ISPR: Rawalpindi, 23 October 2026: Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, NI (M), HJ, Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces (COAS & CDF) has reaffirmed that Pakistan will continue to purge Indian sponsored terrorist outfits to the fullest.
The COAS & CDF who visited Corps Headquarters, Peshawar today was briefed on the prevailing security situation, ongoing counter terrorism operations, border management measures and operational preparedness of formations deployed in the province.
Field Marshal commended the high morale and professionalism of officers and troops, directing them to continue vigilance and highest standards of operational readiness to effectively counter threats. He underscored that we will continue the campaign against Indian sponsored terrorist outfits to the fullest and hit them hard wherever they are.
While paying tributes to the sacrifices of the people of Pakistan including Shuhada and Ghazis of the security forces, COAS & CDF affirmed that with the support of the people Pakistan will surely inflict total defeat to the terrorists and their perverted ideology.
Upon arrival, the COAS & CDF was received by Commander Peshawar Corps.
It may be remembered that Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, NI (M), HJ, Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces (COAS & CDF) spent a long hectic day yesterday along with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Governor KP Faisal Kundi at apex committee in Peshawar that had long deliberations to fix law and order as well as governance issues in KP—a province that is bleeding with terror wounds while seized PTI government had been enjoying state resources for their personal gains and supporting he narrative of TTP and Afghan Taliban.
The Afghan Taliban has received $9.6 billion in cash in the last five years from the UN-USA network. Since SIGAR, which was one of the most critical U.S. oversight bodies monitoring aid and expenditures in Afghanistan, officially shut down in January 2026 after 17 years of activity, the latest data is not available because there is no international organization working now to monitor aid.
Until its closure in Afghanistan, SIGAR released dozens of investigative and audit reports, many of which exposed corruption, mismanagement, financial waste, and the failures of major reconstruction projects.
In its last report of 2025, SIGAR warned that the Taliban frequently uses coercive tactics, including physical force, to dictate where international aid is distributed on the ground. Despite the Taliban’s public denials, these finalized reports reiterate that while cash packages are aimed at humanitarian relief, they inevitably provide an indirect economic buffer to the Taliban regime by stabilizing its local currency (Afghani). The closure of SIGAR operations in Afghanistan left nobody internationally who could report how UN/US money is being used by the Afghan Taliban.
Based on the specific mathematical formula provided, multiplying the $40 million in cash arriving in Kabul every week by 4 weeks, 12 months, and 5 years results in a total of $9.6 billion in cash arriving in Kabul and being handed over to the Afghan Taliban in the last five years. However, official audits by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2024 cited the cash used by the Afghan Taliban as being between $2.9 billion and $3.6 billion.
It may be remembered that the United States has made available over $21.36 billion globally for Afghanistan assistance, asset management, and refugee relocation since August 2021. Of that total, over $3.63 billion was allocated specifically to assistance on the ground within Afghanistan. According to available open-source data, from October 2021 through mid-2025, the U.S. disbursed $3.5 billion in direct aid to the country (through Afghan Taliban networking), with 72%, according to the data, spent on humanitarian operations managed through the UN and partner organizations. SIGAR’s final auditing efforts in 2025 flagged $541 million in aid funds as suspicious or lacking sufficient oversight documentation during its late-stage investigations.
It is pertinent to mention that SIGAR data stated that the dollars are first sold in the local market to obtain Afghan currency, and the money is deposited into designated UN accounts at private commercial banks in Afghanistan to fund 19 UN entities, the World Bank, and dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing food, medical care, and humanitarian relief because international wire transfers to Afghanistan are frozen. This is done through private banks purchasing local currency from the Taliban-controlled central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank), allowing the regime to accumulate U.S. dollars. Moreover, the Taliban extracts millions of dollars by taxing NGO workers, imposing licensing fees, and forcing aid groups to pay for utilities and operating permits.
Several U.S. lawmakers have introduced several bills, such as the “No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act” and the “Stop Funding Global Terrorists Act”, to block U.S. aid from benefiting the Afghan Taliban. These bills have successfully advanced through the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but they have faced hurdles and have not yielded any results.
UN organizations in Kabul, such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), work under the financial blackmail of the Taliban (fund transfers to banks and all banks being under Afghan rule). Therefore, these organizations have to maintain friendly relations with the Taliban, overlooking the brutality of Afghan Taliban rule, because UN organizations cannot work independently when economic resources are completely controlled by the Afghan Taliban. Senior Taliban leaders control the central bank, which has no systems in place to prevent terrorism financing or money laundering, according to the inspector general’s report. Moreover, humanitarian organizations are sometimes forced to pay cash directly to the Taliban. Local Taliban leaders have demanded that the UN and aid groups hire their members and relatives.
