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Russia confirmed presence of international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan

Monitoring Desk: The spokesperson of Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova has said that Afghanistan is currently grappling with the activities of international terrorist organizations.

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the eradication of terrorism originating from Afghan soil should be a shared objective, requiring all nations to work together against international terrorism.

During a press briefing on November 20, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Russia had on various occasions and at different levels, expressed its willingness to assist in facilitating dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. She noted that Moscow views engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan as a vital means of maintaining regional peace and security and supports diplomatic efforts to resolve differences. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson clarified that while Russia is prepared to facilitate such talks, the consent of both Islamabad and Kabul would be essential.

Discussing the situation in Afghanistan, Maria Zakharova emphasized that stability is crucial (in Afghanistan), given that the country is currently grappling with the activities of international terrorist organizations.

She specifically mentioned the activities of the terrorist group ISIS-K (Islamic State – Khorasan Province) and underscored the necessity of addressing the threat of terrorism within Afghanistan.

She further stressed that there should be no room for hidden agendas or double standards in the fight against terrorism. In the context of Pakistan’s call for concrete action against terrorist organizations operating from Afghan soil, a Russian spokesperson highlighted the importance of joint cooperation for regional security and counter-terrorism.

“Pakistan is a key partner for Russia in the fight against terrorism in South Asia; the activities of terrorist organizations on Afghan soil pose a threat to regional security,” said Maria Zakharova.

Reaffirming its commitment to continued counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan, Russia has offered to act as a mediator to help resolve tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan and facilitate the resumption of dialogue. The Russian Foreign Ministry has identified Pakistan as a key partner in the fight against terrorism in South Asia. Furthermore, it has denied the existence of any ban on Russian student visas for Pakistani citizens and has assured that the individual cases of affected students will be examined in consultation with the relevant government agencies.

Discussing Russia’s relations with Pakistan, Maria Zakharova stated that Pakistan is among Russia’s key partners in the fight against terrorism in South Asia.

She noted that Russia maintains close contact and cooperation with Islamabad on this issue at a bilateral level, while consultations between the two countries also continue across various multilateral platforms.

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized that cooperation among regional states is essential for effective counter-terrorism measures, and that Russia values ​​its engagement with Pakistan in this sphere.

Maria Zakharova affirmed Russia’s support for the principle that regional problems should be resolved at the regional level.

She stressed the need to strike a balance—taking into account local conditions, regional specificities, and the interests of the concerned nations—particularly when dealing with sensitive matters such as counter-terrorism cooperation.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, counter-terrorism efforts should be viewed in conjunction with the socio-economic development of Afghanistan and the strengthening of the security capabilities of its state institutions.

Referring to various regional consultative frameworks concerning Afghanistan, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that Russia continues to cooperate with Pakistan in this regard. She specifically mentioned the Moscow Format on Afghanistan, the four-nation consultative mechanism comprising Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, the coordination mechanism of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

According to Maria Zakharova, Russia prioritizes the Moscow Format because it serves as a broad platform for regional consultations regarding Afghanistan. She emphasized the importance of these regional platforms regarding security matters concerning Afghanistan and cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Responding to a question regarding visa problems for Pakistani students to Russia, Maria Zakharova reiterated that there is no ban on issuing student visas to Pakistani citizens in Russia.

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Curtain Raiser: Pakistan–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission is ready to address bilateral trade bottlenecks

DND Special Report: Prime Minister of Pakistan Mohammad Shehbaz Sharif is scheduled to visit Moscow in the last week of this month. Pakistan and Russia are working together to make this visit more than merely a routine engagement and are confident that the event will reshape and revitalise bilateral relations between the two countries.

Pakistan’s foreign policy, under the vision of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is based on ‘connectivity’ with verifiable and tangible results. Islamabad has mastered the art of navigating relations between the United States and China and has perceptibly added Russia to its diplomatic equation. Global unipolarity is a reality, and the recent trilateral talks involving President Putin, President Trump and President Xi have demonstrated that even superpowers are considering collective efforts to address the challenges arising from changing global realities. Pakistan strongly believes that the 21st century is an era of connectivity that must be based on mutual prosperity. Trade and business are therefore key to this connectivity, and Pakistan and Russia lag behind in this sphere. Consequently, both countries are working extensively to mitigate the obstacles hampering bilateral trade and are prioritising their resolution before President Putin meets Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Moscow this month.

With bilateral commerce languishing near multi-year lows, Pakistan is preparing an economic and financial reset ahead of this meeting. The 11th Session of the Pakistan–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC), scheduled to convene in Moscow from November 23 to 25, will focus on this issue.

According to available information, Pakistani negotiators are heading to the Russian capital with a clear mandate: to dismantle the banking, regulatory and logistical bottlenecks that have crippled bilateral trade and double Pakistan’s exports to Russia from US$55.6 million to at least US$112 million within the next 18 to 24 months.

Official figures compiled through the Pakistan Single Window (PSW) reveal that Pakistan’s exports to Russia have plummeted by roughly 68 percent over the past five years, tumbling from an all-time high of US$171.94 million in FY2020-21 to a dismal US$55.55 million in FY2025-26. Early data from the first four months of the current fiscal year (July–October FY2026-27) paints an even grimmer picture, with exports registering just US$15.72 million, putting annual shipments on track to fall below US$50 million unless immediate corrective measures are enacted. Overall bilateral trade has similarly contracted, shrinking from US$963.07 million in FY2023-24 to US$206.59 million in FY2025-26, largely due to a sharp drop in Pakistani imports of Russian pulses.

Trade economists and commerce officials stress that the steep erosion of Pakistan’s market share in Russia is not the result of waning Russian consumer demand. Since the onset of Western sanctions in 2022, Moscow has been forced to decouple from European supply chains across a vast spectrum of consumer and industrial goods, including apparel, footwear, leather products, pharmaceuticals, surgical instruments and processed foods. While regional competitors such as China, Turkey, India, Uzbekistan and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) states have moved aggressively to fill the vacuum, Pakistan has remained largely sidelined.

According to PITAD’s diagnostic assessment prepared for the Ministry of Commerce, the binding constraints lie squarely on the operational side of transactions. Chief among these is a near-total paralysis of formal banking channels. Fearing exposure to secondary Western sanctions, Pakistani commercial banks have avoided maintaining correspondent relationships with Russian counterparts. With Letters of Credit (LCs) virtually unavailable, exporters and importers on both sides have been forced to demand risky advance cash payments, stifling routine commercial transactions.

