak–Afghan relations have been fragile since the early 1980s because they were designed under a historical misperception and constructed around Western demands. Pakistan played the role of supplier for what the global North required, particularly during the jihad era. But before the 1980s, Afghanistan was never a friendly neighbor to Pakistan, and it still isn’t today”
After finishing his PhD, Dr. Kamil worked as a research associate at the Tarzi Research Foundation in Kabul, which was funded by the Indian government. He also received training at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, where he worked closely with Indian intelligence officials on various projects. During his stay in India, he traveled frequently to Gulf countries as part of Indian delegations. He is fluent in Pashto, English, Hindi, Persian, and Arabic. Indian diplomatic circles describe Dr. Kamil as committed to strengthening Afghanistan–India relations, noting his deep-rooted networking in Pakistan as well.
India’s recent diplomatic interactions with the Taliban, facilitated by the Biden administration in January 2025 through a Gulf country just before the end of Biden’s tenure, are viewed as significant. These moves signal India’s strategic effort to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, these developments highlight the need to closely observe future exchanges between India and the Taliban, as they could have major implications for regional security and diplomacy.
“From the 1950s through the early 2000s, Afghan administrations—through KHAD and later the NDS—supported ethnic nationalism and terrorist groups to destabilize Pakistan”
Diplomatic circles note that India currently enjoys better relations with Afghanistan than during the tenures of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, both of whom exercised caution with India to avoid provoking Pakistan. Under the Taliban, however, relations have flourished, as the group has assured India of its commitment to protecting Indian interests in the region, particularly in Afghanistan. India previously invested over $3 billion in development projects such as the Salma Dam, the Zaranj-Delaram Highway, and the Afghan Parliament building. Now, India has pledged an additional $3 billion under Taliban rule.
India’s strategic approach has already counterbalanced Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban have openly hosted, funded, and supported Pakistan’s adversaries, including the TTP, BLA, and the Majeed Brigade. Indian media openly discuss collaboration between RAW and Afghan intelligence, further fueling Pakistan’s concerns over encirclement and cross-border attacks. Indian regional experts on television frequently emphasize that Pakistan faces a hostile environment on both its eastern and western borders, with projects such as CPEC continuously threatened by “Pashtun and Baloch resistance.” It is also widely acknowledged by global actors that India is funding the Afghan interim government, which in turn transfers funds to groups such as the BLA and TTP. Yet Pakistan’s options remain constrained, as friendly countries urge a “policy of restraint” in its dealings with Afghanistan.
“With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban 2.0 is no different from its 1995–2000 version. Even then, despite Pakistan’s full support in bringing them to power, the Taliban ignored Pakistan’s demands and maintained covert ties with Indian intelligence”
Meanwhile, the Taliban present the Indo-Afghan relationship as one centered on “education, capacity-building, and infrastructure,” aligned with their vision of a stable and independent Afghanistan.
In several official statements, Afghanistan’s Foreign Ministry has referred to India as a key regional country with historical ties to Afghanistan, expressing hope for further strengthened relations while reiterating its commitment to a balanced foreign policy and constructive engagement with all sides.
It is also notable that Afghan businessmen, students, and medical patients already benefit from a fast-track visa regime for travel to India. Additionally, thousands of Afghan nationals imprisoned in India have been released on “humanitarian grounds.”
Diplomatic circles claim Afghan–Indian relations accelerated after Pakistan’s military victory in the May 2025 conflict, which Pakistan refers to as “Marka-e-Haq.” India’s diplomatic engagement has since expanded, including meetings with Taliban officials such as Acting Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob and Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. These developments reflect a stronger Indian role in Afghanistan’s political landscape.
“The open interactions between Indian diplomats and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, which gained attention for selective media coverage, underline a growing rapport that could eventually lead to New Delhi officially recognizing the Afghan government,” commented at least two prominent Indian regional experts during televised discussions.
When asked to comment, a former senior intelligence officer with decades of experience in Afghan affairs warned that Pakistan must not forget historical precedents. From the 1950s through the early 2000s, Afghan administrations—through KHAD and later the NDS—supported ethnic nationalism and terrorist groups to destabilize Pakistan. The Taliban’s current policies, he argued, represent a continuation of this trend, with India’s involvement reinforcing longstanding patterns.
A senior journalist from Islamabad Aijaz Ahmed who had been covering security and diplomatic corps, commenting on the present phase of Pak–Afghan relations, said:
“With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban 2.0 is no different from its 1995–2000 version. Even then, despite Pakistan’s full support in bringing them to power, the Taliban ignored Pakistan’s demands and maintained covert ties with Indian intelligence. Today, those ties are overt, and the Taliban openly demonstrate their close relations with India, refusing to sacrifice them for Pakistan. Their blunt support for groups like the TTP, including funding and operational backing, makes this era more dangerous than before. Pakistan’s options are limited against this aggressive Afghan policy. The end of America’s direct presence has left a fractured landscape, and India is exploiting it fully. History reminds us of the continuity—whether KHAD, NDS, or today’s GDI—Afghan intelligence has always shifted allegiances, often at Pakistan’s expense. Will this chapter end any differently?”, added Aijaz Ahmed.
Foreign affairs expert and author Dr. Shazia Anwer Cheema also weighed in, stating:
“Pak–Afghan relations have been fragile since the early 1980s because they were designed under a historical misperception and constructed around Western demands. Pakistan played the role of supplier for what the global North required, particularly during the jihad era. But before the 1980s, Afghanistan was never a friendly neighbor to Pakistan, and it still isn’t today. Pakistan’s security architects must revisit and redefine the kind of relations the country should maintain with a neighbor that has always posed concerns for all its bordering states. In today’s shifting geopolitical mosaic, diplomatic successes and failures depend on understanding these recurring narratives and the lessons they offer.”