Ground realities in Afghanistan are changing as northern resistance groups have begun attacking and targeting the Afghan Taliban, while resistance continues in parts of Kamdesh Valley and Nuristan despite the Taliban’s reported recovery of several areas. Against this backdrop, reports indicate that the Afghan Taliban regime has deployed more than 30,000 hardcore fighters to northern Afghanistan and shifted a part of the al-Qaeda network towards areas bordering Central Asian countries.
According to information obtained through northern resistance groups, al-Qaeda has intensified efforts to organize and finance Central Asian terrorist networks. Approximately one month ago, the network allegedly held an important meeting in Dasht-e Archi area of Imam Sahib district in Kunduz province to discuss strengthening relations, financial support, recruitment, training and operational capabilities of these groups.
An individual using the alias Abu al-Hasan al-Maghrebi, a national of an Arab country, attended the meeting as a representative of al-Qaeda. According to the information, he has also been active in Panjshir province and maintains close relations with the Taliban Minister of Interior. He is reportedly responsible for equipping and supporting Central Asian terrorist centres and uses Telegram IDs for communication.
The meeting was reportedly held at a centre associated with Uyghur militants of the Turkestan Islamic Movement and was attended by commanders and representatives of various terrorist organizations.
The centre is reportedly headed by Haji Latif, a native of Jowzjan province who also uses a Telegram ID and is also described as a prominent official of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
“Drones, terrorism and growing threats to Central Asian state from Afghan soil”
Other participants reportedly included Muhammad Uyghuri, an influential member of the Turkestan Islamic Movement’s leadership Haji Tariq, described as an official of East Turkestan; and his deputy, Qari Mawaz Turkistani, who is responsible for the group’s financial affairs and also use Telegram IDs.
An individual operating under the alias Qari Rashid Turkistani, identified in the information as Qari Rashid and a member of the al-Qaeda network, was also reportedly present at the meeting.
Representatives of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan included Sheikh Abu Bakr Uzbekistani, who has worked alongside the Taliban for years and was previously a commander in the Islamic State group in Syria (ISIS), and Maulvi Abu Bakr, who currently oversees a training centre in Chahardara district of Kunduz province. Maulvi Abu Bakr is reportedly connected extensively with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The centre managed by Sheikh Abu Bakr is said to receive direct supplies and financial support from the al-Qaeda network.
Drone Terrorism and growing threats to Central Asian state from Afghan soil
According to available information, members of the Turkestan Movement and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan viewed Abu al-Hasan al-Maghrebi’s participation as a significant development and a fundamental step towards strengthening their relations with al-Qaeda and securing additional financial assistance as Central Asian terrorist organizations remain heavily dependent on the network for funding and most Central Asian militants have been integrated into Taliban security forces. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda is continuing its efforts to strengthen its own ranks and expand the operational capacity of affiliated groups by providing the financial resources required to recruit additional fighters.
Although Taliban intelligence reportedly provides salaries and an additional monthly payment of 5,000 Afghanis to each family of members belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Ansarullah and the Turkestan Movement, al-Qaeda continues to function as the overarching network and primary supporter of these organizations.
Its camps are reportedly engaged in recruiting new members and providing religious instruction and training in the use of weapons to young people and new recruits. The reported assistance highlights the network’s efforts to maintain the loyalty of affiliated fighters and reinforce its position among Central Asian militant organizations operating in Afghanistan.
According to information, individuals trained in Ghazni province have made considerable progress and are now capable of operating drones. Efforts are reportedly underway to equip centres in northern Afghanistan with the capabilities required for drone operations. The reported development points to an effort to expand the technical and operational capabilities of Central Asian terrorist networks beyond conventional weapons and training. The provision of drones, alongside financial support, recruitment and weapons instruction, could increase the operational capabilities of these groups if the reported plans are implemented.
Northern resistance groups claim that during one of the meetings, Sheikh Abu Bakr reportedly requested that al-Qaeda establish and financially support additional centres and schools across Afghanistan. In response, the al-Qaeda representative allegedly stated that plans had been prepared for two important centres in Panjshir and Paktia provinces and that these facilities would soon be made available to the groups concerned.
Representatives of Central Asian militant organizations also emphasized the need to strengthen existing centres in northern Afghanistan.
The reported plans suggest that the network intends to expand its infrastructure across several parts of the country, combining recruitment, religious instruction, weapons training and financial assistance.
The activities indicate that al-Qaeda may be seeking to reorganize and strengthen Central Asian militant organizations through funding, recruitment, weapons training and the introduction of drone technology.
The integration of these groups into Taliban security structures, coupled with plans to establish additional centres stretching from northern to eastern Afghanistan, raises concerns about the future security environment in the region.
The information suggest al-Qaeda as continuing to serve as a central source of financial and organizational support for Central Asian militant networks despite the reported assistance provided by Taliban intelligence to members and their families.