Sources in the Ministry of Finance are of the view that, to break the trade deadlock at next week’s Moscow summit, Islamabad’s delegation will place financial engineering and countertrade at the top of the agenda. Rather than relying on conventional hard-currency transfers, Pakistan intends to leverage its existing import bill as a financial engine for its exporters.

Dried pulses, such as chickpeas, lentils and peas, currently account for roughly 95 percent of Pakistan’s imports from Russia, valued at between US$140 million and US$220 million annually. Under the government’s amended barter framework, SRO 1989(I)/2025, which scrapped the restrictive “import-first” requirement and authorised multi-party consortia, Islamabad is proposing “linked-trade” structures. Under this model, major pulse importers in Karachi and Lahore will be paired with consortia of Pakistani rice, kinnow, potato, textile and leather exporters. Pakistani importers will settle their dues by paying domestic exporters in Pakistani rupees (PKR), while Russian pulse suppliers will offset the value against incoming Pakistani goods.

Alongside private-sector barter, Pakistan plans to push for mandatory export-offset clauses in state-level procurements of Russian urea, DAP fertiliser, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and crude oil. Negotiators are also set to formally respond to Russia’s January 2026 Note Verbale regarding barter pilots by sharing verified lists of Pakistani importers of fertilisers, steel, plastics and rubber, while asking Moscow to nominate confirmed buyers for Pakistani chrome ore, cotton and seafood.

On the banking front, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is expected to finalise a bilateral settlement framework with the Central Bank of Russia. The proposed architecture involves designating one or two Pakistani banks with zero US-dollar clearing exposure, or creating ring-fenced banking windows, to operate PKR and Russian rouble (RUB) correspondent accounts with non-sanctioned Russian lenders. Supported by a domestic clearing and escrow account, local-currency and Chinese yuan (CNY) invoicing, buyer-risk insurance from EXIM Bank of Pakistan and a joint compliance vetting desk, the mechanism is designed to insulate Pakistani businesses from sanctions risks while guaranteeing timely payments.

Beyond finance, the Pakistani side may press Moscow for immediate regulatory breakthroughs in agriculture and digital commerce ahead of the winter export season.

In the agro-food sector, Pakistan’s export basket remains perilously narrow, with five textiles, leather and surgical product lines accounting for 80 percent of total shipments. Despite Russia being one of the world’s largest consumers of mandarins, Pakistani citrus exports fetched a mere US$0.75 million in FY2025-26. With the December–April kinnow season imminent, Islamabad will ask Moscow to rapidly accredit additional Pakistani orchards and packhouses, accept joint pre-shipment inspections by Pakistan’s Department of Plant Protection (DPP), and lift the long-standing restriction on Pakistani rice through remote video inspections. Pakistan will also seek broader approval for potato exporters, after only three firms were cleared when the market reopened in April 2026, and offer reciprocal market access for Russian meat and dairy products in exchange for the registration of Pakistani halal meat and seafood plants.

To slash transit times from over a month by sea to roughly 20–25 days, Pakistan Railways and Russian Railways (RZD) are working to finalise a launch date and regular monthly schedule for the 7,000-kilometre pilot container train running through Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Recognising geopolitical vulnerabilities along the Iranian leg, Pakistani planners are also exploring contingency overland routes via Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, alongside greater utilisation of International Road Transport (TIR) corridors. However, this factor depends on security situation in Afghanistan.

When Pakistani and Russian officials sit down in Moscow on November 23, Islamabad’s wish list will also include signing the pending Programme for Trade & Economic Cooperation (2025–30), establishing a bonded Pakistani showroom in Moscow, creating a registration support fund for Sialkot’s surgical manufacturers and pharmaceutical exporters, expanding tariff concessions under the EAEU Unified System of Tariff Preferences, and launching a joint feasibility study for a future Pakistan–EAEU Preferential Trade Agreement.

If successfully negotiated and backed by rigorous quarterly monitoring in Islamabad, officials believe the Moscow session could mark a decisive turning point, not only halting a five-year export slide but also laying the structural groundwork to propel bilateral exports towards a stretch target of US$250 million by the end of the decade.

 

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Terrorists on the run as security forces gain ground following Governor’s Rule in KP

DND Special Report

Security forces and the Pakistan Army are gaining ground in troubled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), particularly along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as intensified counterterrorism operations have put terrorist networks under mounting pressure following the imposition of emergency and Governor’s Rule in the province.

Terrorists on the run as security forces gain ground following Governor’s Rule in KP

Over the past 30 days, from October 20 to November 19, 2026, security forces have conducted a series of successful intelligence-based operations (IBOs) across KP, killing scores of terrorists belonging to Indian-sponsored Fitna al-Khwarij, the designation used by Pakistan for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated terrorist networks.

The operations have targeted terrorist hideouts, weapons depots, explosives manufacturing facilities and clandestine installations in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mir Ali, Bannu, Tank, Orakzai, Kurram, Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan.

Security circles believe that the imposition of Governor’s Rule has facilitated improved coordination between federal authorities, the civil administration and security institutions, allowing security forces greater operational space to pursue terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. They argue that the security apparatus can now conduct operations more effectively, unlike during the previous PTI provincial government, when, according to these circles, terrorists enjoyed sufficient operational freedom and deep-rooted connections within KP provincial government had been facilitated information to terrorists before operations of security forces.

The federal government imposed emergency measures and Governor’s Rule in KP on October 11, 2026, invoking Articles 232 and 234 of the Constitution. It maintained that the measures were necessary to address deteriorating security conditions, strengthen federal-military coordination and restore peace.

Despite the political disagreement, the succession of military operations during the past month reflects an intensified campaign against terrorist networks, with security forces increasingly targeting not only terrorists but also the infrastructure sustaining their activities. Terrorists had access to illegal goldmining also in Kohat where 90kg plus gold was excavated monthly and sent to Afghanistan. One can say that Pakistan’s goldmines were also at the disposal of terrorists under the direct protection of PTI previous provincial government.

The latest major success was reported by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) on November 19, following multiple engagements conducted on November 16 and 17.

