By Dr Taimoor ul Hassan
Water is more than a natural resource—it is a strategic lifeline. For Pakistan, the Indus River system sustains agriculture, powers industries, and supports over 240 million lives. However, with increasing tensions over the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan under the aegis of the World Bank, the looming threat of a “water war” has become an alarming reality.
The shifting geopolitical climate, climate change, and India’s assertive dam-building policies demand a closer legal and strategic examination of the treaty and its implications for Pakistan.
Historical Background of the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, by then-Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and President of Pakistan Ayub Khan. Mediated by the World Bank, the treaty was a response to post-Partition water disputes that arose after British India’s division in 1947. The treaty apportioned the waters of the Indus Basin between the two countries:
India received exclusive rights to the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej.
Pakistan gained control over the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, with minor allowances to India for non-consumptive use, agriculture, and hydroelectric generation under strict conditions.
The agreement was hailed as a model of water diplomacy. It survived multiple wars and periods of political tension, serving as a stabilizing factor in bilateral relations. However, the past two decades have exposed its limitations in light of evolving hydro-politics and India’s infrastructural pursuits.
Legal Framework and Provisions
The IWT is not merely a bilateral agreement; it is a binding international treaty. It outlines mechanisms for water-sharing, data exchange, and dispute resolution:
Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): A joint body that meets annually to maintain data exchange and resolve routine issues.
Neutral Expert Mechanism: Invoked for technical disputes such as the design of hydroelectric projects.
Court of Arbitration (CoA): Engaged when diplomatic and technical mechanisms fail.
The treaty prohibits India from storing or diverting water from the western rivers but permits run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants under strict design constraints. However, interpretation disputes often arise, especially concerning the permissible scope of such projects.
India’s Dam Projects and Treaty Violations
India’s aggressive pursuit of hydropower projects on the western rivers, especially in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, has intensified Pakistan’s concerns. Key projects include:
Baglihar Dam (Chenab River): Pakistan raised objections in 2005; a neutral expert allowed its continuation but mandated design changes.
Kishanganga Hydroelectric Plant (Neelum River, a tributary of Jhelum): Pakistan approached the Court of Arbitration in 2010, which ruled in India’s favor on diversion but emphasized minimum environmental flows.
Ratle, Pakal Dul, Sawalkot Dams: Under construction or proposed, all on western rivers, raising cumulative concerns.
India claims compliance with treaty terms, but Pakistan argues that cumulative effects, storage capacities, and procedural evasions violate the spirit of the agreement.
India’s Strategic Posture: Weaponization of Water
Following the Pulwama attack in 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared, “Blood and water cannot flow together.” This political rhetoric has renewed fears in Pakistan about India using water as a strategic tool. While India has not abrogated the treaty formally, it has increasingly signaled intentions to alter water flow as a means of coercion.
India’s invocation of the treaty’s review or potential suspension raises critical legal questions:
- Can India unilaterally revoke the IWT? Under international law, particularly the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), treaties cannot be arbitrarily terminated. The IWT lacks an exit clause, binding both parties unless mutually agreed otherwise or unless a material breach occurs.
- Is water a tool of war? The use of water as a coercive instrument would violate international humanitarian law and UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 (2010), which recognizes the human right to water and sanitation.
Thus, while India’s rhetoric is alarming, its legal ability to weaponize water remains constrained—but only if challenged robustly.
Pakistan’s Legal Position and Diplomatic Challenges
Pakistan has, so far, pursued a largely reactive and procedural approach:
It has sought legal recourse through Neutral Experts and the Courts of Arbitration.
The Permanent Indus Commission continues to function, albeit ineffectively, in contentious matters.
Diplomatic engagements, particularly with the World Bank, often face inertia due to India’s reluctance to engage meaningfully.
However, Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts have been criticized for being slow, segmented, and lacking global visibility. Legal mechanisms are time-consuming, and while they have yielded partial relief, they have not deterred India from pursuing more projects.
Strategic and Legal Countermeasures by Pakistan
To strengthen its position, Pakistan must adopt a multipronged strategy combining legal rigor, diplomatic dynamism, and domestic water resilience:
- International Legal Advocacy
Raise the issue at international forums such as the UN, OIC, and possibly the ICJ (if jurisdiction is established), framing India’s water behavior as a threat to regional peace and environmental justice.
Engage third-party legal experts and build international pressure through documentation, data, and legal briefs.
- Invoking Environmental Law and Climate Justice
Emphasize how India’s dam-building disrupts fragile Himalayan ecosystems, threatening biodiversity and downstream livelihoods.
Use platforms such as the Paris Agreement and COP summits to raise concerns about water as a climate justice issue, linking it with melting glaciers and altered monsoon patterns.
- Treaty Reinterpretation and Updating
Pakistan can propose a modernized protocol to the IWT to account for contemporary challenges like climate change, sedimentation, groundwater stress, and digital monitoring.
Push for cumulative environmental impact assessments (CEIAs) for Indian projects, not just isolated technical reviews.
- Domestic Water Security Enhancements
Invest in reservoirs and storage capacity to improve drought resilience.
Promote efficient irrigation, such as drip and sprinkler systems, to reduce dependency on river flow.
Strengthen institutional frameworks like the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) and ensure interprovincial water equity to avoid internal discord.
- Technological and Scientific Diplomacy
Collaborate with international hydrology and satellite experts to monitor real-time river flows and dam impacts.
Develop an independent digital water monitoring system to verify India’s compliance and detect treaty violations early.
Regional Water Diplomacy: Beyond the Bilateral Lens
Water is a regional issue. Afghanistan, too, is developing projects on the Kabul River, which flows into Pakistan. A sustainable solution demands a regional water treaty framework, possibly under SAARC or a new South Asian Water Council.
Such a body could:
- Harmonize data collection and climate adaptation strategies.
- Encourage cross-border watershed management.
- Enable early warning systems for floods and droughts.
- Pakistan must lead such initiatives if it wants to shift from reaction to leadership.
Conclusion: From Requiem to Resilience
The Indus Waters Treaty is at a crossroads. It is neither dead nor fully alive—caught in a limbo of diplomatic fatigue and legal ambiguity. India’s dam-centric strategy, framed under national security and energy development, challenges not only the spirit of the treaty but the very survival of downstream Pakistan.
Yet, water wars are not inevitable. They can be preempted through robust legal defense, proactive diplomacy, strategic alliances, and above all, internal preparedness. The choice is between clinging to a reactive posture or evolving a resilient water strategy that protects national interests while advocating regional cooperation.
Pakistan must act—decisively, legally, and strategically. The water war is already underway, and the time for passive protest is over. The future of Pakistan’s water, and by extension its agriculture, economy, and peace, depends on what actions it takes now.
Note: Dr Taimoor ul Hassan is a former Dean of BNU and UCP, presently Professor of Mass Communication at UCP
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk.