If substantiated, the alleged activities would indicate that Afghanistan remains a potential operating environment for transnational militant organizations seeking to rebuild their networks and expand their capabilities.
The development could have implications for Afghanistan’s northern neighbours and broader regional stability, particularly if armed groups operating near Central Asian borders acquire additional funding, trained personnel and drone capabilities.
The information was attributed to sources associated with northern resistance groups and researchers specializing in Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The allegations, including the identities of the participants, the reported meeting, financial arrangements and planned drone deliveries, could not be independently verified for this report.
PESHAWAR, October 20: Following the imposition of Emergency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under constitutional provisions that ended PTI 13-year rule in the province, allegations of corruption and misuse of public resources are coming to light, with investigations into various cases raising further questions about the management of the provincial exchequer.
One of the cases now under investigation concerns Provincial Housing Minister Dr Amjad Ali, who is accused of accumulating assets beyond his known sources of income, facilitating the illegal appointment of relatives to key positions within the Housing Authority, and benefiting from irregularities in government housing projects.
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has expanded the scope of its investigation into assets beyond known sources of income against the provincial minister, with particular attention to the construction of the billion-rupee ‘Mega City Nowshera’ project on land situated along the Kabul River.
According to details emerging from the ongoing investigation, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Housing Authority possesses neither the legal title, including transfer documents, nor physical possession of the land earmarked for the project.
The findings have raised questions about how a project of such magnitude proceeded without the Housing Authority possessing the required legal ownership documents and physical control of the land.
NAB had requested the Director General and Project Director of Mega City Nowshera to provide details of properties held in the names of 31 relatives of Dr Amjad Ali. However, the requested information was not provided. The former Secretary and former Director General of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Housing Authority have also been accused of benefiting from corruption by illegally acquiring residential properties in the project.
According to a notice issued by NAB to former Director Imran Wazir, the accountability bureau has sought complete details and records of written agreements dated February 15, 16 and 22, 2022, concluded between the Chief Executive of Lead Private Limited and the provincial Housing Minister.
NAB has also sought the names and National Identity Card (CNIC) numbers of committee members who participated in a joint visit to the project site on February 24, 2022, along with the relevant note sheets and other written documents.
NAB expands probe into KP Housing Minister Dr Amjad over Mega City Nowshera Project
The bureau has demanded the complete original record of Mega City Nowshera, covering site surveys, land acquisition, technical and financial matters, and correspondence and written documents exchanged with the Irrigation Department, Tehsil Municipal Administration, Agriculture Department and other relevant departments under the joint venture.
Additionally, NAB has sought details of notices issued to Leaf Private Limited under the Joint Venture Regulations 2021. The demand for these records forms part of the expanded investigation into the project and the alleged irregularities surrounding its establishment and administration.
NAB has also requested details of assets, particularly the purchase and sale of residential, commercial and industrial plots, land and units, held in the names of Dr Amjad Ali, his close relatives, and 31 family members comprising 20 men and 11 women.
According to the notice, flat No. A04 on the third floor of the high-rise flats at Warsak-1 was allotted to Ms “S”, the daughter of the provincial minister. In view of this allotment, NAB has sought comprehensive details of the purchase and sale of residential, commercial and industrial plots or units held in the names of the minister’s other male and female family members.
The inquiry into properties held by the minister and his relatives is linked to allegations that assets were accumulated beyond known sources of income. NAB is also investigating allegations concerning the appointment of the minister’s relatives to key positions within the Housing Authority.
The investigation has also brought the former Secretary of Housing and the former Director General of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Housing Authority under scrutiny over their acquisition of residential accommodation in the project. According to the available details, both officials acquired accommodation for themselves in violation of the applicable rules and regulations.
A committee was subsequently constituted to examine the matter. The committee declared the actions of the former Secretary and the former Director General illegal or in violation of the relevant rules and regulations.
The alleged acquisition of residential properties by senior officials has added another dimension to the investigation into the Mega City Nowshera project and the administration of the provincial Housing Authority.
Separately, information has surfaced that Dr Amjad Ali had been using 12 official vehicles, with some of these vehicles allegedly being used by his relatives, who also benefited from official fuel-refilling orders. These information have raised further questions about the use of government vehicles and fuel resources by public officeholders and their families. These allegations require examination alongside the broader questions concerning the use of public resources and the management of provincial assets.
Former Director Imran Wazir confirmed that NAB was conducting an investigation into the matter but said he could not offer any opinion on it at this stage.
The expanded inquiry into Mega City Nowshera is focused on land ownership, joint-venture agreements, departmental records, property transactions involving the minister’s family, and the alleged irregular acquisition of residential accommodation by former senior Housing Authority officials.
The investigation is ongoing, and the allegations against the minister and other individuals remain subject to the findings of the accountability bureau and the relevant legal process.