According to the military’s media wing, security forces killed 22 terrorists belonging to Indian-sponsored Fitna al-Khwarij in South Waziristan, Bannu and Tank districts.

On the reported presence of Khwarij, security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation in South Waziristan District. During the operation, troops effectively engaged terrorist positions and, following an intense exchange of fire, killed 15 terrorists.

In two separate encounters in Bannu District, security forces engaged terrorist hideouts, neutralising six of them through precise and skilful engagements. Another terrorist was killed in an encounter in Tank District.

Weapons and ammunition were recovered from the slain terrorists, who had been actively involved in numerous terrorist activities in their respective areas.

Explosives manufacturing facility uncovered in Mir Ali

In another significant development, security forces uncovered a large, organised facility used by Fitna al-Khwarij for manufacturing explosives, dealing a major blow to the terrorist network. A US manual of weapons was also recovered from the laboratory.

The clandestine laboratory had been established inside civilian residential houses to conceal its activities and avoid detection. Security forces discovered the facility before it could be used for further terrorist activities, averting a potential large-scale catastrophe in the area.

Establishing explosives factories and storing bomb-making materials in densely populated civilian areas is part of the terrorist organisations’ strategy of using ordinary people as human shields. Such practices expose innocent residents, including women and children, to potentially devastating consequences.

Stockpiling explosives in residential areas of Mir Ali is not a new tactic for Fitna al-Khwarij. Similar clandestine caches have previously resulted in devastating explosions and mass casualties, claiming the lives of innocent children, women and other civilians.

The terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated disregard for local customs, social values and human life by establishing operational facilities in residential neighbourhoods and places where ordinary citizens live and even inside mosques.

Mir Ali residents reject terrorists and refuse to claim their bodies

The ongoing operations have also highlighted growing public resentment against terrorist organisations in areas that have suffered prolonged violence and intimidation.

Residents of Mir Ali have reportedly reached the limit of their patience with Fitna al-Khwarij and are standing alongside security forces in their efforts to restore peace.

The public rejection of terrorists has reportedly reached such an extent that local residents have categorically refused to participate in the funeral rites of slain Khwarij. Even the parents of some terrorist facilitators have reportedly disassociated themselves from the criminal activities of their offspring and refused to claim or bury their bodies.

Following the refusal of families and local residents to claim the bodies, the district administration was compelled to bury the slain terrorists in unmarked graves.

The development reflects the growing social isolation of terrorist elements in the region and the resentment of communities that have endured years of militancy, intimidation and violence.

16 terrorists killed in North Waziristan; two soldiers martyred

On November 14, security forces killed 16 terrorists during a series of intelligence-based operations in North Waziristan District, while two Pakistan Army soldiers embraced martyrdom.

Security forces targeted multiple locations in Mir Ali, Datta Khel and surrounding areas. During an intense exchange of fire in Ali Khel, troops killed 12 terrorists, including two Afghan nationals. Another two terrorists each were neutralised in separate engagements in Mir Ali and Datta Khel.

The operations dealt a significant blow to terrorist networks operating in the region, although the martyrdom of two soldiers highlighted the sacrifices being made by security personnel in confronting entrenched terrorist groups.

43 terrorists eliminated in North Waziristan and Orakzai

On November 13, security forces reported another major achievement, killing 43 terrorists in KP over a 48-hour period.

Of the 43 terrorists eliminated in KP, 35 were killed during engagements targeting Fitna al-Khwarij hideouts in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. In a separate operation in Orakzai District, security forces killed another eight terrorists.

During subsequent clearance operations, troops recovered large caches of weapons, ammunition and explosives, exposing the scale of terrorist infrastructure established in these areas.

Terrorist hideouts and torture cells exposed in Mir Ali

On November 8 and 9, security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation in Muzak village, on the southern outskirts of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, targeting two terrorist hideouts established inside mosques.

According to ISPR, terrorists had been using the places of worship to store prepared improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bomb-making materials, weapons and ammunition. The premises were also being used as torture cells.

Security forces sanitised the locations and initiated follow-up clearance operations.

The discovery exposed the exploitation of religious places by terrorist organisations for criminal and operational activities, putting worshippers and surrounding communities at risk.

Operations intensified in Kurram and Bannu

Between November 3 and 7, security forces continued intelligence-based operations in Kurram District, targeting terrorist sanctuaries close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The operations, initiated on November 3, were aimed at clearing areas being used by terrorist networks for movement, concealment and other activities.

Separately, on November 7, security forces conducted a targeted raid in Bannu District, killing four terrorists and recovering weapons.

These operations formed part of the broader effort to dismantle terrorist infrastructure and prevent terrorists from using border-adjacent districts as safe havens.

CTD operation in Peshawar

On October 29, security forces and the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) conducted a joint intelligence-based operation in the Akhun Baba Graveyard area of Peshawar.

Supported by aerial surveillance, ground troops engaged terrorist elements, killing five terrorists. Several suspects were also arrested, while weapons and ammunition were recovered.

On the same day, Director General ISPR Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, during a media session in Peshawar, reaffirmed that intelligence-based operations in KP would continue until terrorism was completely eliminated.

Six terrorists killed in Dera Ismail Khan; two soldiers martyred

Earlier, on October 26, security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation in Dera Ismail Khan District, killing six terrorists.

Two Pakistan Army soldiers embraced martyrdom during an intense exchange of fire. Following the engagement, sanitisation operations were launched to clear the area of remaining terrorist threats and prevent terrorists from regrouping.

Counterterrorism campaign continues under Azm-e-Istehkam

The operations conducted between October 20 and November 19 represent an intensified phase of Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign under the broader vision of Azm-e-Istehkam.

The successive engagements have targeted terrorist leadership, hideouts, weapons storage locations, explosives manufacturing facilities, torture cells and logistical networks. Recoveries of weapons, ammunition and explosives, alongside the discovery of clandestine manufacturing installations in civilian residential areas, have exposed the infrastructure supporting terrorist activities.

The involvement of Afghan nationals in terrorist networks was also evident from the November 14 operation in Ali Khel, where two Afghan nationals were among the 12 terrorists killed.

Meanwhile, the reported refusal of Mir Ali residents and families to claim the bodies of slain terrorists reflects the growing resentment against terrorist organisations among communities that have suffered from their activities.

