Editorial
The results of the US midterm elections are interesting, not simply because Republicans have suffered a political setback, but because the defeat has also exposed the declining influence of the old guard within the Democratic Party, particularly those associated with the pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, and Washington’s traditional militaristic foreign policy.
The outcome represents a much bigger political message than an ordinary electoral reversal: American voters appear increasingly unwilling to finance endless overseas wars, support unconditional Israeli military adventures or accept a foreign policy that puts the interests of other countries ahead of America’s own domestic priorities.
“Results leave a lesson to White House that winning wars is not about destroying countries, and winning elections is not about starting wars”
Perhaps the most consequential outcome is that President Donald Trump has lost much of the political protection he enjoyed before the elections. Having suffered a major electoral defeat, he now faces a difficult choice: either reconsider the disastrous direction of his Iran policy or attempt to demonstrate American military strength through further escalation. The latter possibility is particularly dangerous because a president who has already suffered a significant political defeat may feel less constrained by electoral considerations when making decisions about war and peace.
Those who once hoped to see Trump emerge as a Nobel Peace Prize winner are now watching from the sidelines, perhaps sipping their lattes and smoking cigars, as the president who promised to end America’s overseas wars finds himself associated with one of the most consequential military confrontations of his presidency.
The irony is difficult to ignore. Trump built much of his political appeal on his criticism of America’s endless wars, his promise to put America first and his commitment to stop conflicts rather than initiate new ones. Yet, his decision to attack Iran, reportedly under considerable pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has placed his administration in direct contradiction with the political promises that helped bring him back to the White House.
The central argument of western writers is that the US midterm election results represent more than a setback for the Republican Party: they expose the collapse of the bipartisan pro-Israel, pro-war political establishment.
What makes these election results particularly interesting is the argument advanced by several Western political commentators that the defeat was not confined to Republicans. The traditional Democratic establishment, which had consistently supported unconditional military and financial assistance to Israel, also suffered a serious political setback.
For years, both major American political parties operated within an almost unquestionable bipartisan consensus on Israel. Democratic and Republican administrations alike continued providing military assistance, diplomatic protection and political support to successive Israeli governments, irrespective of their conduct in Palestine and the wider Middle East.
The Biden administration was particularly associated with this approach. Former President Joe Biden and his political establishment maintained unwavering support for Israel during Benjamin Netanyahu’s military campaign in Gaza, while continuing to approve weapons transfers and defend Israeli actions internationally. Kamala Harris, who served as vice president and subsequently became the Democratic presidential candidate, also remained within the established Democratic foreign policy framework.
The political establishment repeatedly presented this approach as a defence of democracy and regional stability. However, for an increasingly dissatisfied section of the American electorate, it represented an expensive foreign policy that prioritised overseas commitments over domestic economic and social concerns.
The same establishment also promoted an expansive vision of American global leadership through military alliances, political interventions and initiatives presented as international democratic cooperation. The Biden administration’s Democracy Summits and the rhetoric surrounding the so-called rules-based international order were part of this broader approach.
However, Washington’s credibility suffered because successive American administrations have themselves been accused of applying international law selectively, defending allies when convenient while invoking legal principles against geopolitical opponents.
As foreign policy adviser Matt Duss argued in a January 2025 assessment of the Biden administration’s foreign policy failures, international law increasingly appeared to be treated as an instrument against adversaries rather than a universally applicable standard.
This contradiction is not exclusive to Biden. Trump has also repeatedly faced accusations of violating international law. Nevertheless, the continuity between successive administrations demonstrates that the problem is considerably deeper than the personalities occupying the White House. It concerns the American foreign policy establishment itself.
One of the most significant political messages emerging from the elections concerns the influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
For decades, AIPAC and its political network exercised considerable influence over American electoral politics by supporting candidates favourable to Israel and campaigning against those advocating a more critical approach towards Israeli policies.
However, the growing electoral success of candidates openly questioning unconditional support for Israel suggests that the political environment is changing.
Reports of substantial campaign spending against pro-Palestinian candidates, including the reported expenditure of more than $40 million against Michigan candidate Abdul El-Sayed, illustrate the extent to which the Israel question has become a major electoral battleground. His reported electoral breakthrough, despite the financial resources deployed against him, is particularly significant.
As Beth Miller, political director of Jewish Voice for Peace Action, reportedly observed, the old bipartisan consensus on Israel is over.
This does not necessarily mean that Washington will immediately abandon its strategic relationship with Israel. American political institutions, defence interests, lobbying networks and established foreign policy commitments remain deeply entrenched. However, the emergence of candidates prepared to question unconditional military assistance to Netanyahu represents an important political development.
