By Agha Iqrar Haroon
Pakistan is witnessing a visible uptick in terrorist attacks, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of Balochistan. At face value, this surge has fueled a narrative that terrorism is resurging, and the state is under growing pressure.
Yet this reading relies on a narrow and misleading metric: attack frequency. When assessed through a comprehensive counter-terrorism lens, one that weighs capability, lethality, territorial control, leadership cohesion, and operational sophistication, the reality is far more decisive. Pakistan is not losing ground. It is steadily winning the war.
The current wave of violence is driven primarily by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), BLA and allied groups operating with sanctuary, facilitation, and logistical support inside Afghanistan under the Afghan Taliban. While this external backing has enabled terrorists to remain operational, it has not translated into strategic gains. Instead, it has coincided with shrinking operational space, rising militant casualties, internal fragmentation, and the steady consolidation of state dominance.
History offers a clear lesson: terrorists’ groups often increase attack frequency when they are under pressure, not when they are advancing. This pattern has repeated itself across conflicts from the LTTE’s final phase in Sri Lanka to ISIS after the collapse of its territorial “caliphate” in Iraq. Pakistan itself experienced the same phenomenon during the decline of TTP after 2014. A higher number of attacks, therefore, signals desperation for relevance rather than momentum toward control.
What matters more is effectiveness and here the terrorists are failing. Despite more incidents, the average lethality per attack has declined. High-casualty suicide bombings and complex, multi-stage assaults, once the hallmark of TTP operations have become increasingly rare. Most attacks now involve low-skill improvised explosive devices, sporadic small-arms fire, or isolated cells acting without broader coordination. This shift reflects degraded networks, weaker planning capacity, and reduced access to skilled operatives.
Equally telling is the changing balance of losses. In most engagements, militant fatalities now exceed those of security forces, and many attackers are neutralized either on-site or through follow-up intelligence-based operations. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism posture has evolved from reactive deployments to pre-emptive, intelligence-driven action. A growing number of plots are disrupted before execution, particularly in urban areas, underscoring deepened surveillance penetration and improved inter-agency coordination.
Geographically, terrorism has been pushed to the margins. Terrorist activity is largely confined to border districts and isolated pockets. There is no sustained territorial control, no parallel governance structures, and no urban footholds critical indicators of insurgent failure. Terrorists increasingly strike soft or symbolic targets rather than hardened military installations or strategic infrastructure, a classic sign of diminished confidence and capability.
Afghan sanctuary, often portrayed as a force multiplier for TTP, has instead become a strategic liability. United Nations monitoring reports confirm that TTP leadership, training camps, and logistical networks continue to operate inside Afghanistan. Yet this arrangement has generated mounting costs. Hosting TTP strains Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan, disrupts trade, invites diplomatic pressure, and raises the risk of cross-border escalation, burdens that the Afghan Taliban can ill afford given their economic fragility and diplomatic isolation.
Internal fractures within militant ranks have compounded these pressures. TTP is increasingly fragmented, with rifts between competing factions, and disputes over resources and patronage. These divisions have led to operational leaks, defections, and the assassination of mid-level commander’s clear symptoms of organizational decay. Within the Afghan Taliban, unease is growing over TTP’s presence, with reports suggesting attempts to relocate or contain terrorists rather than empower them.
A decisive shift in Pakistan’s deterrence posture has further altered the battlefield. The long-standing assumption that cross-border sanctuary guarantees safety no longer holds. Pakistan has demonstrated both the capability and willingness to target facilitators and planners beyond its borders when necessary, raising the cost of hosting TTP and injecting uncertainty into terrorists planning cycles. Leadership dispersal, restricted movement, and disrupted financing have followed. Afghanistan lacks the economic and strategic depth to sustain prolonged escalation, a reality increasingly acknowledged within its own power structures.
International dynamics have also tilted in Pakistan’s favor. Key Muslim-world states including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have conveyed a consistent message to Kabul: regional stability requires curbing terrorism, not sheltering it. Pakistan’s standing as a stakeholder in regional security, its participation in global counter-terrorism frameworks, and its economic and diplomatic credibility contrast sharply with Afghanistan’s aid dependence and diplomatic constraints. As a result, international alignment has largely validated Pakistan’s security concerns.
Domestically, Pakistan has achieved a level of political consensus on counter-terrorism rarely seen in the past. Federal and provincial authorities are synchronized, operational decisions are unified, and there is broad cross-party support for security operations. Political leaders publicly honor fallen soldiers and law enforcement personnel, depriving terrorists of one of their traditional advantages: internal political division and narrative exploitation.
Taken together, these indicators tell a consistent story. Terrorists are attacking more, but achieving less. Their lethality is falling, their losses are rising, their operational space is shrinking, and their unity is eroding. Sanctuary no longer guarantees protection, and external support increasingly imposes costs rather than advantages.
The war against terrorism in Pakistan is not being decided by the number of attacks reported in headlines. It is being decided by quality of intelligence, operations, coordination, and strategic coherence. On those terms, the balance clearly favors the state.
The remaining challenge is not capacity, but persistence. Sustained pressure, strategic patience, and continued political unity will determine how quickly the conflict reaches its end. For now, the trajectory is unmistakable: Pakistan’s security forces are not merely containing terrorism, they are systematically winning the war.