Security forces are increasingly focusing on dismantling the infrastructure, supply chains, explosives manufacturing facilities and logistical arrangements that enable militancy to survive.

The stated objective of the ongoing campaign remains the complete elimination of terrorism and restoration of lasting peace in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

 

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Bilawal Bhutto’s shifting poles make a mockery of his politics

DND Report: Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has historically been in favour of a separate province of South Punjab and contested at least four elections with the slogan of providing a separate administrative unit to the people of South Punjab, which is geographically linked to the province of Sindh.

The PPP has also supported the creation of a separate province/administrative unit of Hazara by carving it out of KP. However, the same party has taken an extreme position on the separation of urban Sindh from rural Sindh. What a mockery of the party’s stated position on the same issue with two different slogans! Is this not hypocritical politics?

When the PPP previously supported the creation of a South Punjab province, it justified this difference by stating that the demand for South Punjab enjoyed broad consensus among the region’s elected representatives, whereas dividing Sindh lacked consensus among the province’s broader population and provincial legislature.

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari opposes carving new provinces out of existing ones—particularly the division of Sindh—arguing that such a move violates constitutional procedures, lacks political consensus and fails to address Pakistan’s core economic and governance crises. On one point, he is right: new administrative units would become a burden on the federation if governance issues were not addressed through an overhaul of the entire civil administrative structure. A streamlined civil bureaucracy would bring greater financial and administrative benefits than the existing system. He is also right that political consensus is needed for carving new provinces out of existing ones.

He should, therefore, support the proposed referendum to ascertain public opinion on the creation of new provinces and help build political consensus. He should respect the reality that political consensus does not mean the consensus of political parties alone; rather, it means the consensus of the public. Why, then, is the PPP opposed to seeking the public’s mandate and opinion on this critical issue?

Moreover, political consensus does not mean that this is the prerogative of the PPP alone. Other political parties, such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P), have long been demanding a separate urban province. The PPP’s illogical stance on new provinces appears to be an attempt to protect its 50-year electoral stronghold in Sindh, while Bilawal Bhutto frames his opposition around constitutional, economic and security arguments rather than partisan survival.

Bilawal Bhutto has gone too far and warned that any “forced” attempt to divide Sindh against the will of its people would have severe security consequences, stating that imposed divisions could lead to bloodshed on the streets of Karachi.

The PPP is merely protecting its political turf by relying on specific constitutional and historical justifications, particularly Article 239 of the Constitution. Under Pakistan’s Constitution, altering the boundaries of a province cannot be done through a federal executive order or a simple referendum. It requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament, as well as a two-thirds majority vote in the affected provincial assembly. Because the PPP holds a commanding majority in the Sindh Assembly, it argues that its opposition is a legitimate exercise of constitutional provincial autonomy.

Bilawal Bhutto is silent on the possible question that could be raised through a referendum: whether there should be new provinces or not. If the answer is in favour of new provinces, then provincial assemblies should respect the public demand and proceed with passing resolutions for the creation of new provinces under Article 239(4).

Pakistan must not remain hostage to political parties and their power structures. Rather, it should move forward, and, for that matter, the Constitution must be amended to accommodate emerging demands.

 

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Ansarullah Tajikistan, ISKP and TTP collaborate under the leadership of Afghan Taliban, claims report

Monitoring Desk

The Afghan Taliban regime has been providing intelligence, financial assistance and weapons to Jamaat Ansarullah, also known as Ansarullah Tajikistan or the “Tajik Taliban,” since returning to power in Afghanistan, raising serious security concerns for Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region.

According to intelligence circles in Tajikistan, the militant organization receives direct financial support from the Taliban regime, including a share of revenues generated through mining operations in northern Afghanistan. Available information further suggests that some of the funding is transferred through cryptocurrency to Hanzala Tajikistan, who serves as the group’s financial chief.

Jamaat Ansarullah was founded in 2006 by Amriddin Tabarov, a former field commander during the Tajik Civil War who rejected the 1997 peace agreement. The organization, primarily composed of Tajik nationals, is an ethno-nationalist jihadist group seeking to overthrow the government of President Emomali Rahmon and establish an Islamic emirate in Tajikistan along the lines of Afghanistan’s Taliban system.

Following Tabarov’s death in 2015, leadership of the organization passed to Mahdi Arsalan, also known as Muhammad Sharipov, a Tajik national who fought alongside the Afghan Taliban and subsequently participated in the Syrian conflict.

International monitoring reports, including assessments by the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal, have documented the Afghan Taliban regime’s military assistance to Jamaat Ansarullah. According to these assessments, the Taliban equipped the group’s fighters with military hardware seized from US forces and deployed them to guard strategically important districts along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border in Badakhshan province.

United Nations reports have also indicated that Jamaat Ansarullah operates dedicated training camps in Afghanistan’s Khost and Takhar provinces, where Al-Qaeda instructors are reportedly involved in training activities. The organization also maintains an infiltration unit known as Ansar in Kunduz province.

Security assessments issued in 2025 and mid-2026 by Tajik intelligence networks documented infiltration attempts in the Afghan-Tajik border region involving homemade explosives and drone strikes. These incidents also included deadly attacks targeting Chinese contractors operating near the border, highlighting the potential threat posed by militant networks operating in northern Afghanistan.

Available information suggests that Ansarullah Tajikistan, ISIS‑Khorasan (ISKP) and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) collaborate under the leadership of Afghan Taliban, creating a complex, multi‑layered militant ecosystem in the Afghanistan–Pakistan–Tajikistan borderlands. This network characterized by overlapping loyalties, covert state-linked facilitation, and inter-group tactical cooperation that poses escalating risks to Central Asian stability, regional counterterrorism frameworks, and international security mandates.
Available information suggests that Ansarullah Tajikistan, ISIS‑Khorasan (ISKP) and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) collaborate under the leadership of Afghan Taliban, creating a complex, multi‑layered militant ecosystem in the Afghanistan–Pakistan–Tajikistan borderlands. This network characterized by overlapping loyalties, covert state-linked facilitation, and inter-group tactical cooperation that poses escalating risks to Central Asian stability.

Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban regime has significantly expanded mining activities since returning to power, particularly in gold, emeralds and rare minerals across northern provinces, including Badakhshan and Panjshir. The regime has reportedly signed more than 200 mining contracts with domestic and foreign companies.