Monitoring Desk: A young man, Ahmad Waleed who once taught computer skills and English—capable of nurturing the next generation through knowledge and learning—is now, under the oppressive rule of the ignorant and bigoted Taliban regime, forced by sheer desperation to drive a rickshaw.
In the land under Hibatullah’s dominion, knowledge and expertise hold no value; instead, those who possess learning and talent are cast to the margins, while ignorance and bigotry cast a dark shadow over the lives of millions.
What have the Taliban done to Afghanistan? They have driven teachers from the classroom to the streets, pushed the educated from their professional fields into poverty, and transformed the hopes of an entire generation into despair and hopelessness!
This is the consequence of a regime of ignorance: a land where a teacher cannot afford bread, and the future of the youth is held hostage by a fanatical regime.
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan had, in the past, been a country where resources were exploited with little accountability, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where mining became one of the most ruined sectors. Illegal mining using dynamites, destroying 80 per cent of precious stones for only 20 per cent recovery, had remained in the news since the 1980s.
The majority of this illegal and unchecked mining had been carried out by Afghans under political patronage, while one of the most important political parties, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), had led this theft of national resources since long.
Several journalists who had raised their voices against this mafia in the past had either been silenced through force or forced to leave their jobs to secure the lives of their families as this had been business of multimillion dollars. Since the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) emerged as the ruling elite in KP, it became a partner in crime with other political parties, including JUI. Politicians from both parties shared natural resources, including timber and mining products, among themselves, even when PTI used to call the JUI chief, Fazlur Rehman, “Maulana Diesel.”
They had two faces: one political and the other financial. On the financial front, they had been jointly abusing national and natural resources. Now, when the government of Pakistan is trying to control the exploitation of natural and national resources, both parties are openly joining hands, particularly over the mining sector in KP.
Tehreek-e-Insaf and Fazlur Rehman have suddenly become very concerned about the mines and minerals of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. When contacted, officials of mines and mineral exploration entities, they were of the view that upper-soil minerals are mostly stolen by political elites in last 50 years and now government is trying to work deep-soil exploration that needs scientific and highly professional expertise that were not available with unskilled but callous groups who ruined the country’s mineral resources. They said that it is easy for political elites to spread falsehoods without understanding the facts regarding minerals or the established procedures. The deep-soil extraction of minerals procedures governing mineral development make the distinction clear. They are of the view that politicians such as Fazlur Rehman know exploiting and abusing natural resources, particularly mines and mineral would not be possible for them under established writ of the government that has decided to streamline mine and mineral as an industry where national resources would be used for national demands not for making certain politicians billionaires therefore they have launched a propaganda campaign against the government and linking the imposition of Emergency with mine and mineral sector while everybody know that this constitutional step had been taken to fight back terrorism in the region and to build a workable governing structure over collapsed administrative system in KP.
The presence of minerals and their production on a commercial scale are two entirely different things. Identifying mineral potential in an area does not mean that proven, extractable and economically profitable reserves exist there.
Large-scale mineral projects require years, or even decades, for geological surveys, sample testing, drilling and determining the quantity and quality of reserves. An initial estimate is not a substitute for confirmed mineral reserves.
A feasibility study first evaluates the economic viability of mineral reserves, mining costs, global market prices, and requirements for energy, water, infrastructure, machinery and investment. A project is considered viable only when these factors are economically acceptable.
In large-scale projects, exploration, pre-feasibility and full feasibility are distinct and separate stages. This process can take several years, depending on the complexity of the project.
Under the mineral laws of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, large-scale mining requires relevant leases, technical reports, feasibility studies, mine development and operational plans, environmental assessments, and details regarding finance and infrastructure.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mineral Rules, 2017, stipulate a two-month timeframe for the approval of a development scheme following the submission of an application. This refers specifically to the approval period for the scheme itself, not the duration of the entire project, from the initial survey to production.
Mineral licences, exploration permits and mining leases are distinct legal stages. The mere presence of minerals, the identification of an area or the completion of an initial survey does not, in itself, grant a company the immediate right to mine.
Large-scale mineral projects may require advanced foreign drilling equipment, heavy machinery, crushing and processing plants, as well as power and water infrastructure. Procuring, importing and installing this equipment, followed by trial production, requires additional time and capital.
Large-scale projects often involve international suppliers, financial institutions and foreign investors. However, the procurement of machinery or the influx of foreign investment does not, in itself, constitute proof of the transfer of mineral ownership or provincial rights.
According to the World Bank, the global average duration from the discovery of a new mine to the commencement of production can exceed 17 years. This is a general global estimate. The Reko Diq project in Pakistan serves as a prominent example of this gradual process. The feasibility update for the project was completed in 2025, with production from the first phase expected to commence by the end of 2028. This example illustrates that there is often a gap of several years between the discovery of significant mineral deposits and the actual commencement of production.
