Khalid Khan
Nominally, we attained independence on August 14, 1947, but in reality, we remain shackled. What is commonly referred to as freedom was, in essence, a mere transfer of power from the white aristocracy to the native rulers. Along with this transfer of power came the entire framework of laws, traditions, privileges, authority, values, principles, and regulations that had once been the instruments of British rule.
The East India Company governed undivided India through an entrenched bureaucratic system, while the political elite—comprised of feudal lords, capitalists, social figures, sycophantic intellectuals, and religious entrepreneurs—served as loyal courtiers of the colonial empire. This class actively assisted the British in suppressing movements for freedom, rebellion, revolution, awareness, political consciousness, and national identity formation. Formally, the native aristocracy had no political role or parliamentary significance. Their primary duty was to depoliticize the masses and suppress every dissenting voice.
Following the Second World War, direct colonial rule became increasingly untenable. Consequently, imperial powers sought to establish proxy governments in newly independent states, with varying degrees of success. While the British were unable to establish a firm foothold in post-independence India and had to relinquish power to its indigenous leadership, they found a reliable alternative in Pakistan’s bureaucratic structure and ruling elite. Thus, rather than achieving true independence, Pakistan underwent a seamless transition of power to a system already predisposed to serving imperial interests.
By a fortunate coincidence, and perhaps divine intervention, the newly formed Pakistan Army remained largely insulated from this compromised transition. The reasons for this were manifold: the army’s nascent structure, the fervent spirit of jihad and independence that fueled its ranks, the severe shortage of manpower and military resources, and the colonial rulers’ relative disregard for its potential. While Pakistan’s military leadership initially remained under British command, the institution itself was spared the immediate influence of the entrenched ruling elite.
From day one, a stark divide was established—on one side stood the guardians of Pakistan, and on the other, the plunderers of the nation. The same classes (civil-military bureaucracy, politicians, socialites, and certain religious groups that helped the British Raj to establish the Empire in South Asia) that had once served as enforcers of British colonial rule seamlessly transitioned into enjoying the privileges of independent Pakistan. The only barrier to their unchecked exploitation was the Pakistan Army. Hence, from the very outset, efforts were made to vilify the military and shift the blame for every national crisis onto its shoulders—a tactic that met with considerable success.
This ruling elite continued to exploit the people, usurp the rights of smaller provinces, and, with calculated precision, shift the blame for their excesses onto the Pakistan Army. This was achieved through misleading statistics about defense expenditures, systematically instilling anti-military sentiment in the public psyche.
Time and again, the nation was plunged into crises through deliberate conspiracies, compelling the army to intervene to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities and safeguard national security. In doing so, it inevitably became embroiled in the ‘sinful yet thankless’ exercise of political governance. Over time, shifts in global political dynamics further prolonged military rule—an outcome that was neither desirable nor beneficial for Pakistan or its armed forces.
The military leadership has historically intervened out of constitutional necessity and national defense imperatives, rather than personal ambition. This is not to suggest that the military was entirely untainted, but it is undeniable that Pakistan’s ruling elite skillfully manipulated the institution for its ends. It is a misconception that the army exploited politicians and the civil bureaucracy—on the contrary, these two forces collectively exploited the army.
The civil bureaucracy while hands in gloves with political elites unfortunately serves corruption, injustice, nepotism, violations of merit, and systemic plundering crafted a system that left even seasoned observers astounded.
In a properly functioning state, institutions operate within their legal frameworks, ensuring national stability and progress. Pakistan was established on religious foundations, a valid basis, yet this foundation was cynically exploited for personal gains. The concept of an Islamic state encompassed Islamic social structures, economic systems, legal frameworks, values, traditions, and brotherhood—elements that could have preserved and united a newly independent, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and culturally diverse nation.
However, the untimely demise of Pakistan’s founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the weaknesses of other early leaders allowed, in Jinnah’s own words, the ‘counterfeit coins’ in his pocket to assume control of the nation. Religious forces, whose role should have been to advocate for the implementation of Islamic laws, instead prioritized their vested interests, steering Pakistan away from becoming an Islamic welfare state. The civil bureaucracy, for its part, compounded the problem.
In the early years, national enthusiasm was high, and Pakistan witnessed rapid development, yet institutions failed to take root. Political instability ensued. Anti-state ideologies began to proliferate. Corruption and misgovernance escalated. Eventually, conditions deteriorated to the point that military intervention became inevitable. Ideally, this should not have happened, but it did, and it was an ominous precedent.
The military, too, developed a taste for power, which was rationalized under the guise of constitutional responsibility. This practice, however, was confined to a select few at the highest echelons of command; as an institution, the Pakistan Army remained largely untainted. This was the critical juncture at which politicians and bureaucrats strategically used the military as a tool to further their interests.
It is now imperative to engage and educate the younger generation with a truthful and balanced narrative. Elected representatives must be confined to their legislative functions, while developmental projects should be entrusted to autonomous local governments. Comprehensive legal and institutional reforms are essential. The civil bureaucracy must be restructured and redefined—not as rulers, but as public servants.
The Election Commission must be empowered, and the judiciary must regain public trust through transparent and impartial rulings. The military, at the very least, should be granted a formal constitutional role for an initial period of 30 years to ensure stability. Given the prevailing literacy rate and the conduct of political parties, a transition toward a presidential system should be seriously considered. If such a shift is not feasible, then at the very least, fundamental reforms must be introduced within the civil service.
Pakistan stands at a crossroads. The path we choose today will determine whether we emerge as a strong, sovereign state or remain entangled in the vicious cycle of misgovernance, exploitation, and institutional decay. The responsibility to correct course does not rest with a single institution—it is a collective obligation, and time is of the essence.