For the first time in decades, the political cost of supporting every Israeli military decision may be becoming greater than the electoral advantage traditionally associated with doing so.
This changing political environment could eventually create space for a more balanced American approach towards Palestine, the occupied West Bank and the wider Middle East. It could also encourage Washington to reconsider the continued supply of weapons that have contributed to the destruction of civilian communities.
The most immediate international consequence of the election results concerns Iran.
According to reporting by Axios, Vice President JD Vance had reportedly advocated an agreement to end the war and privately expressed strong reservations about Netanyahu’s assessment of Iran. Several senior officials within Trump’s administration were also reportedly uncomfortable with the prospect of renewed large-scale military operations.
The reported disagreement was not simply about the timing of military action. It concerned the strategic wisdom of allowing Israel to determine the direction of American foreign policy.
According to the reported account, Netanyahu was considered wrong in his assessment of several aspects of the Iranian confrontation, while Vance warned that the war could carry serious political consequences for Republicans in the midterm elections.
There were also reports that Trump had considered striking Iran before the elections under pressure from Netanyahu but ultimately decided to wait until the electoral outcome became clearer.
This raises a fundamental question: why should an American president allow the strategic calculations of a foreign leader to determine whether the United States enters another major war?
The United States possesses enormous military capabilities, but military superiority does not automatically translate into political victory. Iran has spent decades preparing for asymmetric warfare, developing missile and drone capabilities, strengthening its regional deterrence and preparing for the possibility of a prolonged confrontation.
The assumption that American airpower and overwhelming conventional military superiority could quickly compel Tehran to surrender its strategic positions was always questionable.
The consequences of the confrontation, including the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, the regional security crisis and the enormous expenditure of military resources, demonstrate the risks of underestimating an adversary that has prepared for precisely such a confrontation.
Even after extensive military operations, the political objectives attributed to the American-Israeli campaign remain far more difficult to achieve than its proponents initially suggested.
Regime change has not necessarily followed military destruction. Iran’s strategic institutions have demonstrated resilience, while the country’s missile and drone capabilities and its capacity to impose costs on adversaries remain central considerations.
The reported preparations by the US military for potentially resuming large-scale combat operations, including the deployment of additional military capabilities to the region, therefore represent a dangerous development.
At the same time, Qatari mediation efforts to secure support from Washington and Tehran for a draft agreement offer a possible diplomatic exit.
The question is whether Trump will choose diplomacy or allow Netanyahu’s calculations and the demands of hawkish advisers to determine America’s next move.
The reported position of JD Vance deserves particular attention. Vance has long been associated with an American foreign policy that places greater emphasis on domestic priorities and avoids unnecessary overseas military commitments. His reported opposition to renewed escalation against Iran reflects a broader political constituency within the Republican Party that is increasingly sceptical of foreign interventions.
If the Axios reporting accurately reflects the internal debate, Vance and other senior officials understood that another major military confrontation could damage Trump’s political standing and undermine the Republican Party’s electoral prospects.
The mediators’ reported question to White House officials before the elections is equally revealing: what would Trump do if he lost?
The inability of his advisers to provide a clear answer reportedly reflected the uncertainty surrounding the administration’s strategic direction.
Now that the elections have delivered a serious setback, the situation has become more complicated.
Tehran’s public celebration of Trump’s political defeat may also influence the calculations in Washington. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, reportedly described the electoral outcome as a political defeat for Trump, alongside what he characterised as an Iranian strategic victory in the field and around Hormuz.
Such statements may irritate the American president and strengthen the arguments of those within his administration advocating a tougher military response.
However, a decision to resume war merely to demonstrate political strength or punish Tehran for celebrating an American electoral defeat would be an extraordinary strategic mistake.
The real test of American leadership is not how many bombs it can drop but whether it can achieve its political objectives without dragging an entire region into prolonged conflict.
Another important political development concerns Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, whose future has reportedly come under scrutiny following the Republican electoral setback.
Hegseth was among the most vocal advocates of military escalation against Iran and represented the administration’s hardline approach towards the use of American military power.
His rhetoric about overwhelming military force, destruction and the elimination of perceived enemies reflected an assumption that American conventional superiority would be sufficient to achieve the desired results.
Yet, the fundamental weakness of this approach was its failure to distinguish between destroying military infrastructure and achieving sustainable political objectives.
Military campaigns can destroy facilities, eliminate commanders and inflict enormous damage. However, they cannot automatically manufacture a favourable political outcome, dismantle a country’s national identity or compel an adversary to abandon its strategic red lines.
