By Agha Iqrar Haroon
The debate on creating new provinces in Pakistan has once again taken center stage, generating a wide range of viewpoints and narratives. Some academicians and anthropologists argue that the formation of new provinces could be harmful for Pakistan’s integration, a country already grappling with administrative failures, unequal resource distribution, terrorism, poverty, and illiteracy. Others insist that new provinces are essential to avoid a political deadlock that may push Pakistan further into crisis.
The four-province structure of Pakistan was good enough when the country’s population was around 60 million. Today, the population has grown to more than 240 million—a fourfold increase—yet the number of provinces remains the same. This imbalance has placed an enormous strain on governance, education, healthcare, and development, creating a widening gap between the needs of the people and the capacity of the state to deliver. If we compare provincial populations, the change becomes even more striking:
Punjab: 1972 census: about 32 million–2023 census: about 128 million
Punjab’s current population exceeds that of many European countries combined, yet it is still governed as a single province. The sheer size and diversity of its population make effective governance extremely challenging.
Sindh: 1972: about 10.5 million—2023: about 50.5 million
Sindh’s population has increased fivefold, but no additional administrative unit has been created to handle this growth. Karachi, a megacity with over 20 million people, continues to face severe urban management problems—ranging from water shortages and traffic congestion to crumbling infrastructure—because the provincial system is overstretched.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK): 1972: about 10.1 million—2023: about 40.1 million
The population has quadrupled, but healthcare and education services remain grossly inadequate. The limited provincial capacity has left many districts underserved, widening inequalities between urban centers and remote areas.
Balochistan: 1972: about 2.3 million—2023: about 10.4 million
Although Balochistan has the smallest population, its vast geographical area makes governance extremely difficult. Providing basic facilities such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure across such a large and sparsely populated province has proved nearly impossible under the existing administrative framework.
Countries such as India, Nigeria, and China have created new administrative units in response to rising populations and regional demands. Pakistan, however, has remained static, failing to adapt to demographic pressures.
Provincial governments are increasingly unable to provide basic amenities. Local populations feel deprived, and grievances over unequal distribution of resources are fueling social and political tensions. Governance, instead of becoming more effective, is becoming more strained with each passing year. If four provinces were sufficient for 60 million people in 1970, then with today’s population of 240 million, Pakistan realistically needs 12 to 14 provinces to ensure balanced governance, equitable development, and national integration.
Some discussions suggest revisiting Pakistan’s administrative structure as it existed at independence in August 1947, when the country was divided into West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). At that time, Pakistan inherited a mix of provinces and princely states.
The administrative units of Pakistan in 1947 included Punjab Province, Sindh Province, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Baluchistan Chief Commissioner’s Province, Karachi Federal Capital Territory (separated from Sindh and made the capital), Bahawalpur State, Khairpur State, Kalat State (in Balochistan), Las Bela State, and Makran State. However, it is often overlooked that NWFP was created as a separate administrative unit in 1901. Prior to that, it was part of Punjab under British rule until Lord Curzon carved it out on November 9, 1901, in an effort to suppress ongoing resistance movements. Hazara, being the largest Hindko-speaking area, was included in NWFP and has remained part of it. To further consolidate its position against possible uprisings, the British Raj played a decisive role in the establishment of the first modern state structure in Afghanistan. This move was part of its broader strategy of creating a buffer zone against regional instability and Russian influence. Simultaneously, the Raj sought to psychologically and economically connect the newly created North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) with Afghanistan, thereby ensuring that both regions remained interlinked in terms of trade, tribal affiliations, and shared administrative interests. This policy not only reinforced British control over the frontier but also limited the potential for unified resistance movements to emerge along the sensitive borderlands. After the 18th Amendment, NWFP was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).
Hazara Division is the second-largest division of KP, but the province’s name was defined solely by Pashtun identity—Khyber representing the Pashtun belt and Pakhtunkhwa meaning “land of the Pashtuns.” For decades, Hazara Division has demanded recognition as a separate province. This demonstrates that restoring the 1947 administrative model is neither viable nor practical today.
