By Muhammad Moteeb
Trump’s rhetoric marked by threats and hardened statements puts regional security, maritime navigation, and global interests at stake. This engagement in unending propaganda, fact manipulation, extremist remarks, and non-kinetic means of instability from both sides may annihilate future chances of normalization.
Trump has a track record of willful violations of several international obligations. The JCPOA agreement, after 20 months of lengthy discussions between Iran and the P5+1 countries, once fostered economic relief for Iran. Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and initiated a protracted cycle of sanctions against Iran and firms engaged in economic exchanges with Tehran. Trump’s exploitation of the past deal allowed Iran to enrich more uranium, and now he is again attempting to engage Iran in a peace deal, raising questions about US democratic credibility.
Tehran has repeatedly declared its stance that it does not seek to acquire a nuclear arsenal. Israel’s continued layered propaganda portraying Tehran as harboring nuclear ambitions has further complicated negotiations. Both parties must refrain from threatening statements to avoid confrontation and to create space for a diplomatic solution to this hostility.
The long campaign of US threats against Iran and the media-driven perception of an imminent US–Iran war may not materialize in the near future. The current US deployment of naval assets in the Middle East does not appear to signal a pursuit of all-out war with Iran. Washington would require an active war partner close to Iran to maintain supply lines during a conflict. Arab states’ refusal to participate in such hostility has delayed escalation. Operating against Iran via Jordan or Israel would be costly for Washington due to the deployment of expensive military assets.
Tehran’s threats to target US bases in the Middle East will yield no meaningful results if an all-out war breaks out between the US and Iran. Iran’s previous missile attack on a US base in Qatar was intercepted, and such threats are unlikely to inspire regional US allies that maintain security treaties with Washington and rely on its security umbrella. There is little logic in targeting US bases unless they are used directly against Iran. While Iran threatens all-out war in response to any violation, if the US employs its full capabilities to strike Iran, it could repel missile threats rapidly. In short, Iranian retaliation against regional US bases would draw Arab states closer to Washington, as the US would move to protect them from potential attacks.
In the previous 12-day war with Israel, Iran was hit hard, with much of its senior military leadership killed in the initial hours. Tehran appeared to lack comprehensive planning, relying primarily on barrages of ballistic missiles in retaliation, the majority of which were intercepted. If Iran were to attack Israel again in response to US strikes, it would amount to an invitation for further destruction. Dragging Israel into a wider war would result in joint US-Israeli strikes, leading to mass civilian casualties and widespread infrastructure destruction. Iran should limit its retaliation strictly to its direct attacker.
Iran should also exercise caution in the use of its ballistic missiles. Excessive barrages in the early stages of a war could deplete its stockpiles. If Iran exhausts its missile reserves and its production lines collapse, the US could claim victory without deploying ground forces. Israel seeks to push the US toward a ground assault to completely annihilate nuclear sites, but such an operation would be extremely costly. Washington can achieve strategic objectives without such complications.
The current talks, initially held in Türkiye, have been transferred to Muscat, and Israel is likely to employ every non-kinetic means to sabotage negotiations. It will attempt to provoke the US into striking Iran’s remaining nuclear facilities. Iran appears not to have learned from previous negotiations, during which US strikes occurred even as talks progressed positively. A similar scenario could be repeated to deceive Tehran. While regional actors are attempting to prevent an all-out war, Iran’s threat of resorting to total war in response to any US strike lacks practical leverage. Tehran should remain cautious of US tactics aimed at misleading negotiation partners.
During the previous conflict, Iran failed to intercept a single aircraft, raising questions about its air defense capabilities despite claims of regional military superiority. Tehran has not sufficiently developed its air force, while its main rivals operate advanced aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. Iran’s allies, Russia and China, operate some of the world’s most advanced air forces but have not assisted Tehran in developing its own. A persistent question remains regarding Iran’s rivalry with states thousands of kilometers away and its inability to establish effective deterrence despite decades of preparation.
Tehran’s reliance on regional proxies may hinder Israel’s vision of a “Greater Israel,” but these groups have faced decisive setbacks one by one. Iran’s capacity for ground assault against Israel diminished following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, and Hezbollah alone may be insufficient to counter Israel’s most lethal strikes.
Recent suggestions of transferring uranium to Moscow may represent a US tactic to reduce Tehran’s nuclear program to zero and deprive it of its enriched uranium, effectively nullifying years of effort. This scenario recalls Ukraine’s decision to relinquish its nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for security assurances, which later proved inadequate. Tehran should refrain from such steps and strive instead for negotiations that yield tangible benefits rather than laying the groundwork for future conflict.
Both parties should commit to a no-war pledge supported by a self-executing mechanism for dispute resolution. Israel and Tehran should also engage in direct dialogue to resolve their core differences and foster long-term regional peace.
Note: Muhammad Moteeb is studying Liberal Arts in the University of Management and technology (Lahore).
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk
