Editorial
The prime minister Shehbaz Sharif this week said that FBR system is eating billions of rupees per day and this siphoning continues. He shared information that is already known to almost everybody since decades who reads newspapers or watch televisions. Being the prime minister, he knows loopholes of the system, and he is person who should fix this pilferage of public money.
Addressing governance reforms, the prime minister said corruption within the FBR eating public money that should be deposited into the national treasury instead end up in private pockets, resulting revenue losses that weakens the economy, increase financial pressures and force Pakistan to borrow more to repay existing debts. PM Shehbaz said that only a transparent governance system can resolve the country’s long-standing economic challenges.
After this statement, Interior Minister who had been an international journalist—Mohsin Naqvi explained the situation further saying that governance system has collapsed since long. This is again not a news, but it is newsworthy because sitting Federal Minister is saying this. When the PMLN government took over federal government under the umbrella of PDM allied government and Shehbaz Sharif became Prime Minister, he raised the issue of structural changes and administrative changes in governance system and his meeting with federal secretaries during PDM government reminded that civil bureaucracy is not working. Since then, thousands of new civil bureaucrats had been hired through CSS examination system and through other channels.
Many cosmetic surgeries had been done so far to get the results without touching bureaucratic structure and without amending Establishment Code (known as Esta Code). There are reasons to believe that the government wishes to get the results without fixing the structural faults and without touching powerful bureaucracy rather government always places bureaucrats to find the causes of failure of bureaucratic structure (governance) and for reconstitution of the known failed system. Will bureaucrats find causes of their own failures, and will they advise (recommendations) the government how to fix bureaucracy? Fixing problems of governance that is run by civil administration needs review of powers and rules that are basic cause of structural failure in system where bureaucracy is strongly protected by the Esta Code. Will bureaucrats recommend reviewing and change the Esta code or low down it in favor of the state instead of in favor of bureaucracy?
“Without undertaking a comprehensive restructuring or complete overhaul of the civil administration system, the formation of new provinces will serve little purpose. It is essential to recognize that the core problem lies not in the size of existing provinces alone, but in the inefficiency, corruption, and outdated structures of governance that continue to hamper effective administration“
Addressing the Pakistan Economic Summit 2026 in Islamabad, Naqvi categorically said that Pakistan’s current governance model had effectively “collapsed” after decades of failing to deliver, adding that decentralisation was essential to improve public services, ensure timely justice and create opportunities for a new generation of leaders. While referring the decentralization, Naqvi, might be indicating to introduce new administrative federating units (provinces) and transferring more powers to basic democratic units such as city governments although the most populace province–Punjab had not conducted local bodies elections that are long awaited.
Naqvi signaled that the aspirations of young people (Gen-Z) could not be addressed through token financial assistance, saying they were demanding merit-based employment, justice and equal opportunities rather than stipends or gadgets. He warned while referring to a term that has recently been used for Gen-Z in the wake of student protests in India, that if these “cockroaches” united, “they can turn everything upside down”.
“Whether you agree or not, the system we have been living under has collapsed.”, said Naqvi.
Naqvi also talked about reviewing federating units and formation of new units that Pakistan desperately needs and this subject has been in discussion since long and this debate has once again taken center stage, generating a wide range of viewpoints and narratives. Politicians including PM Shehbaz Sharif (PMLN), Fazlur Rahman (JUI-F), Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (PPP), former prime minister Imran Khan (PTI) and even MQM are on record demanding and supporting the idea of new provinces and in their public talks they accepted that new provinces are essential. However, in practice provincial assemblies are shy to allow formation of new provinces. According to Article 239(4), of 1973 Constitution, a constitutional amendment for establishing a new province must first be introduced in the provincial assembly of the province that is proposed to be divided. The resolution must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the provincial assembly. If the provincial assembly rejects the proposal, the process ends at that stage. After approval by the provincial assembly, the amendment bill be passed by both houses of Parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate, with a two-thirds majority in each chamber. Once approved by the provincial assembly, National Assembly and Senate, the bill is sent to the President for final approval. After the President signs it, the amendment becomes law and a new province can officially be established. Article 239(4), of 1973 Constitution is a lethal weapon in the hands of provinces that bars the federation to take decision for forming new provinces as per demand of the today’s realities because the available data goes in favor of formation of new provinces.
The four-province structure of Pakistan was good enough when the country’s population was around 60 million. Today, the population has grown to more than 240 million—a fourfold increase—yet the number of provinces remains the same. This imbalance has placed an enormous strain on governance, education, healthcare, and development, creating a widening gap between the needs of the people and the capacity of the state to deliver. If we compare provincial populations, the change becomes even more striking:
Punjab: 1972 census: about 32 million–2023 census: about 128 million
Punjab’s current population exceeds that of many European countries combined, yet it is still governed as a single province. The sheer size and diversity of its population make effective governance extremely challenging.