After independence, India created several new provinces (unions) to accommodate identity-based demands, while Pakistan avoided this path. Pakistan’s political elites and entrenched bureaucracy resisted power-sharing, adhering instead to the formula: “the more the land, the more the resources, the more the power.” India, with its diverse socio-economic, political, and cultural landscape, evolved into what scholars call a quasi-federal state, blending unitary and federal features. This flexible model allowed India to manage separatist tendencies by accommodating regional aspirations. Pakistan, on the other hand, adopted a fragile federal model under the Government of India Act of 1935, introducing federal, provincial, and concurrent legislative lists.
Even after the 18th Amendment, which devolved significant powers to the provinces, Pakistan’s federalism remains weak. Provinces enjoy the lion’s share of resources through the National Finance Commission (NFC) but avoid the responsibility of debt repayment, even when federal loans are used for projects within provinces. Provincial administrations also concentrate development resources in elite constituencies and urban centers, deepening socio-economic disparities while marginalizing remote regions.
Advocates of new provinces argue that they would improve governance, but critics highlight that Pakistan’s civil administration has collapsed. Without overhauling this system, new provinces would merely add an extra burden to the national exchequer. With a rapidly growing population and increasingly complex governance needs, the current administrative framework is inadequate.
Opponents, especially from KP and Sindh, warn that dividing provinces could deepen ethnic fault lines and cause instability. Independent thinkers, however, argue that recognizing distinct identities—such as Hindko speakers in Hazara, Potohari and Saraiki speakers in Punjab, or Urdu speakers in Sindh—would reduce political blackmailing and strengthen integration. Pakistan’s tragic 1971 disintegration remains a reminder of the dangers of ignoring ethnic and linguistic diversity. Today, voices demanding new provinces echo nationwide, making this a critical issue for governance and national security.
When considering new provinces, the state must decide whether it seeks a centralized structure, decentralization, or a hybrid model. Decentralization, through reorganizing sub-provincial identities, could integrate marginalized groups into the mainstream. Centralization, however, risks deepening alienation and fueling separatism.
Decentralization would also be more cost-effective if achieved by empowering local governments. Yet, provincial elites and bureaucracies have historically resisted strong local governance. Resistance would likely intensify if decentralization diminished the authority of commissioners and deputy commissioners. The PML-N, long seen as favoring bureaucratic dominance, is unlikely to support reforms that weaken civil service control. PPP’s 2012 proposal for a Saraiki province, PTI’s campaign for South Punjab, and PML-N and MQM’s promises for Hazara and an urban Sindh province all faded once these parties assumed power, reflecting how demands for provinces are often exploited for electoral gains rather than pursued as serious reforms.
The responsibility of the federal government is not only to redraw boundaries, but also to strengthen local governments and ensure equitable governance. Robust grassroots structures could address grievances directly, reducing pressure for new provinces.
Conclusion
The debate should be no longer about whether Pakistan needs more provinces rather it should be about how soon the country can move in that direction. Creating additional provinces is not merely a political slogan, but a national necessity. Effective governance requires smaller, more manageable administrative units that can address issues of health, education, infrastructure, and development at the local level. The demand for new provinces in Pakistan is neither new nor baseless. It arises from genuine grievances—economic disparities, political exclusion, and administrative failures. The path forward lies in restructuring the civil administration, strengthening local governments, and ensuring equitable distribution of resources. True federalism—based on autonomy, representation, and justice for all regions—is key to Pakistan’s stability. Without such reforms, ethnic and territorial biases will continue to threaten the country’s fragile unity.
The foremost point that must not be overlooked while making such an important decision is the need to move beyond the fallacy that merely creating new provinces will automatically resolve Pakistan’s administrative challenges. Without undertaking a comprehensive restructuring or complete overhaul of the civil administration system, the formation of new provinces will serve little purpose. It is essential to recognize that the core problem lies not in the size of existing provinces alone, but in the inefficiency, corruption, and outdated structures of governance that continue to hamper effective administration. While this may appear to be a daunting and politically sensitive task for the federal government, it remains the foremost requirement if Pakistan truly wishes to move forward. Otherwise, the creation of new provinces, without reform, would do nothing more than impose an additional financial burden on an already fragile and crumbling economy, leading to further complications instead of offering solutions.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk.
