This week, Pakistan and Russia deliberated on a “forward-looking” partnership aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation in diversified trade, energy, business-to-business engagements, and social sectors such as health and education.
The task for Pakistan is necessary and promising but difficult, as Russia like Iran remains under U.S. sanctions, and Pakistan often avoids actions that could irritate Washington. This is the reason why the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline and the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline (PSGP), intended to connect Karachi to Lahore, have never materialized even after two decades of planning. Some of reasons for delayed and sometime denied execution include Pakistan has to navigate carefully as it looks toward Moscow, must keep persistent risks in mind, must not antagonize Gulf, Middle East and West while designing Eurasian realignments and protecting itself from risks of fallout of Russia-Ukraine consequences.
The 10th Pakistan–Russia Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, co-chaired by Pakistan’s Energy Minister Awais Leghari and his Russian counterpart Sergei Tsivilev, concluded on November 27, 2025, with the renewal of several commitments. Only time will tell what the real outcome of these commitments will be.
Russia–Pakistan relations have grown gradually but quietly, often remaining under Washington’s radar. Islamabad consistently gauges the mood of Washington before deciding how far it can go with Moscow. Russia’s primary export interest in Pakistan is the energy sector, but Pakistan’s energy landscape has long been U.S., Gulf, and Middle East–centric—leaving little space for Russia to fit in without antagonizing Washington or key Gulf capitals.
Foreign affairs experts believe Pakistan can still benefit from pragmatic cooperation with Russia, shaped by shifting global power alignments. As Western-led institutions decline in influence and geopolitical blocs become more fluid, Islamabad may find opportunities for strategic, economic, and security convergence. However, structural challenges including sanctions on Russia, Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities, and its reliance on Western financial institutions and Gulf states cannot be ignored. Pakistan wants to benefit from emerging multipolarity, but the question remains: how far can it realistically stretch itself?
There are, however, promising geopolitical shifts: the decline of the Western-led “rules-based order,” the rise of Eurasian connectivity, shared interests in regional stability, Pakistan’s pursuit of balanced foreign relations, and Russia’s need to deepen ties in South and Central Asia amid Western isolation. Islamabad and Moscow can shape these developments into trends that create space for a more substantive partnership.
Despite Moscow’s “sanctions season” since the Russia–Ukraine war, Pakistan’s military ties with Russia have gradually strengthened through enhanced military-to-military contacts, joint exercises (Druzhba), discussions on energy and steel-sector collaboration, diplomatic consultations on Afghanistan, Pakistan’s participation in the SCO, and potential intellectual convergence. Both sides can build diplomatic synergy if Pakistan fulfills Russia’s expectations and resolves long-standing issues such as the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, LNG supply commitments, acceptance of Russian crude shipments, and allowing Russian involvement in hydroelectric, metallurgy, and energy projects. At the moment, these expectations appear higher than what Pakistan can risk, given that diversification away from Middle Eastern suppliers seems difficult at a time when Islamabad is actively seeking Gulf investment through SIFC and related initiatives.
Although Russia and Pakistan collaborate effectively in regional geopolitics and security dynamics, Moscow’s recognition of the Afghan Taliban regime does not align with Islamabad’s interests. Pakistan remains the greatest victim of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil, and Russia’s recognition has provided moral support to a regime sponsoring terrorism not only in Pakistan but also globally—the latest example being attacks on Chinese engineers and workers in Tajikistan. Since the Afghan Taliban use terrorism as diplomatic leverage, Russia seeks cordial relations to avoid further attacks like the one at the Moscow Concert Hall. Pakistan, however, is not prepared to accept Afghanistan’s terms to secure relief from terrorism. Recent regional attacks, border tensions, and Taliban-linked incidents highlight how deeply Afghanistan remains involved in exporting terrorism.
There is no doubt that Russia’s pivot to Asia offers Pakistan a rare window to deepen ties without provoking zero-sum reactions, and current Russia–Pakistan interactions reflect broader global geopolitical transformations. As the post–World War II order fractures and new power centers emerge, both Moscow and Islamabad seek diversified partnerships and strategic autonomy. Yet, due to economic, structural, and geopolitical constraints, the path toward a deeper and more stable partnership remains challenging.
The themes emerging from recent speeches and engagements underscore a shared intellectual foundation: rejection of unipolarity, emphasis on sovereign decision-making, and pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation. If Pakistan continues its balanced diplomacy and Russia maintains its pivot toward Asia, the partnership is likely to strengthen in the coming decade.