Sindh: 1972: about 10.5 million—2023: about 50.5 million
Sindh’s population has increased fivefold, but no additional administrative unit has been created to handle this growth. Karachi, a megacity with over 20 million people, continues to face severe urban management problems—ranging from water shortages and traffic congestion to crumbling infrastructure—because the provincial system is overstretched.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK): 1972: about 10.1 million—2023: about 40.1 million
The population has quadrupled, but healthcare and education services remain grossly inadequate. The limited provincial capacity has left many districts underserved, widening inequalities between urban centers and remote areas.
Balochistan: 1972: about 2.3 million—2023: about 10.4 million
Although Balochistan has the smallest population, its vast geographical area makes governance extremely difficult. Providing basic facilities such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure across such a large and sparsely populated province has proved nearly impossible under the existing administrative framework.
Countries such as India, Nigeria, and China have created new administrative units in response to rising populations and regional demands. Pakistan, however, has remained static, failing to adapt to demographic pressures.
Provincial governments are increasingly unable to provide basic amenities. Local populations feel deprived, and grievances over unequal distribution of resources are fueling social and political tensions. Governance, instead of becoming more effective, is becoming more strained with each passing year. If four provinces were sufficient for 60 million people in 1970, then with today’s population of 240 million, Pakistan realistically needs 12 to 14 provinces to ensure balanced governance, equitable development, and national integration.
Some discussions suggest revisiting Pakistan’s administrative structure as it existed at independence in August 1947, when the country was divided into West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). At that time, Pakistan inherited a mix of provinces and princely states.
The administrative units of Pakistan in 1947 included Punjab Province, Sindh Province, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Baluchistan Chief Commissioner’s Province, Karachi Federal Capital Territory (separated from Sindh and made the capital), Bahawalpur State, Khairpur State, Kalat State (in Balochistan), Las Bela State, and Makran State. However, it is often overlooked that NWFP was created as a separate administrative unit in 1901. Prior to that, it was part of Punjab under British rule until Lord Curzon carved it out on November 9, 1901, in an effort to suppress ongoing resistance movements. Hazara, being the largest Hindko-speaking area, was included in NWFP and has remained part of it. To further consolidate its position against possible uprisings, the British Raj played a decisive role in the establishment of the first modern state structure in Afghanistan. This move was part of its broader strategy of creating a buffer zone against regional instability and Russian influence. Simultaneously, the Raj sought to psychologically and economically connect the newly created North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) with Afghanistan, thereby ensuring that both regions remained interlinked in terms of trade, tribal affiliations, and shared administrative interests. This policy not only reinforced British control over the frontier but also limited the potential for unified resistance movements to emerge along the sensitive borderlands. After the 18th Amendment, NWFP was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).
Hazara Division is the second-largest division of KP, but the province’s name was defined solely by Pashtun identity—Khyber representing the Pashtun belt and Pakhtunkhwa meaning “land of the Pashtuns.” For decades, Hazara Division has demanded recognition as a separate province. This demonstrates that restoring the 1947 administrative model is neither viable nor practical today.
After independence, India created several new provinces (unions) to accommodate identity-based demands, while Pakistan avoided this path. Pakistan’s political elites and entrenched bureaucracy resisted power-sharing, adhering instead to the formula: “the more the land, the more the resources, the more the power.” India, with its diverse socio-economic, political, and cultural landscape, evolved into what scholars call a quasi-federal state, blending unitary and federal features. This flexible model allowed India to manage separatist tendencies by accommodating regional aspirations. Pakistan, on the other hand, adopted a fragile federal model under the Government of India Act of 1935, introducing federal, provincial, and concurrent legislative lists.
Even after the 18th Amendment, which devolved significant powers to the provinces, Pakistan’s federalism remains weak. Provinces enjoy the lion’s share of resources through the National Finance Commission (NFC) but avoid the responsibility of debt repayment, even when federal loans are used for projects within provinces. Provincial administrations also concentrate development resources in elite constituencies and urban centers, deepening socio-economic disparities while marginalizing remote regions.
Advocates of new provinces argue that they would improve governance, but critics highlight that Pakistan’s civil administration has collapsed. Without overhauling this system, new provinces would merely add an extra burden to the national exchequer. With a rapidly growing population and increasingly complex governance needs, the current administrative framework is inadequate.
Opponents, especially from KP and Sindh, warn that dividing provinces could deepen ethnic fault lines and cause instability. Independent thinkers, however, argue that recognizing distinct identities—such as Hindko speakers in Hazara, Potohari and Saraiki speakers in Punjab, or Urdu speakers in Sindh—would reduce political blackmailing and strengthen integration. Pakistan’s tragic 1971 disintegration remains a reminder of the dangers of ignoring ethnic and linguistic diversity. Today, voices demanding new provinces echo nationwide, making this a critical issue for governance and national security.