The transparency of a mineral project is not determined by political allegations; rather, it is assessed through verifiable records concerning relevant licences, leases, approvals, contracts, investments, production, royalties and oversight.
In the mineral sector of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the provincial government and the relevant mineral authorities play a fundamental role. The scope of involvement for federal entities, private investors or foreign companies is defined by the applicable laws, the specific project and the relevant agreements. The roles of these various entities differ from one project to another.
It is essential to distinguish between estimates of mineral deposits in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, their potential economic value, proven reserves, approved projects and actual production. Presenting these distinct figures as if they represent the same thing is misleading.
Pakistan’s mineral resources are not confined solely to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Significant mineral potential also exists in Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh and other regions. The development of mineral resources at the national level and the protection of the legal and financial rights of the provinces are not mutually exclusive.
The core question is: over the past thirteen years, which specific mines or leases were granted to which parties, under what legal authority, and what was the approval process, and so on?
Given the timelines for mineral projects, the requirements for legal approvals and the necessity for specialised machinery, it is accurate to state that large-scale mining is a gradual and highly technical process.
Therefore, the criteria for evaluating allegations regarding the “seizure” of mineral resources are clear: one must examine specific mines, the relevant leases, the legal authority involved, any changes in ownership or contractual terms, and verifiable official records.
In the absence of such evidence, merely pointing to mineral potential or the imposition of an emergency as proof of the “seizure” of mines is both ignorant and absurd. Such claims serve no purpose other than to fuel lies and propaganda on social media, a tactic currently being employed by Tehreek-e-Insaf and Fazlur Rehman.
Monitoring Desk:Iran will operationalize the Chabahar–Zahedan Railway track by December 31, 2026, to connect Afghanistan with seawater through a road link. Iran swiftly completed the project at the request of the Afghan Taliban government, which is facing the closure of its traditional trade routes through Pakistan after Islamabad closed the border in October 2025 due to the constant emanation of terrorism from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
This week, Pakistan temporarily closed the Pak-Iran borders to streamline security issues related to the movement of trade goods after intelligence reports confirmed that the Afghan Taliban were using trade goods vehicles to transport weapons and terrorists inside Pakistan. It is interesting to note that Afghanistan-Iran relations have risen while Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are facing historic low due to constant terrorism injection from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
According to available information, the Chabahar–Zahedan Railway track has already been completed. It connects the port of Chabahar to Iran’s main rail network via Zahedan, from where it connects to the Milak–Zaranj border crossing between Afghanistan and Iran. The Milak Border Crossing has connected Iran with Afghanistan since its establishment in 2005. Located on a 12.5-hectare site near Zaranj, Afghanistan, the terminal facilitates both passenger movement and cargo transport. The adjacent Silk Bridge, jointly managed by Iran and Afghanistan, forms the primary crossing point between Zaranj and Milak, with plans for a second bridge underway to enhance connectivity and accommodate growing trade volumes.
After the closure of the Pak-Afghan borders last October, Afghanistan has been conducting trade through Uzbekistan and Iran, and a direct Iranian railway connection with Afghanistan will provide additional convenience to the landlocked country. The railway passes through Khash, Iranshahr, and Nikshahr. The line is 750 kilometers long and is built as a single track with the standard gauge. The line is designed for a maximum permissible speed of 120 km/h for passenger trains and 90 km/h for freight trains. It is planned to transport 1.3 million tons of goods in the first year of operation, with this volume planned to increase to 35 million tons within the next 20 years.
The security situation in Sistan (Iranian Balochistan) is a major concern for the Iranian government in operationalizing railway traffic, and 300 temporary security posts for Iranian guards are being built before the project becomes operational by December 31, 2026.
By Dr Akhtar Hussain Sandhu The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government’s non-cooperation with the federal government’s policies and its opposition to military operations against terrorists led to the imposition of Governor’s Rule on 12 October 2026. Political hoopla has been a defining feature of Pakistan’s political history.
The PTI’s dissenting and, moreover, defiant politics led its leadership and activists towards violence. However, the subsequent situation, in which security agencies reportedly identified deep links between KP-PTI leaders and the Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), convinced the federal government to impose Governor’s Rule.
There are allegations that the KP government had a covert understanding with Afghanistan regarding cooperation. Although no one has presented evidence of such an understanding, the PTI’s non-cooperation with Pakistan Army operations, its silence on the deaths of law enforcement personnel, and its apathetic attitude towards equipping the KP police with the required modern weapons reflect the provincial government’s detachment from federal policies. These factors have also reinforced the claims made by state institutions.
