DND Special Report
Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting Attaullah Tarar on Friday claimed that there is a “synergy” between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a claim that echoes themes appearing in political and security commentary and in earlier published reports over the past several years.
Two earlier reports, titled “Synergy between TTP and PTI shows that both are engaged in weakening the state institutions” published on March 16, 2025 and another report titled “Is there any difference between TTP and PTI?” published on May 11, 2023 can be useful to understand what Minister Tarrar said on Friday because both reports had already drawn attention to what their authors described as similarities or convergence between the political activities and narratives associated with PTI and the objectives of TTP.
A review of the two reports shows that the synergy was presented through several different dimensions: hostility towards state institutions, particularly the military; the use of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a political or operational base; narratives directed against state institutions; political instability and violence; alleged support or accommodation for TTP; and the use of propaganda and international lobbying to put pressure on the Pakistani state.
The first report, published in 2023, drew a comparison between TTP’s declared confrontation with the Pakistani state and PTI’s increasingly confrontational political narrative.
According to the report, both groups had displayed hostility towards Pakistan’s constitutional and state institutions, although for entirely different stated reasons. Report said that TTP rejected the constitutional order on religious grounds, while PTI’s political discourse refuted to accept 1973 Constitution. The report particularly focused on hostility towards the Pakistan Army. It contrasted the TTP’s armed attacks against military installations with PTI’s political criticism and later violent confrontation with military-related installations.
One of the examples cited was the attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi by terrorists in October 2009, compared with the May 9, 2023 attacks on military and government installations during protests following the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
The two reports also identified Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as an important point of convergence. The first report argued that both TTP and PTI had significant influence in KP and PTI supporters used the province as a launching point for political mobilisation towards Islamabad. The report further cited that PTI’s government had facilitated the return or resettlement of TTP militants in Pakistan following negotiations with the militant organisation.
The first report went further and said that PTI had effectively “bailed out” TTP after the terrorist organisation had come under severe pressure from Pakistani security operations. It claimed that negotiations resulted in TTP members returning to Pakistan and terrorists were allowed to settle in KP. The report also referred to PTI proposal or invitation for TTP to enter mainstream politics.
The second report developed another aspect of the synergy. It argued that TTP benefits when political confrontation creates instability inside Pakistan because security institutions are required to divide their attention between counterterrorism operations and internal political unrest. According to the report, PTI’s protests, political confrontation and anti-military rhetoric could therefore indirectly serve TTP’s objectives by creating political and institutional instability and terrorist attacks in Pakistan increase when PTI launches protests against government.
The second report placed particular emphasis on what it described as a convergence of narratives. According to the report, TTP attacked the legitimacy of the state and security forces through the language of its terrorist ideology, while PTI challenged state institutions through political messaging, protests and criticism of military leadership. The report argued that both narratives could have a similar practical effect: weakening public confidence in state institutions.
Both reports also identified information and propaganda as an important area of convergence. The second report said PTI spread what it described as misinformation and anti-state narratives during the Jaffar Express hostage crisis, while security forces were conducting rescue operations. The report argued that such messaging could undermine public confidence in security institutions and thereby benefit TTP’s broader propaganda objectives. The first report similarly referred to PTI’s international political and diplomatic activity, including communications with international institutions and the use of lobbying firms in the United States.
The report presented these activities as another means of putting pressure on the Pakistani state.
The reports also drew a distinction between the methods used by the two organisations while arguing that the ultimate effect could sometimes overlap. TTP has historically used suicide attacks, armed assaults, assassinations and other forms of terrorism while PTI, according to the reports, used demonstrations, political mobilisation and, particularly in the May 9 episode, violence against public and military installations. The reports therefore presented violence against state institutions as another common element. The May 9, 2023 violence is especially relevant to this comparison because military installations and government buildings were attacked or damaged at several locations following Imran Khan’s arrest.
Another similarity highlighted by the first report concerned the legal protection. The report argued that senior TTP terrorists had rarely got conviction through Pakistan’s regular judicial system and compared this with what it described as the limited number of convictions of senior PTI leaders and activists.
When the two reports are placed side by side, at least six recurring areas of alleged convergence emerge:
1. Opposition to state institutions: Both reports describe TTP and PTI as challenging the authority or legitimacy of important state institutions, particularly the military.
2. Anti-military narratives: Both reports identify criticism or hostility towards the Pakistan Army as an important common element, although the methods and ideological motivations are different.
3. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Both connect the political strength or activity of PTI and the militant presence of TTP with KP.
4. Political instability: The reports argue that prolonged political confrontation creates conditions that can benefit militant organisations by weakening institutional cohesion and diverting security attention.
5. Information and propaganda: Both reports identify narratives, social media messaging and information campaigns as an important battlefield in which the interests or effects of PTI and TTP could converge.
6. Confrontation with the state: The reports compare PTI’s political confrontation and episodes of violence with TTP’s armed campaign against the state.
The two reports provide a basis for examining similarities, parallel narratives and mutually beneficial effects. The significance of the two earlier reports is therefore not that they conclusively proved a PTI-TTP alliance rather, they demonstrate that the question of possible convergence being raised by Federal Minister before Attaullah Tarar has logical standing.
