DND Thought Centre Report
In Pakistan, structural and institutional reforms, particularly judicial and constitutional reforms are extremely difficult to introduce and then implement. Several factors contribute to this inability to align with the emerging demands of the 21st century.
One key reason is the tight grip of the civil bureaucracy over the administrative system, which is reluctant to relinquish authority and share powers vested in it under a legacy shaped by the British Raj’s Babu Sahib culture. Another barrier is political compromise. The 1973 Constitution is rigid in nature and requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority for amendments. Achieving such a majority necessitates significant political trade-offs, as seen in the passage of the 26th Amendment, when compromises were made because JUI did not support the establishment of constitutional courts.
A constitution is considered rigid if it cannot be amended through ordinary legislative procedures and instead requires a special, more complex mechanism. Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution is rigid because amendments require:
A two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament, and Provincial approval for certain amendments.
This process is stricter than ordinary lawmaking which requires only a simple majority thus reinforcing constitutional rigidity. Over the past two decades, multiple institutional reforms aimed at democratizing governance, devolving authority, and strengthening provincial autonomy have unintentionally made the state machinery fragmented, slow, and inconsistent. The proposed 27th Amendment seeks to address these structural issues by restoring coherence across governance, justice, finance, and national security. It focuses on essential sectors that correspond to long-standing challenges eroding efficiency and public trust.
Creating Constitutional Courts: Refocusing the Judiciary
Pakistan’s judiciary currently handles everything—from routine property disputes to constitutional crises—within the same institutional framework. This unified jurisdiction has caused case backlogs and blurred judicial focus. More than 2.2 million cases are pending nationwide. The Supreme Court, instead of exclusively interpreting the Constitution, spends significant time hearing appeals on civil and criminal matters. High Courts are similarly overburdened with petitions under Articles 199 and 184(3), many of which deal with administrative grievances rather than constitutional questions.
The 27th Amendment proposes establishing dedicated Constitutional Courts—similar to those in Germany, South Africa, and Italy—to handle constitutional and human-rights-related matters exclusively.
The 2006 Charter of Democracy, signed on 14 May 2006, also promised the establishment of a Constitutional Court. Yet, almost 18 years later, this commitment remains unfulfilled.
More than 65 countries—including P-5 members such as the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia—have constitutional courts. Early foundations appeared in the 1776 Constitution of Pennsylvania and the 1777 Constitution of Vermont, which established “Councils of Censors” responsible for reviewing laws inconsistent with the constitution.
In 1919, Austria established the first dedicated constitutional court. Czechoslovakia followed in 1920. These developments inspired other European countries—including Liechtenstein (1925), Greece (1927), Spain (1931), and Germany (1949)—to do the same. Today, dozens of countries, from Albania to Zimbabwe, have constitutional courts that exclusively hear constitutional matters.
Unlike Pakistan and India, where Supreme Courts hear both constitutional and general appeals—including challenges to constitutional amendments—these countries maintain strict separation of jurisdictions.
In Pakistan, the Supreme Court has spent considerable time on constitutional petitions over the past 18 months, while more than 60,000 ordinary civil and criminal cases remain pending. Some litigants wait decades. In a recent case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a man spent 25 years in a death cell while his appeal and review petition awaited adjudication.
Under the proposed reforms, the Constitutional Court would exclusively hear constitutional matters, while the Supreme Court would focus on ordinary appeals—aiming to dispose of all pending appeals within two years and resolve new appeals within a year.
This structural reform would strengthen the separation between ordinary and constitutional jurisdictions, allow the Supreme Court to provide uniform legal interpretation, and ensure faster and more credible protection of fundamental rights.
Restoring Executive Magistracy
Pakistan’s justice system is paralyzed by inefficiency and case backlog. Minor disputes—traffic violations, petty offences, local conflicts—overburden courts that should focus on major cases.
Before 2001, Executive Magistrates working under district administrations held authority under Sections 107–145 of the Criminal Procedure Code to dispose of minor matters summarily. Their abolition under the Devolution Plan removed a critical mechanism of local order and preventive justice. The 27th Amendment proposes restoring Executive Magistrates to:
- Resolve minor disputes promptly
- Prevent escalation of local conflicts
- Free regular courts to handle serious cases
- Reforming the Appointment of the Election Commission
Election Commission of Pakistan
Elections are the lifeblood of democracy, yet the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has repeatedly faced delays and deadlocks in appointing its members and chairperson. The current process requires agreement between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, often resulting in prolonged stalemate. This leaves the ECP incomplete and election timelines uncertain.
The goal is to depoliticize appointments by creating procedures ensuring consensus-based, merit-driven selection, rather than political bargaining. A strong, neutral ECP is vital for credible democracy and peaceful power transitions.
Re-centering Education Policy
Education shapes national identity and competitiveness. However, following the 18th Amendment, devolving education—especially higher education—to provinces fractured the system. Each province developed its own curriculum, examination standards, and teacher qualifications, producing unequal outcomes and divergent national narratives.
Without a unified national curriculum, social cohesion has weakened. A student in Sindh learns a different version of Pakistan than a student in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The 27th Amendment seeks to re-establish a federal role in education to ensure:
- A standardized national curriculum built around shared civic values
- Uniform teacher qualifications and assessments
- Equal learning opportunities across provinces
Correcting Fiscal Imbalances in the NFC Award
The National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, which determines revenue distribution between the federation and provinces, has unintentionally created distortions. Under it, more than 57% of federal revenues now go to provinces. Although this strengthened provincial autonomy under the 18th Amendment, it limited the federal government’s fiscal capacity amid rising debt obligations and defence needs.
Consequently, the central government has limited resources to invest in infrastructure, national development, or defence.
Additionally, population-based allocation discourages provinces from controlling population growth.
The 27th Amendment aims to recalibrate these dynamics, promote fiscal responsibility, and align national and provincial resource distribution.
Federal Oversight of Population Growth
Pakistan faces a population emergency, with nearly five million people added annually straining healthcare, education, and employment.
After the 18th Amendment, population planning became a provincial subject. This change resulted in fragmented policies and inconsistent data. Institutions like the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics lack authority to enforce uniform targets.
The amendment proposes returning population welfare to federal oversight by:
- Integrating provincial data into a national dashboard
- Establishing unified benchmarks
- Incentivizing provinces to meet demographic goals
- Aligning population policies with national development and SDGs
Synergy in the Armed Forces
Modern warfare requires synchronized, multi-domain operations integrating intelligence, technology, and information. Success depends on unified purpose and rapid decision-making.
Pakistan’s recent experience shows it can deliver coordinated responses, but often on an ad-hoc, personality-driven basis rather than institutionalized mechanisms. As threats evolve to include cyber and space, fragmented command structures are no longer viable.
Institutionalizing jointness across military, diplomatic, informational, and administrative domains is essential to national security.
Conclusion
The 27th Constitutional Amendment is not intended to roll back provincial rights or centralize authority. Instead, it seeks to restore functional balance where fragmentation has weakened governance. Pakistan’s constitutional framework must evolve to meet the complexities of the 21st century. By bringing coherence where division currently prevails, the 27th Amendment offers a path toward a more capable, coordinated state that delivers justice, equity, and order.