When considering new provinces, the state must decide whether it seeks a centralized structure, decentralization, or a hybrid model. Decentralization, through reorganizing sub-provincial identities, could integrate marginalized groups into the mainstream. Centralization, however, risks deepening alienation and fueling separatism.
Decentralization would also be more cost-effective if achieved by empowering local governments. Yet, provincial elites and bureaucracies have historically resisted strong local governance. Resistance would likely intensify if decentralization diminished the authority of commissioners and deputy commissioners. The PML-N, long seen as favoring bureaucratic dominance, is unlikely to support reforms that weaken civil service control. PPP’s 2012 proposal for a Saraiki province, PTI’s campaign for South Punjab, and PML-N and MQM’s promises for Hazara and an urban Sindh province all faded once these parties assumed power, reflecting how demands for provinces are often exploited for electoral gains rather than pursued as serious reforms.
Creating additional provinces is not merely a political slogan, but a national necessity for effective governance that requires smaller, more manageable administrative units that can address issues of health, education, infrastructure, and development at the local level. The demand for new provinces in Pakistan is neither new nor baseless. It arises from genuine grievances—economic disparities, political exclusion, and administrative failures.
The path forward lies in restructuring the civil administration, strengthening local governments, and ensuring equitable distribution of resources. True federalism—based on autonomy, representation, and justice for all regions—is key to Pakistan’s stability. Without such reforms, ethnic and territorial biases will continue to threaten the country’s unity.
The foremost point that must not be overlooked while making such an important decision is the need to move beyond the fallacy that merely creating new provinces will automatically resolve Pakistan’s administrative challenges. Without undertaking a comprehensive restructuring or complete overhaul of the civil administration system, the formation of new provinces will serve little purpose. It is essential to recognize that the core problem lies not in the size of existing provinces alone, but in the inefficiency, corruption, and outdated structures of governance that continue to hamper effective administration. While this may appear to be a daunting and politically sensitive task for the federal government, it remains the foremost requirement if Pakistan truly wishes to move forward. Otherwise, the creation of new provinces, without reform, would do nothing more than impose an additional financial burden on an already fragile and crumbling economy, leading to further complications instead of offering solutions.
On ground, it looks that that although government believes that governance is not delivering, but at the same time providing special grants for executers and handlers of governance— the bureaucrats instead of questioning them for their administrative failures. Recently, federal cabinet has approved another special allowance for top bureaucracy – the second in four years – and sanctioned Rs1.8 billion budget in the middle of a further extension in austerity measures and a 7% raise for all government employees. The decision was taken during the special cabinet meeting that approved the budget on June 12, but the cabinet division released the details as late as July 17. In the same meeting, the Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif-led cabinet approved only a 7% increase in salaries for all government employees, including these possibly couple of hundred bureaucrats who will enjoy two special allowances, and also extended the austerity measures to the current fiscal year 2026-27.
This is no secret that security forces in Pakistan that are fighting 24/7 against terrorists but they do not have proper gadgets and resources due to poor economic health of the country while at the same time civil bureaucracy is enjoying rise in salaries and perks. The name of the new allowance is “All Pakistan Services (APS) Provincial Governments’ Cadre Posts’ Parity Allowance”. It is the second special allowance that PMLN government approved after it gave a 150% executive allowance to the bureaucrats in June 2022. The cabinet also approved a Rs1.8 billion allocations to pay the allowance with effect from July 1 – a sum that suggests the allowance would be at least equal to 100% of the basic pay.
The majority of politicians, retired bureaucrats, academia, administration experts express in their articles, statements, interviews that existing CSS/generalist model of governance is outdated and unsuitable for modern governance and bureaucratic inefficiency and inconsistent administration are serious ills Pakistan is patient of but nobody dare to change the system and no structural reforms are at sight.
Several reports (some of international lenders such as World Bank/Asian Development Bank) indicates that Pakistan’s security and governance challenges are aggravated by administrative failure (Governance) but there is unwillingness among government to reform the administrative units.
On the other hand, public particularly Gen-Z is asking questions such as:
If policing fails to control crime, what is the purpose of police?
If government hospitals cannot provide adequate care, why are they funded?
If public schools fail to deliver quality education, why do they exist?
If government employees undermine their own institutions, why should taxpayers finance them?
Mohsin Naqvi has indicated a serious issue that Gen-Z is not ready to accept shallow slogans, but this generation wants results while governance system has repeatedly struggled and failed to cater prevailing demands of the era. There are reasons to believe that whatever Pakistan is earning diplomatically and through winning the war against India in May 2025, the entire dividend is going to drain through bad governance but the civil governments are shy to do overhauling of the system and afraid of touching working of bureaucracy that is the only and core tool of governance.