Local Taliban commanders and allied militant factions deployed around mining sites frequently receive direct shares of revenues or extraction fees, which are used to finance their operational activities. Intelligence assessments indicate that this revenue-sharing arrangement has also become a source of financial support for militant organizations operating under Taliban patronage.

The alleged Taliban support for Jamaat Ansarullah has emerged as a major source of tension between Kabul and Dushanbe, making Tajikistan one of the most vocal opponents of the Taliban regime in Central Asia.

In response to growing security concerns, Tajikistan has strengthened security along its 843-mile border with Afghanistan. Dushanbe has also provided a platform to anti-Taliban resistance figures, including leaders of the National Resistance Front, while repeatedly warning international organizations that northern Afghanistan is increasingly becoming a potential launchpad for regional destabilization.

The alleged combination of financial assistance, military equipment, intelligence cooperation and cross-border militant deployments has raised concerns that Afghanistan could once again become a base for militant networks threatening the security of neighbouring Central Asian states.

Available information suggests that Ansarullah Tajikistan, ISIS‑Khorasan (ISKP) and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) collaborate under the leadership of Afghan Taliban, creating a complex, multi‑layered militant ecosystem in the Afghanistan–Pakistan–Tajikistan borderlands. This network characterized by overlapping loyalties, covert state-linked facilitation, and inter-group tactical cooperation that poses escalating risks to Central Asian stability, regional counterterrorism frameworks, and international security mandates.

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Russian State University for the Humanities and UMT Lahore ready for future collaboration

Monitoring Desk: Pakistan’s and Russian academicians can collaborate in several fields, including joint research, youth exchange programmes and collective publications, and can play a pivotal role in enhancing people to people relations between the two nations.

This was observed during a meeting held in Moscow between Dr Shazia Anwer Cheema, Director (Nominated) of the Centre for Performing and Fine Arts at the University of Management and Technology (UMT), Lahore, and the leadership of the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH).

 

The meeting was attended by Acting Vice-Rector for International Cooperation Vera Zabotkina; Alexander Markov, Professor, Department of Cinema and Contemporary Art, Faculty of Art History; Irina Bakanova, Director of the Museum Centre; Natalia Pakhomova, Deputy Director, Department of International Cooperation; and Alexander Stolyarov, Associate Professor, Department of Foreign Regional Studies and Foreign Policy, Faculty of International Relations, Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences. Also present were the Director of the University International Center for the Study of South Asia and Indira Gazieva, Deputy Director of the University International Center for the Study of South Asia.

Russian State University for the Humanities and UMT Lahore ready for future collaboration

The meeting was facilitated by Pakistan’s Embassy in Moscow as part of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s initiative to enhance educational and institutional collaborations among foreign and Pakistani universities.

Russian State University for the Humanities and UMT Lahore ready for future collaboration

During the meeting RSUH’s leadership maintained that developing academic cooperation with UMT through joint online lectures and academic exchanges would be beneficial for both the institutions. The areas such as museology, art history, cognitive sciences and the cognitive study of the arts were considered to be on priority in the proposed collaboration. Furthermore, the possibility of developing joint educational programmes may also be explored.

During the meeting, Dr Shazia Anwer Cheema was of the view that students from both countries would benefit from such collaboration, which would also enhance their international exposure.

It may be mentioned that the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH), which builds on the long-standing traditions of the Moscow State Institute of History and Archives, is a major academic and educational institution specialising in the humanities, social sciences and interdisciplinary research.

The University has experience in international academic exchanges, joint educational programmes, visiting lectures and cooperation with foreign universities.

The Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) is an official branch of the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow. Its museum complex comprises seven exhibition halls housing plaster casts of prominent works of art from leading European museums, representing different periods from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance.

The University promotes the concept of education through art, integrating artistic and cultural heritage into its academic programmes. Students have the opportunity to attend courses in art history, museology and related disciplines, gaining both theoretical knowledge and a deeper appreciation of European artistic traditions.

 

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Shehbaz Sharif’s Russia visit expected to redefine Pakistan-Russia relations

DND Special Report

Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif will pay an official visit to Russia in the last week of November. Diplomatic circles in Islamabad are taking a special interest in this visit, as a majority of diplomats believe that the forthcoming visit could reshape Pakistan-Russia relations against the backdrop of a shifting global balance of power from West to East.

A number of retired diplomats with whom DND News Agency spoke were of the view that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s upcoming official visit to Russia carries special significance because it signals a deliberate effort by Islamabad to diversify its foreign policy and build institutional economic ties with Moscow amid a rapidly changing global order.

They believe that, historically constrained by Cold War alignments, Pakistan’s outreach to Russia reflects a pragmatic pivot towards multipolarity and regional integration. They consider the trip particularly consequential for several reasons, including deepening economic and energy cooperation, expanding regional connectivity, navigating complex regional security dynamics, and maintaining strategic balance in a multipolar world.

It is pertinent to mention that Prime Minister Sharif is taking a large business delegation with him and is also scheduled to address a joint business forum, reflecting his priority of achieving tangible commercial outcomes from the visit. Potential areas of commercial cooperation include discounted Russian crude oil, LNG and gas pipeline projects, alongside possible Russian investment in rehabilitating flagship industrial assets such as Pakistan Steel Mills in Karachi. Although Russia’s oil and gas sectors are under US sanctions and Pakistan has traditionally respected US sanctions, diplomatic circles believe that Islamabad can find a way forward in this regard, as groundwork is already underway to explore possibilities for energy cooperation with Russia.

“PM Shehbaz Sharif had made it clear that he did not want the visit to Russia to be limited merely to taking joint photographs, signing agreements and returning home, instead, he wanted to leave behind a consolidated and solid foundation for developing future economic and diplomatic relations with Russia”

A series of high-level exchanges, including Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev’s landmark visit to Islamabad in October 2026, has provided a critical platform for President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Sharif to address existing variances, particularly their divergent approaches towards Afghanistan, border security and counterterrorism. Diplomatic circles are of the view that Pakistan understands that Afghanistan-Russia relations are not directed against Pakistan but are based on the Kremlin’s own strategic and security considerations.

Sources in the Foreign Office believe that banking and connectivity are two of the most important and pressing issues that must be addressed to move Pakistan-Russia relations beyond episodic diplomacy towards a sustained strategic and economic partnership.