Pakistan is a democratic country, but undemocratic policies and attitudes have devastated the dream of establishing a welfare state. The federal government has spent huge amounts of public money on maintaining a luxurious lifestyle for those in power, while the public has continued to endure severe hardships. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir has expressed his desire to make Pakistan a hard state in which the rule of law empowers the state. However, this aspiration has yet to be realised because politicians remain reluctant to enforce the rule of law.
The rule of law begins with genuine democracy, which is possible only through an empowered local government system. Yet, such a system is largely absent across Pakistan. It does not suit politicians and the civil bureaucracy because it transfers resources and decision-making powers to local governments for development work. Neither politicians nor the civil bureaucracy appears willing to share these resources and powers.
Federal and provincial governments may formulate democratic policies, but their undemocratic attitudes towards implementation prevent those policies from producing the desired results. Governments are dominated by elite families that enjoy protection from accountability for illegal and corrupt activities. Such practices include shielding individuals from criminal proceedings, protecting the occupation of government land and plots, and benefiting from corruption, commissions from contractors, NGOs, fraudulent TA/DA claims, and bogus medical bills. This pathetic situation neither restores peace in society nor produces honest and competent leadership.
If we genuinely want to transform Pakistan into a hard state in which the rule of law is firmly enforced and crime and punishment are proportionate and consistently applied, we must redefine our roles. Everyone, from politicians to those who exercise a strong grip on the system, must join hands to put Pakistan on the path to becoming a strong country. The existing political system cannot transform Pakistan into a hard state as long as elite capture continues to prevail and the powerful remain above the law.
Note: Prof Dr. Akhtar Hussain Sandhu had been teaching at various universities and colleges. Writer lives in Chicago (United States) and can be reached at [email protected]
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in this article/Opinion/Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk (DND). Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of the DND Thought Center and Dispatch News Desk.
ISLAMABAD, October 15:Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev’s four-day visit to Pakistan has triggered a counternarrative in sections of Indian and Afghan-sponsored media, where commentaries have sought to portray differences over Afghanistan as a potential obstacle to growing Pakistan-Russia relations while overlooking the significance of the high-level security engagement between the two countries.
Kolokoltsev departed for Moscow on Thursday after concluding his landmark visit, the first-ever visit to Pakistan by a Russian interior minister. The visit was significant for strengthening bilateral security cooperation, building mutual trust and exploring avenues for joint efforts against terrorism and other transnational security threats.
During his stay, Kolokoltsev held meetings with President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, whose invitation paved the way for the visit.
The extensive high-level engagement demonstrated the importance both countries attach to their bilateral relationship, particularly in internal security and counterterrorism. Against this backdrop, sections of Indian and Afghan sponsored media have attempted to frame the visit primarily through the prism of disagreements over Afghanistan, thereby seeking to undermine its wider diplomatic and security significance.
Commentaries appearing in Indian and Afghan sponsored media have portrayed the visit as an effort to ease differences between Moscow and Islamabad over the Afghan Taliban, which reportedly surfaced during the Moscow Format meeting. However, these narratives overlook a crucial fact: Kolokoltsev’s visit had been planned and scheduled months before the Moscow Format meeting took place on October 5, 2026. Indian and Afghan media outlets have suggested that these differences could undermine recent progress in Pakistan-Russia relations. Nevertheless, such interpretations do not, in themselves, establish that bilateral security cooperation is at risk. Differences in regional security assessments are not unusual between states, nor do they necessarily prevent countries from pursuing shared interests through diplomatic engagement and institutional cooperation.
One of the central arguments advanced in critical commentaries in Indian and Afghan media concerns the contrasting approaches of Pakistan and Russia towards Afghanistan. Russia views engagement with the Taliban authorities as an important component of its regional strategy, including efforts to counter the threat posed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) that is present in Afghanistan. Pakistan, meanwhile, has repeatedly expressed security concerns over terrorist organisations such as BLA, BLM, TTP, Al-Qaeda and many others operating from Afghan territory and their attacks inside Pakistan.
Ironically, the narratives advanced by Indian and Afghan media appear to undermine their own arguments when they acknowledge, albeit with qualifications such as “allegedly,” that terrorist organisations are operating from Afghanistan. This acknowledgment is significant because the presence and activities of such groups constitute a major regional security concern, including for Russia. By recognising this issue, these commentaries implicitly concede that terrorism originating from Afghan territory remains a matter requiring serious attention rather than a dispute that can simply be dismissed as a bilateral political disagreement.
The same commentaries refer to the security conference scheduled to take place in Moscow on October 15–16, suggesting that Afghanistan will remain an important subject of discussion. This argument, too, reinforces the significance of Afghanistan-related security challenges for regional peace and stability. However, presenting these discussions as evidence of an impending deterioration in Pakistan-Russia relations requires substantiation. The fact that the two countries may hold differing assessments of the situation in Afghanistan does not automatically translate into a strategic rupture, particularly when both continue to engage at the highest levels.
