Monitoring Desk: In the Doha US–Afghan Taliban Accord, the United States and Qatar guaranteed that the Afghan Taliban would provide a modern state contributing to global peace, where the rights of the Afghan population would be safeguarded under international law.
The realities are otherwise, and even after four years the Afghan Taliban are ruling Afghanistan with an interim government that is neither all-inclusive nor respectful of human rights, women’s rights, freedom of expression, or girls’ education. Nonetheless, neither the United States nor Qatar are addressing the Taliban’s mode of governance, which is everything but cannot be called a modern Islamic state.
A comprehensive report on the financial design of the Afghan Taliban suggests that they are not doing anything for the population of the country, and that their economic design favors only those in power—warlords who rule the country under the banner of the Islamic Emirate. The report also indicates that the Afghan Taliban are constructing housing colonies in Ghazni, Zabul, and Maidan Wardak for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters, and that funds coming from international bodies, including the United States, are being used to develop “terror training complexes” in these provinces.
Under Taliban rule, the development budget—traditionally the principal instrument for addressing structural economic challenges—has become a mirror of abandonment rather than ambition.
Since the Taliban’s return to power, financial transparency has markedly deteriorated. Budget details are no longer published or made available in accessible formats. More consequentially, the endorsement of the Financial Accounting Law by the Taliban leader has consolidated absolute authority over budget formulation and spending decisions, eliminating institutional checks and public oversight. Within this opaque framework, development financing has been hollowed out.
An examination of data released by the Taliban’s Ministry of Finance and the National Statistics and Information Authority for fiscal year 1403 (2024/25) reveals a stark reality: development has effectively been removed from financial policy priorities. According to World Bank estimates, the Taliban’s annual revenue ranges between $2.5 billion and $3 billion. Of this, approximately 88 percent—about $2.5 billion—was consumed by the ordinary budget, while just 12 percent, or roughly $365 million (24 billion afghanis), was allocated to the development budget. This skewed allocation signals not only widespread misuse of public resources but also a profound absence of a long-term, development-oriented vision.
“Taliban have invested heavily in information warfare. The development budget for Taliban Radio and Television increased nearly fourteen-fold”
The Taliban announced development projects worth nearly 60 billion afghanis (around $910 million) that, in practice, carry no specific budget allocations. Lacking financial backing and credible implementation plans, these projects are largely symbolic and imaginary constructs designed to manufacture legitimacy rather than deliver outcomes. This discrepancy exposes a systemic pattern: announcements substitute for action, while development remains unfunded. The scale of decline in the development budget is unprecedented. Since the Taliban seized power, the development budget has plunged from 131 billion afghanis to just 24 billion afghanis. This collapse comes at a time when roughly 23 million Afghans face poverty, hunger, and livelihood insecurity. Yet, instead of prioritizing health, education, water, housing, disaster preparedness, and livelihoods, the Taliban have sidelined these sectors.
The lion’s share of the budget is allocated to the General Directorate of Administrative Affairs, which received 4.1 billion afghanis, making it the second-largest recipient of development funds. This allocation violates established administrative norms and lacks transparency regarding purpose and outcomes. This single allocation exceeds the combined development budgets of critical sectors such as health, education, housing, and social protection, even as the national health system teeters on collapse and millions lack access to basic services.
“Large allocations were made to Ghazni, Zabul, and Maidan Wardak, with evidence suggesting links to settlement construction for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters”
Security institutions command a substantial share of the development budget despite already absorbing more than 50 percent of the ordinary budget. Of the 2.8 billion afghanis allocated to security from development funds, 67 million afghanis went to the Directorate for the Protection of the Taliban Prime Minister, 198 million afghanis to the Intelligence Directorate, and nearly 17 million afghanis to the Directorate for Monitoring and Enforcement of the Taliban leader’s decrees. Using development resources to further entrench security apparatuses underscores the regime’s priorities: consolidation of power over social investment.
Alongside security and administration, the Taliban have invested heavily in information warfare. The development budget for Taliban Radio and Television increased nearly fourteen-fold, from 7 million afghanis in 1401 to 91 million afghanis in 1403. In the absence of free media, this surge reflects a deliberate strategy to strengthen official narratives and control the public sphere. Yet available evidence suggests that, despite these expenditures, state media have failed to earn broad public trust or engagement, highlighting the limits of propaganda in the face of lived deprivation.
“The cost of funding for terror groups such as TTP, propaganda spending, and administrative control, is borne by citizens through sustained poverty, deepening inequality, environmental vulnerability, and rising dependence on foreign aid”
Regional allocation patterns further reveal the inequities embedded in the budget. Official data show that 55 percent of development spending occurred in Kabul city, rising to 58 percent when Kabul province is included. In fiscal year 1403 alone, 13.24 billion afghanis were spent in Kabul city and 773 million afghanis across the province. This concentration appears designed to cosmetically transform the capital and project an image of competence to domestic and international audiences. Social media narratives and visitor impressions often echo this façade. However, the veneer cannot mask pervasive poverty.
The consequences of this imbalance are severe. It entrenches structural inequality by excluding provinces and remote regions from development priorities, violates the principle of balanced growth, and fuels internal migration to Kabul, overwhelming urban services and accelerating the expansion of informal settlements. Access to water, housing, transport, education, healthcare, and clean air has deteriorated, pushing the capital toward becoming one of the world’s largest slum-concentration centers. After Kabul, relatively large allocations were made to provinces such as Ghazni, Zabul, and Maidan Wardak, with evidence suggesting links to settlement construction for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters.
Despite the Taliban’s claims of domestic financing success, international institutions have effectively replaced the state in delivering development. Beyond billions in humanitarian aid, these organizations implemented $529 million in infrastructure projects in fiscal year 1403, which is more than the Taliban’s entire development budget.Data suggest that the Taliban’s development budget is not a tool for growth but an instrument of power consolidation, rent-based redistribution, and symbolic legitimacy. It supports terror groups such as TTP, propaganda spending, and administrative control, while the costs are borne by citizens through sustained poverty, deepening inequality, environmental vulnerability, and rising dependence on foreign aid. In the absence of transparency, accountability, and genuine investment in people, the promise of development remains an illusion, and Afghanistan’s future remains hostage to it.