When contacted by DND News Agency for comments on the forthcoming visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister to Russia, Ambassador of Pakistan to Russia Faisal Niaz Tirmizi said that the purpose of the visit is not merely to sign agreements but to promote practical economic cooperation between the two countries, enhance people-to-people contacts, and provide a platform for Russian and Pakistani businessmen, manufacturers, industrialists and traders to explore tangible business and trade opportunities.

Responding to a question, Ambassador Tirmizi said that the two countries had identified three fundamental obstacles to increasing bilateral trade: visa-related difficulties, payment mechanisms and logistics. He pointed out that although Pakistan and Russia had signed a foundational agreement in July, bilateral trade, which should ideally reach between $3 billion and $4 billion, remained constrained because many payments were routed through third countries, resulting in additional costs and losses for both consumers and manufacturers. Noting that Russia had successfully established alternative payment systems with other countries despite international sanctions, he emphasised that Pakistan needed to adopt a similar mechanism.

Ambassador Tirmizi also underscored that transportation and logistics costs were just as critical to trade competitiveness as production costs. While inviting Russian enterprises from Moscow and other cities to invest in Pakistan, he highlighted strong potential for partnerships in surgical instruments, sports goods, manpower and technology, particularly by leveraging Pakistan’s young workforce. He added that both countries could serve as major tourism markets for each other. He also revealed that he had held two meetings earlier that day with Russian healthcare companies interested in launching operations in Pakistan.

File Photo

It may be mentioned that, under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and following the guidance of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the Embassy of Pakistan in Russia has been actively conducting diplomatic engagements, holding business forums, participating in events and visiting universities to project Pakistan as a partner seeking to strengthen bilateral relations in every sphere.

He added that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar were giving special consideration to the forthcoming visit. Ambassador Tirmizi further revealed that, during a recent meeting with him in Islamabad, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had made it clear that he did not want the visit to Russia to be limited merely to taking joint photographs, signing agreements and returning home, instead, he wanted to leave behind a consolidated and solid foundation for developing future economic and diplomatic relations with Russia. He said that Prime Minister Sharif wanted cooperation between Pakistan and Russia to grow at the level of companies, the peoples of both countries to come closer to each other, and direct contacts to expand in the fields of culture, education and business.

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Pakistan is a Goldmine for those who run the political-criminal-terror nexus

DND Special Report

Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR) Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry had indicated on more than one occasion in the past that the “political-criminal-terror nexus” is wreaking havoc on peace and constantly bleeding Pakistan.

He shared data with the public through several press conferences, explaining how smuggling across the Pak-Afghan and Pak-Iran borders had ruined local industries in Pakistan and how these smuggling amounts to over Rs3,600 billion per year. Every time Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry raised the alarm over this issue, he and his institution immediately came under attack from politicians and even journalists who had been beneficiaries of this huge illegal business. PTI and JUI had been claiming that the Pakistan Army was blaming politicians without providing verifiable data. Politicians such as Fazlur Rehman, Mahmood Khan Achakzai, and the two sisters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan had been at the forefront of abusing the Pakistan Army. Alas, they had never been arrested or tried for fanning hatred against Pakistan and had never faced the brunt of PECA laws.

“The illegal gold mining scenario raises questions about a core issue that Pakistan has been facing for ages: the ownership and regulation of mineral resources, which belong to the provinces under the Constitution”

During several media briefings, Lt Gen Chaudhry explained how the political-criminal nexus was responsible for the resurgence of terrorism in the province (KP), maintaining that terrorists and their facilitators had deliberately been provided space in KP under a planned scheme. He warned that governance gaps in the province were being filled “with the blood of security personnel”. He urged the people of KP to help break the “political-criminal-terror nexus” and disrupt illicit trafficking and smuggling.

At last, this nexus has been further exposed following the imposition of Governor’s Rule in KP and the tightening of the noose around criminals who had been receiving support from the PTI provincial government in KP. The situation was further exposed on November 14–15, 2026, when TTP terrorists ambushed a police anti-mining operation in Kohat, martyring 10 policemen. Available information suggests that TTP terrorists, mostly Afghan citizens were working as guards for illegal mining activities. Following this incident, KP Governor Faisal Karim Kundi suspended all gold mining in the province and revoked existing leases.

This unfortunate incident proved to be a turning point, further exposing how the political-criminal-terror nexus had been wreaking havoc on national resources. Available data indicates that 90 kg of gold, worth Rs4.2 billion, is extracted monthly using more than 2,000 excavators, with 80% of it being smuggled to Afghanistan. The illegal mining mafia reportedly had the support of the PTI, PPP, and JUI-F, including through a “Youth Committee” formed by the former PTI. The Committee was established in February 2026 under the leadership of one Niamat, who is identified as a TTP commander. This Committee reportedly collected substantial weekly payments from individuals involved in illegal gold mining, charging Rs700,000 per week from locals and Rs1.1 million per week from non-locals and the money was sent to Afghan Taliban.

 

Granting a ten-year lease for gold, which yields Rs4.2 billion per month, for a mere Rs4.92 billion constitutes the plundering of national resources and an attempt to inflict losses on the public treasury, asserts the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

According to available information, the illegal mining mafia is backed by several individuals, including PTI leaders Aftab Alam, Shehryar Afridi, Khurram Zeeshan, Sajid Iqbal, and Ehsan. Others allegedly involved include Amjad Afridi of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), as well as Seth Gohar Saifullah, Naseem Afridi, and Imad Azam of the JUI-F. The brother of former Chief Minister Sohail Afridi, along with Azhar Bukhari (a close relative of Senator Khurram Zeeshan) and his coordinator, Nazir Afridi, were also allegedly involved. Although the mining contracts were reportedly suspended in 2025 following an inquiry by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), illegal excavation allegedly continued despite the restrictions. Thousands of excavators, dumpers, and other heavy machinery were being used in the operations, employing between 8,000 and 10,000 workers on daily wages. The organised mining network had engineers and a dedicated satellite telephone communication system to coordinate activities and avoid detection by law enforcement agencies.

Even in the past, an audit report indicated Rs16.94 billion in financial irregularities in KP’s minerals sector, citing unrecovered dues and official patronage of illegal mining. Similarly, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) raised questions over undervalued auctions for placer gold blocks along the Indus and Kabul rivers and expressed concerns that thousands of mining licences had been issued to politically favoured individuals during the PTI’s tenure.