Moreover, the critical commentaries do not provide verifiable evidence that Russia and Pakistan are unwilling to cooperate in addressing the threat posed by terrorist organisations operating from Afghanistan. Rather, their (commentaries) arguments rely heavily on the existence of differences over regional policy without demonstrating how those differences have translated into a concrete breakdown in bilateral security cooperation.
Similarly, attempts to link Kolokoltsev’s visit directly to alleged Russian concerns about Pakistan’s position on Afghanistan remain speculative in the absence of documentary evidence or attributable statements from Russian officials. The timing of a diplomatic visit, combined with the existence of regional disagreements, is insufficient to establish a causal relationship between the two.
The critical narrative being advanced in sections of Indian and Afghan media also gives insufficient weight to the broader momentum in Pakistan-Russia relations and the continued engagement between the two countries at the highest levels. By focusing predominantly on alleged differences over Afghanistan, these commentaries risk overlooking the wider diplomatic context in which the visit took place.
Kolokoltsev’s meetings with Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership provided an opportunity to discuss shared security concerns and explore avenues for practical cooperation. His visit was itself a significant diplomatic development, reflecting the willingness of both sides to engage directly on matters of mutual interest, particularly regional security dynamics. The range of senior Pakistani officials with whom he held meetings further demonstrated that the engagement was not confined to a single institution or a narrow policy issue.
Although differences over Afghanistan may remain part of bilateral discussions, their significance should be assessed alongside the concrete areas of cooperation and the diplomatic channels available to address them. Counterterrorism, internal security and other transnational threats provide important areas in which cooperation can continue even when the two countries do not hold identical views on every regional issue.
The broader question is whether Pakistan and Russia can maintain and expand their cooperation despite differing regional assessments. The minister’s visit demonstrated that high-level engagement continues even as regional security challenges remain complex. It also provided an opportunity for both sides to maintain direct communication, exchange perspectives and explore ways to address shared concerns.
Portraying Pakistan-Russia relations primarily through alleged disagreements over Afghanistan risks producing an incomplete assessment of a relationship that has continued to develop through diplomatic engagement. Bilateral relations cannot be accurately evaluated solely by identifying differences between the two countries; they must also be assessed in light of ongoing contacts, institutional cooperation and the willingness of both sides to pursue common interests.
Likewise, assertions that disagreements over the Taliban threaten bilateral relations should be supported by demonstrable policy changes, official statements or other reliable indicators rather than speculation. Without such evidence, claims of an impending deterioration in relations remain interpretations rather than established facts.
Kolokoltsev’s historic visit should therefore be evaluated on the basis of its diplomatic significance, the discussions held with Pakistan’s leadership and the prospects for practical cooperation in internal security and counterterrorism. Its importance cannot reasonably be dismissed merely by highlighting differences over Afghanistan, particularly when those differences have not been shown to have halted high-level engagement.
There are challenges for Islamabad and Moscow, but they do not, in themselves, negate the importance of their bilateral engagement and propaganda campaign launched by Afghanistan-Indian sponsored media confirm again that Afghanistan is a constant threat for regional peace, particularly for Russia and Pakistan.
The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has portrayed the administrative change in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a politically motivated move. However, the central question is whether the province’s deteriorating security situation, persistent governance failures, and growing public concerns could be ignored indefinitely in the name of political considerations. The circumstances surrounding this transition point towards a broader imperative: restoring effective governance, strengthening counter-terrorism efforts, and safeguarding Pakistan at a time when the state is fighting hard to eliminate terrorism.
The return of terrorism to Pakistan has become one of the country’s most serious security challenges. The PTI-led government in Islamabad in 2021 pursued a policy of allowing the return and resettlement of TTP terrorists from Afghanistan, a decision that has since become a major reason for resurgence of terrorism. Against this background, the provincial administration’s ability to confront terrorism effectively has assumed critical importance. The issue is no longer merely one of provincial governance or political rivalry; it concerns the security of citizens and the stability of Pakistan.
On October 11, the federal government facilitated an administrative transition in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through a process undertaken under Articles 232 and 234 of the Constitution. The move replaced the existing provincial administrative arrangement with a technocrat-led setup. Given the extraordinary nature of this development, it is essential to understand the circumstances that necessitated such a measure and the responsibilities now confronting the new administration. The precise constitutional basis and procedures governing the transition must, of course, be assessed against the applicable legal provisions and official notifications.
The new administration cannot afford a slow start. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faces serious challenges involving terrorism, administrative weaknesses, questions of transparency, and public dissatisfaction over service delivery. After years of political confrontation and governance controversies, the province needs an administration that prioritises measurable outcomes over political interests. Its legitimacy and effectiveness will ultimately depend not on the circumstances of its appointment but on its ability to deliver tangible improvements in security, governance, health, education, and other essential public services.
