Editorial
Taking a timely decision, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) government has banned the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JK-JAAC) under anti-terrorism laws and tightened security across AJK ahead of a planned protest on June 9.
JK-JAAC has long been involved in creating law-and-order problems in Azad Kashmir. During previous protest campaigns, it resorted to violence and was allegedly involved in the killing of security personnel. Once again, this group, whose past remains controversial, is attempting to thrust Azad Kashmir into international headlines through a protest that could potentially result in violence. In such a situation, the state would be compelled to respond to protect public property, creating the possibility of clashes. Such scenes could then be exploited by certain Indian-sponsored international media outlets.
Viewed within the broader global context, several questions remain unanswered regarding the role of JK-JAAC in creating unrest in Azad Kashmir. India’s information warfare apparatus is now fully exploiting both the internal situation in Azad Kashmir and the ban on JK-JAAC. The narrative promoted by the Indian state and state-linked media is largely unified: that the Gilgit-Baltistan elections are illegitimate, that Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir are inseparable parts of India, and that Pakistan must vacate these territories. India has formally protested the Gilgit-Baltistan elections and is using diplomatic channels to construct a legal and political basis for future action.
On the other hand, India’s Mountain Strike Corps and Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) remain positioned along the Line of Control (LoC), configured for rapid, limited offensive operations in difficult terrain. The induction of a fourth S-400 squadron and the recent hypersonic missile test have enhanced India’s air defence and deep-strike capabilities, potentially supporting a Cross-LoC operation.
India is executing what some analysts describe as a deliberate, multi-phase strategy: first, constructing a legal and diplomatic claim over Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir; second, building a humanitarian casus belli through the JK-JAAC narrative; and third, waiting for developments on the ground to generate imagery (violence) that could be used to justify intervention.
Former diplomats believe that Pakistan’s diplomatic counter-offensive must accelerate. Pakistan should formally brief foreign diplomats in Islamabad regarding India’s information warfare campaign, providing evidence of any alleged attempts to manufacture a pretext for intervention. The water dispute dossier should also be advanced in parallel to demonstrate a broader pattern of coercive pressure. Former military officials, meanwhile, argue that full military readiness should be maintained along the LoC and in the Gilgit-Baltistan region.
JK-JAAC previously operated as a pressure group, demanding near-free electricity, subsidised wheat, and a tax-free economy. The government accommodated many of its demands, some of which were even considered impractical, in an effort to maintain public harmony and treat the organisation as a legitimate public-interest group. Over time, however, the group’s demands expanded into areas involving structural and constitutional issues. The organisation was also repeatedly linked to violent incidents, including clashes in which police personnel were killed. Despite these concerns, the government continued engaging with the group.
The situation changed when some of the group’s demands entered sensitive political territory, including the abolition of assembly seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees who migrated from illegally Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. At that stage, concerns emerged among some observers regarding possible external influences behind these demands.
On June 5, 2026, the AJK Home Department subsequently issued a formal notification placing JK-JAAC on the First Schedule of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014, thereby banning the organisation and all associated entities following presidential approval.
According to the notification, the organisation had acted in a manner prejudicial to the peace and security of the state and had been involved in creating anarchy, intimidating the public, promoting hatred, and fostering a sense of insecurity within society. Citing Section 12 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2014, the notification formally confirmed the group’s inclusion in the First Schedule, covering all alternative names and associated entities.
A review of the situation indicates that 35 of the committee’s 38 demands had already been accepted or implemented, while progress continued on the remaining issues through established forums, including a Monitoring and Implementation Committee and an independent Committee of Experts tasked with examining sensitive constitutional matters. Despite this, JK-JAAC continued to organise protests, many of which were accompanied by tensions and violence.
The AJK government stated that it had pursued negotiations and relief measures, wheat subsidies, reductions in property taxes, open-merit policies in education and recruitment, and various administrative and financial reforms. It maintained that demands relating to taxation, revenue systems, refugee seats, and official privileges required constitutional and legal procedures rather than street agitation and were already under structured consultation.
Among the most controversial demands was the abolition of the 12 seats reserved for Pakistan-based Kashmiris in the AJK Legislative Assembly, a proposal that is illogical and can harm Kashmir’s cause. Such demands and the previous conduct of JK-JAAC has raised several questions, including the rationale behind its campaign against the 12 refugee seats because senior Kashmiri politicians argue that there may be motives beyond ordinary politics behind the demand to abolish these seats.
Historically, refugee seats have not been a major source of controversy. Many Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir believe that refugees from illegally Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir sacrificed their homes, property, businesses, and livelihoods and therefore they deserve continued political representation so these seats are an integral component of the broader Kashmir cause.
Kashmiri politicians say that while electoral reforms, voter registration reviews, and improvements to the election process can be debated, the outright abolition of refugee seats is both illogical and unjustified as these seats are widely regarded as a symbol of the Kashmir freedom struggle and of the identity of displaced Kashmiris so eliminating them would undermine that historical legacy.
The AJK Legislative Assembly consists of 53 members, including 33 general seats, 12 seats reserved for refugees from Jammu and Kashmir, and eight reserved seats for special categories.
The 12 refugee seats were allocated to Kashmiris who migrated from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and settled in Pakistan’s provinces between 1947 and 1965, ensuring that their political representation in the legislative framework of Azad Kashmir remained intact.
Critics claim that these 12 seats enable the federal government to influence the formation or dissolution of governments in Azad Kashmir. However, supporters of the existing arrangement argue that a no-confidence motion requires 27 votes. Even if all 12 refugee-seat members were to vote together, additional votes would still be required. They further point out that political defections among representatives elected from general seats have occurred repeatedly over the past two decades and deserve equal scrutiny.
Supporters of refugee representation also argue that displaced Kashmiris have every right to participate in decisions concerning the future of Kashmir. Removing their representation, they contend, would amount to denying their historical and political identity.
Refugee representation is therefore not merely an electoral matter, it symbolises the continued connection of displaced Kashmiris to their homeland despite migration, partition, and decades of conflict.
Historical records indicate that during the Ayub Khan era, the Electoral College for the President and Council Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir included 2,400 representatives, of whom approximately 1,200 were refugees. Archival records published on 31 August 1961 reportedly document this arrangement.
Supporters of the refugee-seat system also note that leaders such as Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan and Sardar Ibrahim Khan relied on support from both resident and refugee Kashmiris and included prominent refugee leaders in their administrations. They argue that many contemporary critics are unfamiliar with this historical context.
Questions have also been raised regarding the financial dimension of the debate. Critics of refugee representation sometimes argue that refugee-seat members receive disproportionate resources. However, supporters contend that for many years these representatives received little or no development funding and that any allocations they currently receive are modest compared with the resources available to other legislators.
Supporters of refugee seats in AJK argue that the situations are fundamentally different and that comparing them is misleading. They contend that preserving the political identity of displaced Kashmiris is consistent with the broader objective of keeping the Kashmir issue alive rather than erasing the historical experience of displacement.
Three arguments are commonly raised regarding the impact of refugee representation on the local population. The first concerns land allotments, an issue that is largely considered settled. The second involves quotas in education and employment, many of which have already been abolished following court rulings. The third concerns voting rights. Supporters argue that, as Kashmiris, refugee communities should retain the right to vote in matters concerning Kashmir’s future.
While thinking about Kashmir issue one should take in mind that Kashmiris all over the world have one-point agenda and that is decision of Kashmir under UNSC resolution— a plebiscite that can determine the future of Kashmiris so dividing them in refugees or local is an attempt to undermine their struggle and right to vote for their future.