The illegal gold mining scenario raises questions about a core issue that Pakistan has been facing for ages: the ownership and regulation of mineral resources, which belong strictly to the provinces under the Constitution. Politicians always use the factor of ‘resource ownership’ for their political gains. If natural resources such as natural gas, crude oil, coal, oil shale, hydropower, copper, gold, silver, iron ore, chromite, lead, zinc, bauxite, antimony, manganese, platinum, tungsten, rare earth elements, gypsum, limestone, marble, granite, dolomite, silica sand, china clay (kaolin), fire clay, bentonite, fuller’s earth, barite, fluorite, magnesite, phosphate rock, sulfur, talc (soapstone), feldspar, mica, graphite, celestite, emerald, ruby, sapphire, peridot, aquamarine, topaz, tourmaline, garnet, lapis lazuli, quartz, spinel, moonstone, kunzite, fluorite, turquoise, forests, timber, fisheries, and marine resources belong to the provinces, then what does Pakistan possess? Yes, the answer is that Pakistan possesses provinces.

However, if provinces claim ownership of all the above-mentioned natural resources, earn money from them, and spend it on themselves, what will the federation have to run the entire country? On this point, no one provides an answer. The structural problem of Pakistan lies in politics over natural resources, and the provinces have been protected by the Constitution on this issue. Unless the Constitution is amended, Pakistan will continue to suffer from this problem, and any provincial government, like the previous KP government, can sell natural resources illegally to anybody, including terrorists such as the TTP and Afghan Taliban.

 

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PMLN favours more provinces to address administrative needs

DND Report: “Certain political and non-political circles are deliberately attempting to create the impression that the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) does not support the creation of new provinces, or that this matter will only be addressed after the 2029 general elections. This impression is contrary to the facts.”

This was stated by several PML-N old guards when they were informally asked about their views on the formation of new administrative units in the country.

Since the party leadership has yet to issue an official statement on the issue in Parliament, senior PML-N leaders said they could explain the party’s position informally and on condition of anonymity until an official statement is issued by PML-N Supreme Leader Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

They are of the view that the PML-N is fully prepared for the creation of new provinces, as its leadership has openly supported this agenda on numerous occasions. They stated that during the 2026 national debate on administrative restructuring, several key PML-N figures publicly supported increasing the number of provinces to improve service delivery.

In November 2026, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif backed the proposal to increase the number of Pakistan’s provinces from four to as many as 12. He stated that power and financial authority remain overly concentrated in Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta, and argued that smaller administrative units should be created on administrative rather than linguistic or ethnic grounds.

In September 2026, Federal Minister for Planning and Development Ahsan Iqbal called for a national political debate on governance reform, proposing either the creation of 12 to 15 new provinces or the establishment of 160 empowered district governments to improve public services.

During a televised political discussion in August 2026, Federal Minister Raza Hayat Hiraj affirmed that new provinces would eventually be created to address Pakistan’s growing administrative needs.

Special Assistant to the Prime Minister Rana Sanaullah stated in September 2026 that the PML-N was open to discussing new administrative units, maintaining that the party would formalise its position inside Parliament rather than through informal media debates.

The PML-N has a documented history of supporting new provinces through parliamentary assemblies. During its previous tenures in Punjab, the PML-N supported and passed two separate resolutions in the Provincial Assembly—one calling for the restoration of Bahawalpur Province and another advocating the creation of a South Punjab Province.

Senior PML-N leaders, including Ahsan Iqbal, Rana Tanveer Hussain and Rana Sanaullah, previously submitted a bill to the National Assembly Secretariat seeking to amend Article 1 of the Constitution to establish a separate Bahawalpur-South Punjab province.

The PML-N leadership has also historically expressed conditional support for carving out a Hazara Province in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, stating that it would support a constitutional bill in the National Assembly once the provincial assembly passes the required constitutional resolution.

PML-N leaders argue that federal funds transferred to provincial capitals often fail to trickle down to peripheral districts, and that smaller provinces would ensure a more equitable distribution of financial resources.

With Pakistan’s population exceeding 240–260 million, PML-N ministers contend that four massive provincial administrations are no longer sufficient to deliver basic healthcare, education and municipal services effectively.

The PML-N consistently frames its support around administrative efficiency rather than ethnic or linguistic divisions, which helps counter criticism that the creation of new provinces would fuel regional polarisation.

Critics and political analysts point out that, despite vocal support from individual ministers, the PML-N has not yet introduced a formal constitutional bill in 2026. Under Article 239(4) of Pakistan’s Constitution, altering provincial boundaries requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament, as well as a two-thirds majority in the affected provincial assembly—a high threshold given opposition from coalition partners such as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) to any division of Sindh. Therefore, the PML-N wants to move forward once its homework with other political parties, including the PPP, has been completed.

A number of PML-N parliamentarians are of the view that the creation of new administrative units is also a demand of the youth and that political parties should respect the public’s voice. They believe the political elite must not attempt to suppress public demands or manufacture a false impression against them by leveraging specific, hand-picked political representatives.

The argument that the rejection of a proposal by elected representatives equates to its rejection by the public is entirely invalid. A vast majority of the Pakistani public desires the creation of additional administrative units. This would facilitate the resolution of long-standing and serious problems that the existing, overly centralised and sprawling provincial governance structures have failed to address for decades.

The proper way to ascertain the true will of the people is through the clear constitutional avenues and procedures stipulated in the Constitution—not through narratives or political slogans driven by the interests of political parties.

Everyone must bear in mind this fundamental principle: in a democracy, the voice and aspirations of the people take precedence above all else; the role of their elected representatives comes only thereafter.

 

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Afghan Taliban losing face as Pakistan uncovered another Afghan-based terrorist network

Islamabad, Pakistan: For over two decades, Pakistan has been engaged in a war against terrorism, a struggle in which both the state and its people have made immense sacrifices. Now every passing day, Pakistan is achieving successes by busting and exposing Afghan Taliban linked terror networks.