“An equally important challenge is public perception. Counter-terrorism operations cannot achieve their full potential if political narratives undermine public confidence in state institutions or obscure the threat posed by terrorist organisations”
For this reason, clear performance benchmarks, transparent procedures, and effective accountability mechanisms are indispensable. The new setup must be evaluated against verifiable results rather than political declarations. Public money must be spent responsibly, administrative decisions must be open to scrutiny, and the delivery of services must be measured against established standards. Without these safeguards, even a technocrat-led administration risks reproducing the shortcomings it was expected to address.
“Public trust cannot be imposed through official statements; it must be earned through consistent performance, accountability, and the protection of civilian lives”
Counter-terrorism must be the administration’s foremost priority. The police and the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) require adequate resources, modern equipment, effective intelligence coordination, and institutional support to confront an evolving security threat. The protection of police personnel and other security officials must also receive urgent attention, particularly in areas where terrorist attacks have placed extraordinary pressure on law-enforcement institutions. Strengthening these institutions is not simply an administrative task; it is a prerequisite for restoring public confidence and ensuring that the state can exercise its authority effectively.
Developments reported during the first 48 hours of the transition have offered some encouraging indications of the direction in which the administration intends to move. These include the Governor’s announcement of measures to enhance police and CTD capacity, special packages and land plots for the families of martyrs, and an effort to bring the provincial government’s position on the war against terrorism into alignment with the state’s official stance. These initiatives must now translate into practical improvements. Announcements alone cannot defeat terrorism; sustained implementation, institutional coordination, and demonstrable results are what matter.
An equally important challenge is public perception. Counter-terrorism operations cannot achieve their full potential if political narratives undermine public confidence in state institutions or obscure the threat posed by terrorist organisations. The administration must therefore communicate clearly with citizens, explain its security policies, counter misinformation with verifiable facts, and demonstrate through its conduct that the fight against terrorism is intended to protect the public. Public trust cannot be imposed through official statements; it must be earned through consistent performance, accountability, and the protection of civilian lives.
The administrative culture inherited by the new setup also requires close examination. Over the past 13 years, successive PTI-led administrations have exercised considerable influence over provincial governance. Concerns have repeatedly been raised about politicisation, corruption, administrative inefficiency, and the use of public institutions to advance partisan interests. Where officials have been found to have prioritised political loyalty over professional responsibilities, corrective action is necessary. However, personnel changes must be based on competence, integrity, and documented performance rather than political affiliation. Replacing one form of political patronage with another would defeat the very purpose of administrative reform.
“The ultimate measure of this transition will not be whether PTI or its political opponents emerge victorious in the debate. It will be whether the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa become safer, whether terrorism is effectively countered, and whether the state delivers the governance and public services that citizens have every right to expect”
The new administration must also address longstanding development concerns, particularly in the merged districts. The selection of members for the proposed Area Representative and Development Council is reportedly progressing and is expected to be completed within the next two to three days. Operating under the administrative framework of the Area Development Secretariat and the designated administrator, with the patronage of the Prime Minister, the council is expected to facilitate development decisions and expedite the delivery of relief to local communities. Its effectiveness will depend on clear responsibilities, transparent allocation of funds, meaningful local representation, and a mechanism for monitoring implementation.
The people of the merged districts have endured years of insecurity, disruption, and uneven development. Their needs cannot be addressed through announcements or temporary relief measures alone. Roads, schools, healthcare facilities, employment opportunities, and functioning local institutions are essential to rebuilding confidence in the state. Development must proceed alongside security measures so that communities affected by terrorism are not left vulnerable to renewed instability.
Ultimately, the administrative transition in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should not be judged exclusively through the political arguments advanced by its supporters or opponents. Its real test lies in whether it can reduce the terrorist threat, improve policing, strengthen accountability, eliminate administrative inefficiency, and deliver visible benefits to ordinary citizens. If the new setup is to justify the extraordinary nature of the change, it must demonstrate that governance can be separated from partisan considerations and directed towards the public interest.
There is no room for complacency. Pakistan is confronting a persistent security challenge, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remains central to that struggle. The province needs an administration that treats counter-terrorism as an immediate responsibility, public service as its principal obligation, and transparency as a non-negotiable standard. The federal authorities must ensure rigorous oversight, while the technocratic administration must accept responsibility for its performance.
The ultimate measure of this transition will not be whether PTI or its political opponents emerge victorious in the debate. It will be whether the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa become safer, whether terrorism is effectively countered, and whether the state delivers the governance and public services that citizens have every right to expect.
Note: Prof Dr. Akhtar Hussain Sandhu had been teaching at various universities and colleges. Writer lives in Chicago (United States) and can be reached at 