The reported failure to achieve the broader objectives associated with the Iran campaign has consequently raised questions about the advice provided to Trump by his military and political advisers.
There have also been reports that Trump has begun questioning Hegseth’s performance and that the defence secretary could become a political casualty of the electoral defeat.
The irony is particularly striking. Hegseth’s supporters promoted an image of uncompromising military strength, while the administration’s critics argued that his approach was taking America towards a conflict whose strategic and economic costs had not been properly assessed.
If the reports about his possible removal prove accurate, it would demonstrate that the political consequences of a failed military strategy do not necessarily remain confined to the battlefield.
Hegseth may have sought to demonstrate American military supremacy through the Iran confrontation, but the political consequences could eventually reshape the leadership of the Pentagon itself.
For years, Washington has presented itself as the principal defender of the international rules-based order. However, successive administrations have weakened that argument through selective interpretations of international law and the use of military power outside universally accepted legal frameworks.
The Biden administration faced serious criticism over its approach to Gaza, while Trump’s administration has faced criticism over its military actions and threats against several countries.
The problem is that international law cannot remain credible if its application depends on whether a country is an American ally or adversary.
The world does not need another demonstration of American military superiority. It needs a United States willing to respect the same international principles that it demands from others.
This is particularly important for smaller countries, which depend on international law, sovereign equality and multilateral institutions to protect themselves against the coercive policies of major powers.
When Washington treats international law as optional, it weakens the very international system it claims to defend.
For Asia, the American electoral outcome carries mixed but potentially encouraging implications.
The region has little interest in becoming another battlefield for great-power competition. Its economic future depends on trade, investment, connectivity, energy security and regional stability.
For years, successive American administrations have strengthened military partnerships and security arrangements involving Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Taiwan and other regional actors as part of their strategy to contain China’s growing influence.
Washington has repeatedly presented these arrangements as necessary for regional stability. However, from Beijing’s perspective, they represent an expanding network of military pressure around China’s neighbourhood.
The same contradiction applies to American policies towards Hong Kong, Taiwan and other regional questions.
China’s economic rise has fundamentally altered the global balance of power. Rather than accepting this development as an inevitable feature of changing international economic realities, sections of the American establishment have increasingly treated China’s rise as a strategic challenge that must be contained through political, economic and military pressure. The consequences of this approach are not limited to China. They affect the entire Asian region.
Countries across Asia need economic cooperation and freedom from unnecessary military confrontation. They do not want to be forced into choosing sides in an increasingly polarised international environment.
A weakened bipartisan pro-war consensus in Washington could therefore create some diplomatic space for a more balanced American approach towards Asia. However, it would be naïve to expect a fundamental transformation overnight.
The American strategic establishment remains influential, and its geopolitical ambitions are not necessarily dependent on which party controls Congress or occupies the White House.
Nevertheless, the emergence of more diverse, anti-war and pro-Palestinian political voices in American electoral politics provides some reason for cautious optimism.
The midterm elections have delivered an important message to the White House: Americans do not necessarily support a foreign policy based on permanent military confrontation, unconditional support for foreign governments or the expenditure of unlimited taxpayer resources on overseas conflicts.
Trump won political support by promising to put America first and stop unnecessary wars. His decision to engage militarily with Iran has undermined that promise and created an increasingly difficult political situation.
He must now decide whether he wants to be remembered as the president who escalated another disastrous Middle Eastern war or the leader who recognised the limits of military power and pursued a diplomatic settlement.
The electoral defeat has also exposed the vulnerability of the old bipartisan consensus on Israel and the declining ability of powerful lobbying networks to guarantee political outcomes through financial influence alone.
However, the most dangerous possibility is that Trump may interpret his electoral defeat not as a warning against war but as a reason to become more aggressive abroad.
A president who believes he has little left to lose politically could be tempted to take decisions with consequences extending far beyond his remaining time in office. Such a calculation would be disastrous for the United States, Iran, the Middle East and the international community.
The world does not need another war to satisfy the political ambitions of Netanyahu, the ideological preferences of hawkish American officials or the domestic political frustrations of the White House.
If Trump genuinely wants to restore his legacy as a president committed to peace, he must listen to those advisers who favour diplomacy, including the reported position of JD Vance, and give Qatar’s mediation efforts a genuine opportunity.
America’s military might have already been demonstrated. What remains to be demonstrated is its political wisdom. Results leave a lesson to White House that winning wars is not about destroying countries, and winning elections is not about starting wars.