Pakistan uncovered another Afghan-based terrorist network

On November 11, during a press briefing, Additional Inspector General (Police) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Abbas Ahsan and Information Secretary of the Area Development Secretariat (ADS) Mahmood Jan Babar revealed startling details regarding the arrest of Hikmatullah, a former Afghan soldier and member of a Khariji (TTP terrorist) group, in the Tirah Valley, as well as cross-border links facilitating terrorism in Pakistan.

“Badruddin, alias Yusuf, a Khariji militant killed in Dera Ismail Khan on January 31, 2025, was the son of the deputy governor of Afghanistan’s Badghis province”

On November 7, 2026, security forces apprehended Hikmatullah, an Afghan national and former member of the Afghan National Army (ANA), during an intelligence-based operation in the Tirah Valley. He had undergone three months of general military training followed by three months of commando training in the Afghan Army. He was affiliated with the banned Hafiz Gul Bahadur (TTP) group and had previously served as a personal armed bodyguard to one of its commanders, Mansoor.

According to his confession, Hikmatullah admitted to preparing his protégé, Akrama, for a suicide attack, crossing the border from Afghanistan into the Tirah Valley, and participating in planning an assault on a military outpost. However, security forces took timely action and thwarted his nefarious designs.

The arrest of Hikmatullah provides another example of infiltration and cross-border links originating from Afghanistan to facilitate terrorism inside Pakistan. Another Afghan national, Qari Waqas, alias Quddus, was arrested in Upper Kurram. He reportedly confessed to entering Pakistan specifically to join the Khariji Kazim group.

Similarly, Ahmad, alias Qari Abdullah Abu Zar, a Khariji militant who carried out a suicide attack on Malangi Post in Bajaur on February 16, 2026, hailed from Afghanistan’s Balkh province and had previously served in the Afghan Taliban’s special forces. Eleven security personnel and two civilians were martyred in the attack. Furthermore, evidence has emerged indicating that the bomber responsible for the February 6, 2026 attack in Tarlai, Islamabad, had received terrorist training in Afghanistan.

Evidence has also surfaced linking Afghanistan-based terrorists to attacks on the Islamabad Judicial Complex, the Frontier Corps (FC) Headquarters in Peshawar, and Cadet College Wana, which took place in November 2025.

Niamatullah, a suicide bomber arrested on October 19, 2025, hailed from Kandahar. The attack on Bannu Cantonment on March 4, 2025, was reportedly planned in Afghanistan, and six of the 17 Kharijis involved were Afghan nationals.

Badruddin, alias Yusuf, a Khariji militant killed in Dera Ismail Khan on January 31, 2025, was the son of the deputy governor of Afghanistan’s Badghis province and had served as a trainer at an Afghan Taliban training centre.

Additionally, all three Khariji militants killed on November 3, 2026, in the Sardi Khel area of Bannu, including a commander named Anas, were from Kandahar.

Details of Hikmatullah’s Confession

During the November 11, 2026, press conference, officials screened a recorded confession video in which Hikmatullah, alias Hamza, detailed his military background, militant training activities, and infiltration route into Pakistan.

According to his recorded statement, he made several key admissions:

  • Former Military Service: Hikmatullah confirmed that he had served in the former Afghan National Army (ANA). He completed three months of standard military training followed by three months of specialised commando training before the force was dissolved.
  • Training Suicide Bombers: After the ANA was disbanded, he allegedly used his military skills at various seminaries (madrasas) in Afghanistan to train recruits and prepare suicide bombers. Officials specifically referred to his activities at the Khalid bin Waleed madrasa near Jalalabad, where he allegedly trained a student named Akrama for a suicide attack.
  • Association with the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group: He admitted to working with the banned Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and serving as a personal bodyguard to one of its commanders, Mansoor.
  • Infiltration into Pakistan: Hikmatullah described crossing from Afghanistan into Pakistan and passing through several areas before reaching the outskirts of Peshawar. He also recounted an exchange of fire at a security checkpoint during his infiltration.
  • Realisation and Fear: In the video, he stated that he had initially joined the network believing he was participating in jihad but later realised that he was on the wrong path. He also expressed fear that the Afghan Taliban would kill him if they learned that he had made the statement to Pakistani authorities.

Sustained Counterterrorism Operations in Tirah Valley

Throughout 2026, Pakistan’s security forces and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Police have maintained sustained counterterrorism pressure in the Tirah Valley of Khyber District, a strategically important mountainous region bordering Afghanistan. Rather than launching a large-scale conventional military offensive, authorities have relied heavily on targeted Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) to dismantle terrorist hideouts and cross-border infiltration networks.

Recent developments and tactical shifts in late 2026 include:

  • Joint IBOs and Arrests: Alongside the November 7, 2026 arrest of Afghan militant Hikmatullah, police and security forces have conducted continuous intelligence-led raids. KP Police and the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) carried out more than 2,000 IBOs across the province during the first half of 2026 alone, neutralising 182 terrorists and arresting more than 500 suspects.
  • Drone and Surveillance Operations: Security operations in Tirah have increasingly incorporated aerial surveillance and precision drone strikes. In mid-October 2026, for instance, KP Police targeted a militant hideout in the valley using a drone, killing four terrorists and injuring three others during a follow-up search operation. Security forces have also deployed anti-drone technology to counter quadcopter attacks by terrorists.
  • Targeted Raids Instead of a Full-Scale Offensive: Federal officials, including Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, have repeatedly maintained that the military is conducting limited, intelligence-driven operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated networks rather than launching a sweeping ground offensive.

Growing Diplomatic Pressure on the Afghan Taliban

The Afghan Taliban are facing growing diplomatic pressure as regional partners increasingly question their claims of non-involvement in cross-border terrorism against Pakistan.

According to available information, Pakistan has established a near-daily intelligence-sharing mechanism to provide countries such as China, Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye with verified information about Afghan-backed terrorists arrested or killed inside Pakistan.

These developments point to the existence of networks, training centres, and links to terrorist leadership based in Afghanistan that support elements carrying out terrorist activities inside Pakistan.

The State of Pakistan has made it clear that it will not compromise on its sovereignty or national security. Security operations will continue until external elements and their facilitators are eliminated, and every possible measure will be taken to protect the country’s people. Official circles are of the view that in line with the clear policy of the Government of Pakistan, operations are underway against Fitna-ul-Khawarij (the TTP terrorist network) and its facilitators, with all state resources being utilized to eradicate terrorism and unrest from the country.

 

 

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