Editorial
The relationship between Pakistan’s civilian political parties, the state’s military establishment, public groups such as academicians, intellectuals, students, writers and historians has witnessed significant friction since ages, but this divide look intensified since 2022.
Observers and security analysts have documented distinct instances in which civilian parties diverged from or hesitated to explicitly endorse the specific positions advocated by the public regarding the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the Afghan Taliban, counter-terrorism strategies, the demand for new administrative units, the announcement of much-needed governance reforms, and the revamping of the collapsed civil bureaucratic system. From the May 9 attacks on military installations to the JUI-F corruption saga, the political elite did not stand with the state’s interests but rather avoided taking a firm position to cleanse the national political landscape of unwanted elements. Whether it is the much-needed formation of new federating units or long-awaited structural reforms in civil administration, politicians, irrespective of their political affiliations, stand on the opposite side of the state’s interests. Major political parties, including the PPP and PML-N, have always found a narrow passage whenever serious action was required since 2022.
The lack of interest in taking stern action against vandals who attacked state monuments, including monuments commemorating martyrs and military establishments, became evident when political parties under the PDM government and subsequently the largely PML-N-nominated caretaker government refrained from collectively standing against PTI following the May 9 incident. As a result, many of those involved in the May 9 violence managed to reach Parliament through the 2024 general elections. This lukewarm behaviour of the political elite left several unanswered questions in the minds of the public: Why did the PPP and PML-N continue to talk about ‘dialogue’ and negotiations with PTI, which blatantly kept attacking state institutions, promoting the Afghan Taliban’s narrative on the TTP issue, and opposing security operations against terrorists in KP? Do the PPP and PML-N still think that JUI-F, which also supports the Afghan Taliban instead of Pakistan, would be their (PPP-PML-N) political partner in the future?
Following the attacks on military installations and monuments on May 9, 2023, the military establishment adopted a zero-tolerance policy, classifying the events as an “anti-state conspiracy” and advocating trials of civilian rioters under the Army Act. While the ruling Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) coalition, led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and supported by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), publicly condemned the violence, it did not support the demand for trying the culprits in military courts. Despite calls from state factions and certain ministers to formally ban PTI, senior leadership from both the PPP and PML-N consistently floated the idea of “political dialogue”.
Political analysts noted that PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari formed high-level committees specifically tasked with persuading government allies to pursue political engagement rather than the complete political elimination of PTI. Meanwhile, the PML-N government, after announcing a ban on PTI in July 2023, reversed the decision and expressed institutional reservations regarding the widespread use of military courts to try civilians. This cautious legal and political stance ultimately prevented a complete legislative consensus on entirely blacklisting PTI from the 2024 electoral framework, allowing independent candidates backed by PTI to participate and win a substantial share of parliamentary seats.
The situation was not much different when security forces demanded a clear political policy on counterterrorism, but political parties such as JUI-F continued to stand with the Afghan Taliban’s narrative.
When the military establishment announced Operation Azm-e-Istehkam to counter rising militancy, it faced immediate scepticism from regional leaders, including the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) and opposition elements in KP. Major ruling parties (PML-N and PPP) were repeatedly compelled to assure the public that the operation would not cause mass civilian displacement, reflecting the civilian elite’s deep anxiety over fully backing unrestricted kinetic state operations without broad-based public approval.
The partner in the PDM government, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), led by Fazlur Rehman, has traditionally maintained a complex relationship with the state’s security doctrines, especially regarding Afghanistan. JUI-F shares historical, ideological, and religious ties (Deobandi lineage) with the Afghan Taliban leadership. While the state establishment has adopted an increasingly adversarial stance towards Kabul due to cross-border safe havens for the TTP, JUI-F leadership has frequently engaged in independent diplomacy. For instance, Fazlur Rehman undertook high-profile visits to Kabul to meet directly with senior Taliban officials, advocating religious solidarity and dialogue over the military’s preferred strategy of coercive pressure and cross-border kinetic strikes.
Despite JUI-F’s open divergence from the state’s aggressive posture towards Kabul, both the PML-N and PPP have historically maintained political alliances with the party. This partnership is driven by electoral arithmetic in the National Assembly and the Balochistan Provincial Assembly, demonstrating that the political elite frequently prioritises coalition-building and local political survival over enforcing a rigid, state-mandated alignment on foreign policy and counter-terrorism.
Regarding the formation of new federating units, both the PML-N and PPP are avoiding the much-needed public demand. The PML-N has repeatedly promised governance and structural reforms in Pakistan, and its leadership has acknowledged that governance has collapsed and the civil bureaucracy has become redundant. However, no formula or reform package has been announced in the last four years (2022 to date).
Why, on important national issues, does the political elite stand on the opposite side of what the public demands?
